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dentists are uncomfortable treating patients with HIV and many patients with
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conclusions and considers potential regulatory responses to influence dentists'
behavior, including federal disability discrimination law, professional ethics,
the tort and professional licensure systems, health care financing regulations,
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laws, such as Richard Epstein, who view such laws as both wrong and
ineffectual. Professor Burris argues that Epstein's theories of the market and
discrimination are based on ideological premises and factual assumptions that
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Introduction
This Article is about the denial of dental care to people with HIV, a
common, damaging, and preventable form of mistreatment. This is also an
article about the specificity of discrimination. In the midst of a debate about
whether antidiscrimination law "works," I test the proposition that
discrimination is far too variegated a phenomenon to be discussed or remedied
purely on a grand scale. Rather, I suggest that oftentimes we may most
profitably grapple with disaggregated forms of discrimination in their particular
social, historical, and economic context as illuminated by specifically relevant
empirical data. This Article, therefore, is an exercise in close attention to a
single contemporary problem in discrimination law. The analytic method,
however, is fully generalizable to other issues of legal policy, and so, finally,
this is an article illustrating the importance of integrating empirical data and
socio-legal analysis, not only in defining the problems to be addressed, but also
in assessing how the law may best be deployed.
For both medical and psychological reasons, access to dental care is
particularly important to people with HIV disease.' Since the mid-1980s, there
have been anecdotal reports of discrimination by dentists and a small number
of lawsuits under state law. More recently, the United States Department of
Justice (DOJ) has successfully enforced Title III of the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA) in several dental discrimination cases. 2 The actual
frequency of discrimination, and its roots, have been the subject of unusually
extensive empirical research, which has provided considerable data about the
1. Michael Glick, Preface, in DENTAL MANAGEMENT OF PATIENTS WITH HIV 9, 9-10
(Michael Glick ed., 1994) (quoting anonymous patient); Regular Dental Care Can Have
Psychological and Physical Benefits, AIDS ALERT, Nov. 1993, at S1.
2. See, e.g., United States v. Morvant, 898 F. Supp. 1157 (E.D. La. 1995); seealso AIDS
Litig. Rep. (Andrews) 12,602 (Oct. 11, 1994) (reproducing settlement agreement); United States
Dep't of Justice, Press Release, Houston Dental Claim pays $100,000 to Settle HIVDiscrimination
Suit (Sept. 22, 1994) (reporting settlement in suit against Castle Dental Center) (on file with
author); United States Dep't of Justice, Public Access Section, Settlement Agreement Under the
Americans with Disabilities Act by the United States of America, Henry R. David, D.D.S.,
Richard A. Schulman, D.M.D., and Arnold Weinstein, D.M.D., Complaint DJ-202-14-14 (Jan.
11, 1995) [hereinafter Settlement Agreement] (on file with author).
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extent and the nature of the problem.
This Article begins with a brief description of the dental care needs of
people with HIV and the service delivery patterns that have arisen to satisfy
them. There is no doubt that any licensed dentist can safely and competently
provide dental care to people with HIV. It follows that segregated clinics for
the HIV positive, which are the major supplier of care to people with HIV in
many areas, are not medically necessary for primary care. Clinics and
practices dedicated to the dental care of patients with infectious diseases do,
however, constitute an important part of a comprehensive system of service
delivery and dental training.
Section II opens with a review of the extensive literature on dentists'
attitudes and behavior, and on patients' experiences. The Article then reports
the results of two new studies. The first surveys the dental care experiences
of 272 HIV-infected people. Nearly one of five respondents reported a
probably or possibly discriminatory refusal to treat, indicating that
discrimination remains widespread in the second decade of the epidemic.
Refusal was not significantly correlated with patient demographics or health.
Instead it depended primarily on the dentist's awareness of the patient's HIV
status. Most respondents felt morally obliged to inform dentists of their HIV
infection and, rather surprisingly, almost a third believed that dentists had a
right to refuse to treat people with HIV. The study also found that, despite the
inconvenience and the stigma of segregation, patients attending an HIV-only
clinic at an urban dental school were more satisfied with their care than
patients of private dentists. The second study concerns the perceptions of
discrimination and referral practices of Pennsylvania AIDS service
organizations that assist clients in obtaining dental care. The results show a
heavy reliance on hospital- and university-based clinics for HIV dental care.
This reliance is due in part to discrimination and in part to indigent patients'
lack of dental insurance.
Taken collectively, these data establish that many dentists are
uncomfortable treating patients with HIV, and that many patients with HIV
experience discrimination. The research indicates that dentists' unwillingness
to treat flows from a combination of three concerns: fear of infection; fear of
the negative reaction of other patients and employees; and uncertainty about
their own competency to treat HIV-related oral conditions. The data also
establish several other useful facts about HIV-related discrimination.
Discrimination is not based on perceived homosexuality or drug use. Dentists
are not using these or other traits as surrogate markers to weed out
systematically HIV-positive patients. Discrimination seems to occur when the
patient voluntarily reveals his or her HIV status, or, less frequently, when the
dentist can diagnose HIV from oral or other symptoms. Thus, the problem of
dental discrimination is unusual in its dependence on the voluntary revelation
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of a hidden trait.
The dental literature offers several prescriptions for reducing
discrimination. Training in HIV and infection control has been recommended
for dentists and allied health workers such as hygienists. To a considerable
extent, primary dental education has incorporated this training, though it has
not been widely adopted as a mandatory requirement for practicing
professionals. Studies have consistently found, however, that information alone
will not eliminate discrimination rooted in psychological, social, or economic
concerns. Recent work has emphasized the importance of both peer norms and
actual experience in treating patients with HIV.
The dental literature is largely silent about legal issues. One could infer
from dentists' candor regarding discrimination that law has not affected their
behavior. Yet, gradual increases in professed willingness to treat could reflect
the emergence of stronger legal rules, particularly the ADA. Unfortunately,
we lack data regarding dentists' awareness of law and their opinions regarding
the legitimacy of antidiscrimination rules.
With the nature and dimensions of the discrimination problem
established, Section III addresses the principal question of legal policy: How,
if at all, should government authority be used to eliminate or reduce
discriminatory behavior? Powerful voices within and without the academy have
recently mounted a sustained challenge to antidiscrimination law. This attack,
exemplified by the work of Richard Epstein, holds that using law to eliminate
discrimination is immoral and, worse, ineffective. I avoid an extensive survey
of the abstract zones of this debate and, instead, use the particularly well-
studied phenomenon of dental discrimination against the HIV-positive to test
some of the competing hypotheses on solid ground.
This portion of the Article begins with an overview of the various
regulatory systems that might be used to influence dentists' behavior. These
include, in addition to federal disability discrimination law, professional ethics,
the tort and professional licensure system, health care financing regulations,
and the public health law authorizing behavioral change campaigns by health
authorities. In each area, I discuss both the substantive rules and what we
know about their application; on the basis of this review, I compile a set of
measures that might, in theory, constitute a program to change dentists'
behavior. Not surprisingly, I discover no panacea.
Having identified a large number of potential measures, I address the
criticisms of antidiscrimination law in their largest form, as a critique of any
intervention to change discriminatory behavior. Taking Epstein as the
spokesman for the movement, I briefly illustrate the limited force of his
principled arguments against regulation. If one does not accept his libertarian
first principles, one need not accept his libertarian deductions about the
immorality of state action to change discriminatory behavior. That much is
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easy, indeed self-evident.
Epstein's utilitarian arguments against intervention require more
discussion, and can be discussed well in this relatively fact-laden context. The
first of these concerns whether or not the market will, if left alone, fix the
problem, a claim underpinning the moral side of his libertarianism as well. I
demonstrate that his assumption is wrong, and that in fact his theories of the
market and discrimination suffer the flaw of their generality. Discrimination
is not a uniform, diffuse or acontextual phenomenon, but rather a diverse and
particular one. If a particular brand of discrimination, such as dental
discrimination against the HIV-positive, can be shown to be more or less
impervious to market correction, it may suggest that other forms of racial or
gender discrimination, properly disaggregated and specified, may be equally
SO.
3
Even if one believes that legal intervention is moral and necessary, one
may share with its critics the conviction that it is neither easy nor automatically
successful. The salutary aspect of the challenge to antidiscrimination law is
its demand for something more than good intentions from proponents. In the
final section of the Article, I argue that seeing discrimination as a specific
behavior not only undermines claims about the general futility of
antidiscrimination law, but also offers insights into how to use the law to
change such behavior. I look at socio-legal research on compliance with law,
the lessons of successful public health behavior change programs, and the
dental studies to analyze the various regulatory options and construct a package
of measures which stand a good chance of reducing discrimination at a low
cost. The approach I propose rests on stronger, less ambiguous words and
actions by authorities constituted by dentists themselves to establish the norms
of treatment, changes in primary and continuing dental education, and broader
efforts to educate dentists and their patients about HIV and infection control.
The role of law in this approach, while important, is secondary and supportive
3. The model for empirical study of discrimination in particular markets is Ian Ayres, Fair
Driving: Gender and Race Discrimination in Retail Car Negotiations, 104 HARV. L. REV. 817
(1991).
The economic literature examining the effects of antidiscrimination law in broad terms of
Black socio-economic improvement has tended to find uneven gains, over time, by region, and
by occupational category. This supports the view that one must be particular in any serious
discussion of whether or how antidiscrimination law "works." See infra note 307 and
accompanying text. Kimberle Crenshaw makes the related point that varying constellations of
different disfavored characteristics produce discrimination too complex to be analyzed simply in
rigid terms of race or gender. Kimberle Crenshaw, A Black Feminist Critique ofAntidiscrimination
Law and Politics, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 195, 199-201 (David
Kairys ed., 2d ed. 1990).
More generally, I share Ayres and Braithwaite's view that simplistic dichotomies about
whether or how to regulate have few practical advantages apart from their simplicity. IAN AYRES





to action within the sphere of the profession, but it includes more legal action
against dentists who discriminate.
I. Dental Care for People with HIV
A. The Patient's Needs
Dental care is a serious medical need for people with HIV. Patients with
HIV infection tend to have a higher incidence of disease arising from missing
or filled teeth than non-HIV-infected individuals. In the course of their disease,
over 90% of people with HIV experience oral manifestations associated with
the disease, including such common opportunistic infections and cancers as
thrush, herpes simplex, oral hairy leukoplakia, and Kaposi's sarcoma. Large,
painful ulcers are also seen in patients with severe immune deficiency.4 These
oral manifestations are related to general medical health. Oral manifestations
are often early signs of immune deterioration and disease progression. 5
Moreover, some dental conditions can be so uncomfortable as to interfere with
proper eating and the taking of medication, both of which are plainly necessary
for continued health.6
Dentists, like other health care workers who care for people with HIV,
face a low but measurable risk of infection through being cut by an infected
needle or other sharp object.7 There is a lower, cautiously measurable risk
of infection due to exposure of mucosa or broken skin to blood infected with
HIV.' The risk of infection from exposure of intact skin is theoretical.9
Patient-to-patient infection also could occur if instruments are not sterilized
4. Michael Glick, Intraoral Manifestations Associated with HIV Disease, in DENTAL
MANAGEMENT OF PATIENTS wrrH HIV 153, 154-57 (Michael Glick ed., 1994) [hereinafter
DENTAL MANAGEMENT]; Barbara Gerbert et al., AIDS and Dental Practice, 48 J. PUB. HEALTH
DENTISTRY 68, 68-69 (1988).
5. Michael Glick et al., Oral Manifestations Associated with HIV-Related Disease as
Markers for Immune Suppression and AIDS, 77 ORAL SURGERY ORAL MED. ORAL PATHOLOGY
344, 348 (1994).
6. Glick, supra note 4, at 174.
7. David K. Henderson & Susan Beekman, Management of Occupational Exposures to
Blood-borne Pathogens, in DENTAL MANAGEMENT, supra note 4, at 275, 277 (estimating risk
of approximately 0.3% per exposure).
8. As Henderson and Beekman report:
The risk . . . is below the level of detection in clinical studies performed to date.
Combining the data from 15 longitudinal studies attempting to measure the risk of
occupational infection following a mucous membrane exposure, the 95 % confidence interval
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or disposed of properly." Public health officials have treated these risks as
acceptable and have recommended against special precautions for treating
people with HIV. Instead, long-standing guidelines have established a system
of universal precautions applicable to all patients regardless of HIV status."
Widely adopted by dentists, these precautions have dramatically reduced
occupational exposures to patient blood.' 2
Nor does the course of treatment or the risks of complication differ
substantially between HIV-infected and non-infected patients.' 3 As with any
patient, the HIV-positive person's prognosis and present health should be
considered in developing a treatment plan. As a general matter, both the
assessment and the treatment of patients with HIV are well within the zone of
general competence of any licensed dentist.'4
Apart from medical need, going to the dentist is part of the normal
routine of life for many people with HIV. Dental care has cosmetic benefits,
and the patient may simply "want to feel like everybody else."'" Being
refused care, or the fear of it, can be corrosive to well-being. An HIV-positive
attorney recently wrote:
As I began accepting myself as HIV-positive, medical care emerged
as a preeminent concern. My usual doctor and my dentist treat
many AIDS patients, so my concern was not about my immediate
care. But the future, and the fear of serious illness raised many
questions. If I need emergency care, will the paramedics treat me
if they are aware of my HIV status? When I am travelling, which
is quite often, will I be able to find a doctor, dentist or other health
care professional to treat me, if necessary, wherever I go? ... If
I decide not to tell a doctor in order to receive treatment, will I be
10. See Harold W. Jaffe et al., Lack of HIV Transmission in the Practice of a Dentist with
AIDS, 121 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 855, 858 (1994). One incident of cross-infection has been
reported, in an Australian surgical practice. K. Chant et al., Patient to Patient Transmission of
HIV in Private Surgical Consulting Rooms, 342 LANCET 1548 (1993).
11. See, e.g., Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, RecommendedInfection-Control
Practices for Dentistry, 42 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP., May 28, 1993, at 1; 29
C.F.R. § 1910.1030 (1995) (setting forth precautions to prevent spread of disease through
bloodborne pathogens). See generally Milton E. Schaefer, Infection Control, in DENTAL
MANAGEMENT, supra note 4, at 257.
12. Henderson & Beekman, supra note 7, at 282-83.
13. Michael Glick, Modifications of Dental Care, in DENTAL MANAGEMENT, supra note
4, at 247, 247-48 ("Studies have indicated that the overall complication rate secondary to dental
procedures, even with severely immuno-compromised individuals ... is the same or even lower
than that among patients without HIV." (citing Michael Glick et al., Dental Complications After
Dental Treatment of Patients with AIDS, 125 J. AM. DENTAL ASs'N 296 (1994))).
14. See American Dental Association Council on Ethics, American Dental Association
Principles of Ethics and Code of Professional Conduct, 117 J. AM. DENTAL ASS'N 657 (1988).
15. Glick, supra note 4, at 10 (quoting anonymous patient).
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compromising my health because he or she may be missing a vital
piece of information which could change my course of treatment?
Do I even have to tell them my HIV status? 6
B. The Role of Dedicated Practices
The dedicated clinic plays a pivotal and problematic role in both fostering
and preventing discrimination. Although the American Dental Association does
not recognize a specialty in HIV care, 7 most major cities have a clinic or
practice, often affiliated with a major medical center, that has as its primary
or sole mission the provision of care to people with HIV. These dedicated
practices, staffed by practitioners knowledgeable in the care of seriously
immunocompromised patients with severe HIV-related dental symptoms, serve
three indispensable functions.'" First, they are a source of clinical advice for
dentists in the community. The availability of a specialist for clinical
consultation and moral support may encourage more dentists to treat patients
with HIV and reduce unnecessary referrals.' 9 The dedicated HIV practice also
plays a crucial role in dental education at all levels. An HIV practice affords
dental students the opportunity for clinical rotations in HIV care, an experience
which can substantially reduce resistance to providing such care later.2' On
the same theory, the HIV practice can offer mini-residencies to practicing
dentists in connection with continuing education programs. Advanced academic
training in HIV care would be impossible without the clinical opportunities a
specialized practice presents. Finally, the specialized practice can serve as a
tertiary care center. While the vast majority of patients with HIV can be
treated within existing dental practice patterns, specialists are required to treat
patients with severe immunosuppression or difficult oral lesions.
Dedicated clinics and practices also have a negative impact. For a variety
of reasons, clinics treat many patients who do not need specialized care. The
16. Mauro A. Montoya, Jr., ff Tell You, Will You Treat Me?, 27 J. MARSHALL L. REV.
363, 363 (1994).
17. The Association recognizes eight specialties: orthodontics, periodontics, prosthodontics,
dental public health, endodontics, oral pathology, oral and maxillofacial surgery, and pediatric
dentistry. United States v. Morvant, 898 F. Supp. 1157, 1163 (E.D. La. 1995) (citing Plaintiff's
Exhibit 60).
18. See Michael Glick, Should There Be Dedicated Dental Clinics for HIV-Infected
Patients? Argument in Favor, in ORAL MANIFESTATIONS OF HIV-INFECTION 337, 337 (F.
Greenspan & D. Greenspan eds., 1995).
19. See Barbara Gerbert et al., Changing Dentists' Knowledge, Attitudes, and Behaviors
Relating to AIDS: A Controlled Educational Intervention, 116 J. AM. DENTAL ASS'N 851, 852
(1988).
20. See Eric S. Solomon et al., Issues in the Dental Care Management of Patients with
Bloodborne Infectious Diseases:An Opinion Survey ofDental School Seniors, 55 J. DENTAL EDUC.
594 (1991).
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very existence of specialized clinics may reinforce the reported belief of some
dentists that patients with HIV should not be treated in private offices.2'
Specialist practices known to accept patients with HIV may become the main
referral site of social service and case management providers, and attract
patients who have encountered difficulties in getting care. Specialized clinics
within dental schools may detract from dental education if, for example, all
patients with HIV are directed to the clinic and a rotation in the clinic is
elective.
As a legal matter, a dedicated clinic within a larger organization such as
a dental school or a public health care system may be vulnerable to suit under
federal law. The provision of services for the disabled in an integrated setting
"is a fundamental tenet of nondiscrimination on the basis of disability."'
With some specific exceptions, it is illegal under federal law to require people
with HIV or other disabilities to accept segregated services.' The routine
assignment of HIV-positive patients to a specialized clinic, without regard to
the patient's wishes or dental needs, would be difficult to defend at law.24
II. The Empirical Data
A. The Phenomenon of Discrimination: What Does a Review of the
Empirical Literature Tell Us?
Anecdotes of discrimination by dentists against patients with HIV
apparently had circulated widely through the legal and dental professions by
the mid-1980s, sparking numerous studies.' For researchers, the principal
questions were the extent to which discrimination was actually occurring, and
21. Drew Morvant, the defendant in the first ADA dental case to result in a formal
judgment against a dentist, himself made this claim, according to a newspaper report. "Dental
schools, LSU's among them, offer special procedure clinics for HIV-positive patients, Morvant
said. He said it was absurd for the government to argue he should treat AIDS patients just like
any other when doctors are being trained to treat them differently." James Varney, Dentist to
Appeal HIV -Patient Rule, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Mar. 26, 1995, at B1.
22. 28 C.F.R. § 36.203 (1995) (ADA Title mI Regulations, Interpretive Guidance).
23. See 42 U.S.C. § 12,182(b)(1)(A)(iii) (1988 & Supp. V 1993); 28 C.F.R. § 36.202(c)
(1995).
24. Practical considerations substantially limit the potential liability of a dedicated clinic,
or at least of a system of mandatory referral to such a clinic. Patients who have had difficulty
getting care elsewhere, and who believe they are getting good care in the clinic, are not likely
plaintiffs. Nor are civil rights organizations likely to want to test the ADA's application to
segregated facilities in a case against an institution that provides most of the care in a community.
The question of principle, however, remains an irritant for practitioners (and institutional lawyers).
25. Two studies, for example, pointed to a 1987 statement by the director of the Chicago
Dental Society that only three dentists in the area were willing to treat patients with HIV. Jay A.
Jacobson et al., Dental Care Experience of HlV-Infected Men in Chicago, 119 J. AM. DENTAL
ASS'N 605, 605 (1989); Herbert M. Hazelkorn, The Reaction of Dentists to Members of Groups
at Risk of AIDS, 119 J. AM. DENTAL ASS'N 610, 611 (1989).
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what its causes were. Studies investigated dentists' attitudes, dentists' behavior,
and the experiences of patients with HIV.
1. Studies of Dentists' Attitudes
The research has primarily taken the form of attitudinal studies of dentists
and other dental professionals.26 Studies have consistently found high rates
of negative attitudes towards treating patients with HIV. In surveys conducted
before 1987, Gerbert found that 75 % of responding dentists in California were
reluctant to treat people with HIV and would "prefer" to refer them to
others.27 A 1987 study of dentists in Chicago found that, while 19% had
treated a patient with HIV in the past year, 30% would refuse to treat a patient
suspected of having HIV, 53% would refuse to treat a patient with
symptomatic HIV or AIDS, and 80% would be unwilling to accept a referral
of a patient with AIDS.2"
Avowed unwillingness to treat has decreased over time. A large national
survey conducted in 1990 found that 60% of dentists were willing to treat
patients with HIV,29 as did a Texas survey published in 1993."0 A 1991
study of dental students found over three-quarters agreeing that dentists have
26. Dental offices generally feature three kinds of professional: the dentist, the hygienist,
and the assistant. All have some patient care responsibilities and face comparable risks of exposure
to blood via splashing or needle stick. Richard J. Hastreiter et al., Dental Health Care Workers'
Response to the HIV Epidemic, 5 AM. J. DENTISTRY 160, 163 (1992). While this discussion
concerns dentists, behavior change is required in all three professions to reduce discriminatory
behavior, and the distinct characteristics, roles and training of each must be addressed in training.
See Joen I. Haring & Laura J. Lind, Attitudes of Dental Hygiene Students Toward Individuals with
AIDS, 56 J. DENTAL EDUCATION 128 (1992). Legally, the tradition of making the employer
responsible, and the dentist's insurance, makes the dentist the object of most attention. The various
licensing and educational proposals considered in this article are generally applicable to all licensed
allied dental personnel.
27. Barbara Gerbert, AIDS and Infection Control in Dental Practice: Dentists'Attitudes,
Knowledge, and Behavior, 114 J. AM. DENTAL ASS'N 311, 312 (1987); see also Gerbert et al.,
supra note 4, at 853 (70% preferred to refer patients with or at risk of HIM).
28. Robert J. Moretti et al., Attitudes and Practices of Dentists Regarding HIV Patients
and Infection Control, 37 GEN. DENTISTRY 144, 145 (1989); see also Charles J. Curry et al.,
Willingness of Health-Professions Students to Treat Patients with AIDS, 65 ACAD. MED. 472, 474
(1990) (half of dental and medical students surveyed in 1988-89 would prefer not to treat a patient
with AIDS); C. Verrusio et al., The Dentist and Infectious Diseases: A National Survey of Attitudes
and Behavior, 118 J. AM. DENTAL Ass'N 553 (1989) (21% of dentists willing to treat in 1986,
31% in 1988).
29. Donald Sadowsky & Carol Kunzel, Are You Willing to Treat AIDS Patients?, 122 J.
AM. DENTAL ASS'N 29, 29 (1991). Grace and colleagues found a similar rate of willingness to
treat among general dentists in a survey conducted in Maryland in late 1988 and early 1989. They
found, however, that more oral surgeons (about 58%) were willing to treat patients with HIV,
but that fewer periodontists were (about 31%). Edward G. Grace & Leonard A. Cohen, Attitudes
of Maryland Dentists Toward AIDS and Hepatitis Patients, 6 AM. J. DENTISTRY at 32, 33 (1993).
30. K. Vendrell Rankin et al., Attitudes of Dental Practitioners and Dental Students
Towards AIDS Patients and Infection Control, 6 AM. J. DENTISTRY 20, 22 (1993).
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an obligation to treat patients with HIV or hepatitis B (HBV). Sixty-two
percent said they would be willing to treat HIV-positive or HBV patients in
their practices, though just over half (53%) said they would not treat patients
with either condition if they had the choice." Two studies based on data
gathered at least in part in 1993 found that almost 70% of dentists were willing
to treat HIV-positive patients.32
These developments tempted some researchers towards optimism. 3 3 A
closer look at the results suggests such optimism is misplaced. Questions about
willingness to treat have often included loopholes. The recent Bennett study,
for instance, limits its "willingness to treat" inquiry to "patients whose needs
are within the scope of [the dentist's] training," 34  a logical limit that
nevertheless begs the key question of whether or not routine care for people
without serious HIV-related oral complications is within the perceived scope
of the dentist's competence.
Many responses in these surveys reveal deep ambivalence or otherwise
cast answers about general willingness to treat in an ambiguous light. In a
Maryland study, only a third of general dentists agreed with the ADA ethical
opinion holding all dentists to a professional responsibility to treat patients with
HIV, 35 a view shared by 52% of respondents in Bennett's most recent
study.36 Studies consistently find large numbers of dentists opining that a
31. Solomon et al., supra note 20, at 594.
32. Donald Sadowsky & Carol Kunzel, Measuring Dentists' Willingness to Treat HIV-
Positive Patients, 125 J. AM. DENTAL Ass'N 705, 707 (1994), surveying New York area dentists,
found that 69% of respondents expressed a willingness to treat HIV positive patients. Building
on the experience of previous studies, the authors tested this general willingness with more
specific, context-laden questions. Seventy-five percent of respondents were willing to treat an
asymptomatic HIV-positive patient of record, but only 62% were willing to treat a patient of record
with AIDS. The same number would accept a new asymptomatic patient, but only 48% would
accept a new patient with AIDS. See also Carol Kunzel & Donald Sadowsky, Assessing HV-
Related Attitudes and Orientations of Male and Female General Dentists, 126 J. AM. DENTAL.
ASS'N 862 (1995) (assessing same data for gender-based differences). M. Elizabeth Bennett et al.,
Dentists'Attitudes Toward the Treatment of HIV-Positive Patients, 126 J. A. DENTAL ASS'N 509
(1995), surveying 1000 dentists from throughout the United States, reported 67% of dentists
agreeing with the statement "I will treat an IV-positive patient whose needs are within the scope
of my training, even if the option for a legitimate referral exists." Id. at 511. Moreover, 45%
reported treating at least one known HIV-positive person in the last year, and 85% reported
treating at least one "suspected" person with IV in the last year. Id.
33. "Indeed, when the question of treating HIV-positive patients is approached with a more
sympathetic understanding of the psyche of the practitioner, we find that the willingness of 60
percent of the nation's general dentists to treat these patients is commendable." Sadowsky &
Kunzel, supra note 29, at 32.
34. Bennett et al., supra note 32, at 511.
35. Grace & Cohen, supra note 29, at 33; cf Curry et al., supra note 28, at 473 (finding
that only about 20% of combined pool of medical and dental students agreed that a hospital should
be able to terminate a health care professional who refused to treat patients with HIV).
36. Bennett et al., supra note 32, at 510. Almost half of the respondents in this survey





private office is not the proper place to treat patients with HIV, a view that
has changed far less over time than general willingness to treat. A large
Minnesota survey conducted in 1989 found that only 21% of dentists believed
that a private office was "the best environment for treating patients with AIDS
or HIV infection,"' while only 48% of New York dentists surveyed in 1992-
93 thought that a private practice was an "acceptable" place to treat patients
with HIV. 3s
These attitudinal studies tell us very little about the actual frequency of
discriminatory behavior. Negative attitudes might be common, but it does not
follow that dentists with these attitudes will act on them.39 Indeed, studies of
dentist behavior and patient experience indicate that the correlation is rather
weak.' Self-reported treatment of at least one patient with HIV has tended
to lag considerably behind willingness to treat, though there is no data on the
availability of patients to a given respondent.4" For obvious reasons, dentists
are not asked if they discriminate. The studies have, however, been very
helpful in specifying the negative attitudes and their roots. Three major factors
associated with negative attitudes appeared as leading concerns in almost every
study, though not necessarily in this order: (1) fear of infection; (2) business-
based concerns about the effect of treating patients with HIV on other patients
and staff; and (3) concerns about their competence to treat patients with HIV
safely or effectively.42
To the extent that dentists' negative attitudes hinge on beliefs about the
transmissibility of HIV and the complexity of its treatment, the data seem to
37. Hastreiter et al., supra note 26, at 163.
38. Sadowsky & Kunzel, supra note 32, at 709; see also Kunzel & Sadowsky, supra note
32, at 864 tbl. 1 (reporting that women dentists were significantly more likely to disagree that
patients with HIV should be treated in private dental office).
39. M. Elizabeth Bennett et al., Predictors of Dental Students' Belief in the Right to Refuse
Treatment to HIV-Positive Patients, 57 J. DENTAL. EDUC. 673, 673 (1993).
40. See infra Sections II.A.1-2.
41. See, e.g., Bennett et al., supra note 32, at 511 (45% have treated one known HIV-
positive patient in last year, and 67% express willingness to treat); Moretti et al., supra note 28,
at 146 ("Nearly 20 percent of our respondents claim to have already treated an AIDS/ARC patient
within the past year; more than 60 percent of the respondents indicate they would be willing to
treat asymptomatic HIV patients . . ").
42. See, e.g., Grace & Cohen, supra note 29, at 34 ("The main reason for not wanting
to treat AIDS or HV-positive patients was the increased risk of infection. This was followed by
loss of patients and staff fears about increased infection risk."); Gerbert, supra note 19, at 312
(three-quarters of dentists believed that treating people with HIV put them at risk of infection,
and more than 80 percent believed that their staff and other patients would react negatively);
Hastreiter et al., supra note 26, at 165 (more than 50% of respondents "confided that they do not
have sufficient information to safely and effectively provide care to HIV-infected patients");
Moretti, supra note 28, at 145 tbl. 3 (among the dentists who had not treated patients with HV,
the most common reasons were fear for the safety of self or staff (59%), fear that other patients
might seek care elsewhere (48%), and ignorance about the proper treatment of HIV-positive
patients (23%)).
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indicate that knowledge and experience reduce them.43 Fear and a sense of
incompetence tended to be less among dentists who were younger, had
received more recent training on infection control, or who had actual
experience treating patients with HIV (as, for example, in the course of
training, when refusal was not an option).' Dental students with treatment
experience were significantly more likely to plan to treat HIV positive patients
in the future, and they were more confident in their competence to do so."
Gerbert found that dental health care workers (dentists, hygienists, and dental
assistants) who practiced more thorough infection control were also more
willing to treat people with AIDS or HIV.' Whatever the source,
misconceptions about the risk of HIV transmission are significantly associated
with negative attitudes about treating patients with HIV.47 The potential
importance of fear as a cause of non-treatment is emphasized in the most
recent study which reports that dentists "still have a tremendous fear of
contagion."4" Bennett and her colleagues found that 22% of respondents
would not send their children to a school with an HIV-positive child, and that
60% would not eat at a restaurant with an HIV-positive chef.49
Competency concerns were tied to evolving standards in infection control.
When HIV first became prevalent, dentists as a group were rather lax in
infection control, in spite of the chronic problems in the profession with
43. Gerbert et al., supra note 19, at 853. An exception was the study by Grace & Cohen,
which found that "[d]ifferences in reported willingness to treat AIDS patients were not related
to differential rates of continuing education on the subject of AIDS. For example, 61% of oral
surgeons (the group most willing to treat AIDS patients [58%]) and 65% of periodontists (the
group least willing to treat AIDS patients [31 %]) had taken courses on AIDS." Grace & Cohen,
supra note 29, at 33. They also found no correlation between willingness to treat patients with
infectious diseases and the amount of continuing education on infection control. Id. at 34.
44. See Rankin et al., supra note 30, at 25.
45. Solomon et al., supra note 20, at 596.
46. Gerbert, supra note 19, at 314; see also Moretti et al., supra note 28, at 145 tbl. 3
(27 % of the dentists who had not treated a patient with HIV stated that they did not have adequate
training in infection control whereas only 9% of dentists who had treated such patients so stated).
47. Hastreiter et al. found that 51% of dentists were unable to identify correctly the risk
of transmission via needle stick contaminated with HIV-positive blood is less than 1%, and that
those who could were significantly more likely to be willing to treat. Hastreiter et al., supra note
26, at 162, 164; see also Gerbert, supra note 19, at 70 (finding inverse relation between age and
knowledge, attitudes associated with unwillingness to treat, and use of infection control
procedures).
Despite their training, dentists and students are not necessarily better than lay people at
assessing the risks of HIV. Defining a "high" risk as 1 in 1000 or greater, one study found that
11% of dental students rated sharing a water glass a high risk, a third rated touching nonsterilized
instruments as high, half thought blood of infected patient on skin was high, and 78% thought
a bite from a patient with AIDS dementia was high. Solomon et al., supra note 20, at 596 fig.
3; see also Kunzel & Sadowsky, supra note 32, at 864 tbl. 1 (New York dentists continue to
overestimate the risks of transmission by needle stick and danger of HIV relative to HBV).




HBV.5° Many dentists surveyed in the early studies expressed concerns about
their ability to practice appropriate infection control or the efficacy of such
measures in preventing infection. First through Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention (CDC) and dental association guidelines, then through
mandatory Occupational, Safety, and Health Administration (OSHA) standards,
the use of barrier infection control methods with all patients became the
standard of care in dentistry.5 Infection control has been firmly implanted
in the dental school curriculum, so that all new professionals emerge from their
training able to work comfortably in the gloves, masks, and eye protection that
were daunting to dentists trained before the late-1980s.52 As a consequence,
dentists became less resistant to these methods of infection control, although
most dentists continue to bridle at the cost OSHA requirements impose.53
Business-based concerns have remained robust. The most recent survey
finds that 75% of dentists fear that a perceptible willingness to treat patients
with HIV would drive other patients from the practice. 4 Rankin's findings
hinted that dentists focus increasingly on economic concerns as they progress
in their careers from students to practitioners. Only 35% of practitioners, in
contrast to half of the students, were concerned with contracting HIV. On the
other hand, a quarter of dentists were concerned about patients leaving the
practice, versus only 18% of students, and practitioners were twice as
concerned as students about negative staff reactions (10.8% versus 5.8%)."
Two particularly well-designed studies raise important questions about
the role of insufficient knowledge in causing discrimination. In a 1993 study
of attitudes, conducted among University of Pittsburgh dental students, Bennett
and colleagues, using a more sophisticated approach to differentiate among
personality types and gauge the importance of professionalism, found that
knowledge and experience were not significant predictors of willingness to
treat. Rather, non-professional attitudes (evinced, for example, by a negative
response to the statement "people in our profession have a responsibility to
50. See Gerbert, supra note 27, at 311; Moretti et al., supra note 28, at 146-47.
51. See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1030 (1995). The change did not come without opposition. The
American Dental Association vigorously opposed the OSHA regulations all the way to the Supreme
Court, which declined to hear the case. American Dental Ass'n v. Martin, 984 F.2d 823 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 172 (1993).
52. One implication of some of these early studies was that dentists were not concerned
enough about HIV-i.e., while generally overestimating the risk of transmission from a known
patient, they tended to discount the possibility of actually treating HIV or HBV patients who were
not identified, an attitude reflected in their inattention to universal precautions. See Gerbert, supra
note 19, at 72-73; Hastreiter et al., supra note 26, at 164.
53. Bennett et al., supra note 32, at 512.
54. Id. at 511.
55. Rankin et al., supra note 30, at 25. Almost 80% of dental school seniors surveyed
by Solomon et al. in 1991 believed they were competent to treat patients with HIV. But 77% felt
they were at increased risk, and 58 percent believed that treating patients with HIV would lead
other patients to leave their practice. Solomon et al., supra note 20, at 595.
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treat everyone who needs our help"), low levels of dispositional optimism,
discomfort with homosexuality, and male gender were the best predictors of
a belief that dentists had a right to refuse to treat people with HIV.56
The same team of researchers compared attitudes of dental and medical
students and found that dental students were more resistant than medical
students to treating patients with HIV. Weyant and the other researchers
offered two likely explanations. First, dental students actually spend more time
than most medical students performing invasive procedures. Consequently,
dental students' attitudes about risk may more strongly affect their willingness
to treat. "A second hypothesis, not directly addressed in this study, is that
dental students select dental school because they are considerably less
comfortable treating seriously ill people. " " To the degree that either
perception of risk or discomfort with the ill is based on general personality
traits, factual information alone will not change behavior. 8
Several studies have addressed the role of negative attitudes about
homosexuality and drug use. A 1990 study found that "those unwilling to treat
AIDS were more likely to have homophobic opinions than those willing to treat
the disease. ""' Gerbert found 36.7% of her sample opining that people with
HIV should be quarantined.6" Half the respondents in the most recent study
reported feeling "angry at the homosexual community for imposing the risk
of HIV/AIDS on the straight community." 6' None of these surveys attempted
to establish a causal connection between general attitudes and willingness to
treat.
Studies of dental attitudes have rarely included questions concerning the
law. Only 28% of Minnesota dentists surveyed in 1989, before passage of the
ADA, believed that dentists had a legal obligation to care for patients with
HIV.62 By the time of Bennett's survey in 1993, the situation seems to have
changed dramatically. Only 31 % of the respondents in a national survey were
unsure of their "professional obligations to HIV-positive patients," and only
56. Bennett et al., supra note 39, at 676-78.
57. Robert J. Weyant et al., Desire to Treat HIV-Infected Patients: Similarities and
Differences Across Health-Care Professions, 8 AIDS 117, 120-21 (1994). For a discussion of the
ethical implications of such attitudes, see Vincent Rogers, Dentistry and AIDS: Ethical and Legal
Obligations in the Provision of Care, 7 MED. LAW 57 (1988).
58. The authors cautiously accept the hypothesis that "as students gain more intensive
experience ... they will become more comfortable and perceive a lower level of occupational
risk." Weyant et al., supra note 57, at 121.
59. Curry et al., supra note 28, at 473.
60. Gerbert, supra note 27, at 312.
61. Bennett et al., supra note 32, at 513. This study also found a significant correlation
between positive attitudes towards treating patients with HIV and having friends with HIV. Id.
at 512.
62. Hastreiter et al., supra note 26, at 163.
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37% were unsure of their specific legal obligations.63
Questions framed in terms of the dentist's "right" to decide whom to treat
do not necessarily provide a good measure of dentists' awareness of specific
legal rules. They may, however, be helpful in gauging the degree to which the
legal rules requiring nondiscrimination correspond with dentists' preexisting
normative views. In Bennett's recent survey, "84 percent of the sample
maintained that it was their right to decide whether to accept an HIV-positive
patient for treatment." 4 Similarly, although dentists now commonly use
infection control procedures and accept their medical value, almost all of them
agreed that regulators have been insensitive to the financial burden OSHA
requirements impose.65
2. Studies of Dentists' Behavior
Only one published study in the United States has directly tested dentists'
behavior."" This study used actual observations in dental offices to determine
whether dentists discriminate against men who are perceived to be gay or
intravenous drug users. A White male actor, posing alternatively as a
heterosexual, a gay man and a drug user, appeared for care at the offices of
102 randomly selected dentists from the Chicago area. After each examination,
the actor completed a questionnaire about his experience and the dentists were
interviewed. Despite negative feelings towards homosexuality, only one dentist
refused to treat the actor when he was perceived to be homosexual. One dentist
also rejected him when he played the part of an IV drug user. This well-
designed study strongly suggests that, while negative attitudes about gay men
and drug users are common, they do not strongly influence dentists'
behavior.67 It may, more generally, support the hypothesis that dentists are
loath to refuse treatment to a patient who is sitting in the office.6
Inferential support for this latter hypothesis can be derived from the
results of one other test of dentists' behavior, carried out for litigation rather
63. Bennett et al., supra note 32, at 511.
64. Bennett et al., supra note 32, at 511; cf. Curry et al., supra note 28, at 473 (51.7%
of medical and dental students agree that health care workers have right to refuse to treat patients
with HIV).
65. Bennett et al., supra note 32, at 512.
66. Hazelkorn, supra note 25.
67. But see Nancy E. Kass et al., Homosexual and Bisexual Men's Perceptions of
Discrimination in Health Services, 82 AM. J. OF PUB. HEALTH 1277, 1278 tbl. 1 (1992) (reporting
that 1-4% of gay and bisexual respondents had been refused dental care based on dentist's
knowledge or perception of their sexual preference).
68. The finding that dentists were more willing to treat patients of record is consistent with
this, see Sadowsky & Kunzel, supra note 32, at 706, although the fact that most patients suffering
discrimination in the Burris-Glick study had a prior relationship with their dentist indicates the
need for caution.
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than research purposes. In 1990, several individuals with HIV cooperated with
the author (then an attorney with the American Civil Liberties Union of
Pennsylvania) in a "test" of Philadelphia area dentists. Thirty-seven dentists
were selected randomly from the telephone book.69 A person with HIV called
the office, established that the dentist was accepting new patients, and made
an appointment. Some days later, the patient called again, asked to speak to
the dentist directly, and informed the dentist of his HIV status.7' The patients
and witnesses concluded that eleven of the dentists clearly refused to treat the
patient (sometimes providing a referral to the Temple Clinic). Others expressed
a reluctance to treat but did not utter a clear refusal. Another third of the
dentists expressed a clear willingness to treat. It should be stressed that the test
was conducted for the purpose of identifying individual dentists against whom
legal complaints could be filed, not for research purposes.7
3. Studies of HIV-Positive Patients' Experiences
Studies of patients' experiences have been less frequent than studies of
dentists. An early, unpublished study from the late 1980s found that "more
than 21 % of a sample of AIDS patients reported being denied dental treatment
because of their diagnosis. More than half of the AIDS patients who had a
dentist had not told their dentist of their diagnosis, presumably because they
feared they would be denied treatment."72
Interviews with sixty-one HIV-positive patients of three Chicago area
HIV/AIDS clinics who had sought dental care since their diagnosis found that
69. The sample was drawn only from dentists who had paid for an enhanced directory
listing. This criterion was imposed for legal reasons: in order to be classified as a public
accommodation under the applicable Pennsylvania law, a dentist would, among other things, have
to hold himself out as accepting the patronage of the general public. Because standard listings are
free, they do not necessarily constitute advertising for new clients.
70. All dentists in the sample were male.
71. An almost identical method was used in a later study of Brazilian dentists which found
that only 44% were willing to treat a patient with HIV. M.R. Sposto et al., Willingness of
Brazilian Dentists to Treat an HIV-Infected Patient, 78 ORAL SURGERY ORAL MED. ORAL
PATHOLOGY 175 (1994).
For more details on the Pennsylvania cases and their outcomes, see Lawsuits Suggest
Discrimination is Widespread, 'Most Blatant in Health Care', 8 AIDS ALERT 165 (1993)
[hereinafter Lawsuits]; Mark Jaffe, 5 Dentists Admit Bias Against AIDS Patients, PHILA. INQUIRER,
Oct. 6, 1993, at BI; Loretta Tofani, Dentists Face Complaint Alleging Bias Against Carriers of
AIDS Virus, PHILA. INQUIRER, Aug. 21, 1990, at B4.
72. Moretti et al., supra note 28, at 146 (citing W.A. Ayer et al., Experiences of AIDS
Patients in Seeking Out and Receiving Dental Care (unpublished manuscript)). In a more recent
study of 146 British men with HIV, half of those who had been to a dentist since infection had
not told the dentist of their infection. Concern about the dentist's attitude and for confidentiality
were the most frequently mentioned reasons. Of those who did disclose their status, half had been
refused treatment. P. Robinson et al., Dental Visiting Behaviour and Fxperiences of Men with HIV,
176 J. BRrr. DENTAL Ass'N 175 (1994).
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only one patient had been refused treatment.73 Thirty-seven of the respondents
had not told their dentist of their HIV status, however, and so should be
excluded in assessing the frequency of refusal.74 Even excluding those
patients, the adjusted refusal rate of 3% is quite low. The survey also found,
however, that 32% of the patients who disclosed their status to their dentist
were going to a dentist they had not seen prior to infection. The authors
believed that "[ilnformed, nonrandom selection of dentists may have been the
major explanation for their somewhat unanticipated success.""
In an article published in 1989, Gerbert and colleagues reported on two
surveys and a focus-group process.76 In two groups of HIV-positive men (men
enrolled in two different longitudinal HIV studies, both of which tended to be
comprised of better educated, higher income people), the rates of denial of care
were 1.3 % and 10.8 %. The lower result, however, reflected the responses of
both those who had and those who had not tried to get care. This, as the
Jacobson study suggests, is a flaw. While only one of the twenty-seven
participants in the focus group reported having been denied care based on HIV
status,' almost all the gay participants knew of someone with HIV who had.
The authors quoted participants who described experiences suggestive of
pervasive discrimination.
I know someone who was shopping for a dentist who felt that since
he was in health care . . . he should tell them that he had AIDS.
And so he called like 50 or 60 dentists in L.A. trying to find a
dentist and was denied care. And so finally he just made an
appointment with a dentist and before he went on he told him he
had hepatitis so they would take the same precautions . . .7
A more recent study, by Kass and colleagues, of homosexual and bisexual
men enrolled in another AIDS cohort study found that 16% of men with AIDS
and 4% of seropositive men reported being refused treatment by a dentist.79
73. Jacobson et al., supra note 25. The researchers interviewed a total of 125 subjects,
just over half of whom had not sought care for one reason or another.
74. The survey could not detect whether the dentists of the thirty-seven patients who did
not reveal their status were nonetheless aware of it from clinical signs.
75. Jacobson et al., supra note 25, at 607.
76. Barbara Gerbert et al., Dental Care Experience of HIV-Positive Patients, 119 J. AM.
DENTAL Ass'N 601 (1989).
77. All the participants who were drug users reported discrimination based on economic
status. One of these also reported that he had been refused care by a dentist, whom he had seen
for years, when he came down with thrush. Id. at 602.
78. Id.
79. Kass et al., supra note 67, at 1278. The cohort participants did not all have HIV, an
enrollment criterion being lack of infection at time of entry. Because of the small number with
HIV in the cohort, fifty-nine additional patients with HIV from Johns Hopkins Hospital were also
included. The higher rate of discrimination among patients with AIDS compared to those with
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Three percent of people with HIV, and 4% of people with AIDS, reported
being denied care by a dentist based on their sexual orientation. Among the
non-infected participants, 1 % each reported being denied dental care because
of sexual preference and suspected HIV infection. The authors noted that
"many participants volunteered that they had deliberately sought care from gay
practitioners in order to avoid problems."" The Burris and Glick study,
reported here, 8 found rates of discrimination consistent with the Kass study.
B. New Data: Patient Experiences
We created a survey to gather data on four main issues: the degree to
which people with HIV experienced discrimination by dentists; whether such
perceived discrimination was significantly linked to demographic characteristics
of patients other than HIV; patients' moral beliefs about discrimination and
confidentiality; and patients' attitudes about the care provided in dedicated
clinics.8 2
1. Background
We surveyed 272 people with HIV who had sought dental care in the past
five years." Participants were solicited at a dental clinic established
specifically to treat patients with HIV and at four community-based
organizations (CBOs) providing case management and other support services
for HIV-positive people.' The sample loosely reflects the racial, age, and
HIV may be read to add some support to the theory that identified HIV disease is itself the most
important factor in promoting discrimination. Id. at 1277.
80. Id. at 1279.
81. See infra Section II.B.1-2.
82. The data presented in this section were the product of a collaboration between the
author and the following individuals. Michael Glick, D.M.D., Professor of Dentistry at the
University of Pennsylvania School of Dental Medicine and formerly Professor at Temple Dental
School provided expertise in dental care for people with HIV. The statistician for the project was
Ellen Kurtz, M.A., of the Temple University Center for Public Policy. Edwin Greenlee, J.D.
helped develop the survey instrument and conducted trial administrations. Temple Law Students
Joshua Norris and John Lynde were of significant assistance in collecting the data. The author
was the primary director of the survey and wrote the report. Responsibility for any errors or
omissions rests with the author.
83. Three additional surveys were invalid.
84. At the time of the survey, the Temple University Infectious Disease Clinic provided
about 2500 hours of dental care annually to clients from a large area of New Jersey, Pennsylvania,
and Delaware. Thirty-four percent of patients were African American, 59% White, and 7%
Hispanic. Eighty-nine percent were male, 11% female. The average age was 37.6 years. One
hundred patients participated in the survey. One hundred nine patients who appeared for their
appointments between June and September, 1993, were asked to complete a survey, yielding a
response rate of 92%. Participants were paid $5 for completing the survey.
ActionAIDS is the largest case-management agency in the city, serving approximately 550
clients at the time of the survey, between August and October, 1993. The client population was
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gender breakdown of the HIV-infected population of the Philadelphia region.
(See Table I). This is the first study of its kind to include women in rough
proportion to their actual numbers in the HIV-positive population. 5 We
designed an eleven page, forty-eight item questionnaire for the Clinic, and a
ten page, forty-seven item questionnaire for the CBOs. The surveys differed
approximately 57% African American, 34% White, and 8% Hispanic. Clients were 79% male,
and ranged in age from infants to over 60 years old. Clients were approached to complete the
survey when they appeared in the office for appointments, support group meetings, or other
purposes. Participants, other than those approached through support groups were given a five-
dollar food certificate for completing the survey. A total of 44 surveys were completed. There
were 12 refusals (not including the members of the support groups who declined to participate).
A response rate could not be calculated.
Philadelphia Community Health Alternatives/Philadelphia AIDS Task Force offers case
management, testing, and other social services. It served approximately 221 regular clients at the
time the survey was conducted (August to September, 1993), with additional walk-ins for
emergency services and HIV testing. Clients were 52% White, 43% African American, and 5%
Hispanic. Eighty percent of the clients were male. Clients were asked to participate when they
appeared for appointments or other services, and were paid $5. Forty-seven surveys were
completed. There was one refusal (a response rate of 98%).
We the People Living with HIV/AIDS in the Delaware Valley is an organization formed
and led by people with HIV, offering support services, social amenities, and a drop-in center.
Demographic information was not available. Between August and September, 75 members were
asked to participate at the drop-in center and at a weekly dinner. Fifty-four agreed and there were
21 refusals (a response rate of 72%). A contribution was made to the organization to benefit the
organization's weekly dinner.
Congresso de Latinos Unidos provides services to people with HIV in the Hispanic
community. At the time of the survey, it had 352 case management clients, in addition to walk-ins
seeking testing or other assistance. Its population was 87% Hispanic, 9% African American, and
3% White. Eighty-five percent were males. Participants were recruited through support groups.
Thirty surveys, some in Spanish, were completed. Response rates were unknown. Surveys were
completed between August and December, 1993.
85. The proportion of women in the HIV-positive population has been increasing. While
only 12% of the cumulative AIDS caseload, women comprised 18.9% of the AIDS cases reported
in 1994. PHILADELPHIA DEPT. OF PUBLIC HEALTH, AIDS ACTIVITIES COORDINATING OFFICE,
AIDS SURVEILLANCE QUARTERLY UPDATE 7, tbl. 3 (1995).
Our sample was also largely made up of low-income individuals, the majority earning less
then $10,000 per year, and 80% earning less than $20,000. This is generally consistent with the
trend in Philadelphia HIV cases, which has since 1987 shown a shift in new cases toward low-
income groups and away from high-income ones. See Daniel Fife & Charles Mode, AIDS
Prevalence by Income Group in Philadelphia, 5 J. ACQUIRED IMMUNE DEFICIENCY SYNDROMES
1111, 1114 (1992).
Ours was a convenience sample, and so deviated from the ideal of random selection. Such
deviation, however, is common with studies of people with HIV, a population that is, for statistical
purposes, unknown. We considered probability sampling options like random digit dialing, but
the cost of obtaining a sufficiently large sample possessing an unusual characteristic was
prohibitive. The study depends upon self-reported data, which could not be validated. Surveyors
were present (except in surveys distributed through support groups) to read the survey to
respondents who were unable to read, but no one required this assistance and, to our knowledge,
no one declined to participate because of illiteracy.
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Table I. Respondents' Age, Sex and Race
Sample Possible Phila. Phila.





Age 13-19 .7% (2) 2% (1) .5% (26) .6% (8)
20-29 12% (32) 10% (5) 20% 18%
(1105) (253)
30-39 48% (131) 57% 44% 44%
(28) (2388) (628)
40-49 33% (89) 24% 24% 26%
(12) (1270) (366)
50 and older 4% (12) 6% (3) 10% 8% (114)
(524)
Gender Male 80% (219) 73.5% 88% 81%
(36) (4752) (1146)
Female 19% (51) 26.5% 12% 19%
1 (13) (634) (267)
Race White, Non- 24% (65) 45% 32% 22%
Hispanic (22) (1730) (312)
Black, Non- 64% (175) 47% 58% 65%
Hispanic (23) (3149) (921)
Hispanic 8.5% (23) 4% (2) 9% (494) 12%
(176)
Other 3% (9) 4% (2) .2% (13) .3% (4)
* Source: Philadelphia Dept. of Public Health, AIDS Activities Coordinating Office, AIDS
Surveillance Quarterly Update at 7 tbls. 3-5 (1995).
Table does not include missing cases. Percentages may exceed 100 due to rounding.
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only insofar as the identity of the current dentist was known for the Clinic
Group. Survey questions focused on the respondent's most recent experience
with refusal.86 Non-respondents were not surveyed, admitting the possibility
that those who elected to participate had stronger opinions about dental care
as a result of experiencing discrimination. The high response rates in some
sub-samples, and the fact that support groups tended to make a collective
decision on participation, makes this less likely. It is also possible that
respondents falsely reported instances of discrimination in order to help
dramatize a problem they perceived to be serious and underestimated.
Table II. Respondents' Income, Employment and Education
Table does not include missing cases. Percentages may exceed 100 due to rounding.
Sample Possible or




Income <$9,999 64% (175) 59% (29)
$10- 19,999 16% (43) 8% (4)
$20- 34,999 10% (28) 8% (4)
$35 - 49,999 5% (14) 18% (9)
$50,000+ 2% (5) 6% (3)
Education Less than high 18% (49) 14% (7)
school diploma
High school 37% (102) 33% (16)
diploma
Post-high 44% (120) 51% (25)
school
86. Opinion questions were posed on a five point Likert scale. Data were analyzed using
SPSS for Windows software. A chi-square test was used to test the significance of relationships
between variables. Relationships reported here were significant at the .05 level. The strength of
significance was tested using gamma.
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2. Major Findings
a. Frequency of Discrimination
Fifty-two individuals reported that they had been refused treatment by
a dentist. "Refusal" encompasses any manner of non-treatment, including
refusals that the dentists characterized as "referrals." A refusal to treat is not
necessarily illegal discrimination. There are legitimate medical reasons for
referral to a different dentist. We attempted to infer the nature of the refusal
from other circumstances the patient reported. We classified refusals to treat
as probably discriminatory if: (1) the respondent received no treatment after
the dentist learned of his or her HIV status; and (2) the patient either (a) had
never received care from the dentist before (for example, a new patient refused
while attempting to make an appointment), or (b) having had a prior
relationship with the dentist (patient of record), expressed the intention not to
return to the dentist for any treatment in the future; and (4) the patient reported
no other nondiscriminatory reason for the denial of care. These criteria are
based on the assumption that a dentist is unlikely to have a nondiscriminatory
reason for refusing even to examine a new patient with HIV or for suddenly
terminating an existing dentist-patient relationship. While referral for a specific
condition outside the dentist's competence is appropriate, a "terminal referral"
that ends the relationship entirely is suspect. In many cases, the dentists
reportedly made no effort to conceal a discriminatory motive.
Refusals that did not meet these criteria were classified as possibly
discriminatory or nondiscriminatory based on (1) the respondents' reported
medical and oral health at the time of refusal, (2) the dentists' reported reason
for refusing, (3) the patient's judgment about the reason for refusal, and (4)
the patient's responses to open-ended questions about the experience. We
assumed that the referral of a patient reporting no significant health or dental
problems was probably discriminatory, particularly if the patient reported
feeling unwelcome. Forty of the refusals met our criteria for probably
discriminatory. Dentists refused care to twenty-four respondents attempting
to make a first appointment. One respondent, who reported six to ten refusals,
commented: "App[ointmen]t was made, then I would mention I was HIV-
positive, and all of a sudden they had a dozen excuses for not seeing me."
Sixteen refused respondents reported a prior relationship with the dentist. Six
had been seeing the dentist for one to two years, and six for more than two
years. One of the latter responded to the question as to whether he planned to
return to the dentist, "Are you kidding? I would no longer trust his care now
that I know how he feels about HIV." One, who had been seeing the dentist
for between one and two years, reported that he "was already in the chair"
when he revealed his status and was refused further care.
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Nine refusals were deemed possibly discriminatory. Three respondents
reported both a prior relationship with the dentist and some treatment after they
informed the dentist of their HIV status. Their referrals were classified as
possibly discriminatory based on respondents' lack of oral symptoms, intention
not to return to the dentist for treatment in the future, and negative comments
("I don't need to feel uncomfortable because of someone's ignorance"; "Why
force a dentist to treat. I would not trust him or her"; "I felt unwanted at that
office. ").
One case met the first three criteria for a probably discriminatory referral
but was classified as possible discrimination because the dentist reportedly gave
as one of his reasons that he did not accept the patient's Medicaid HMO
insurance. Two other refusals satisfied the criteria for probable discrimination,
but each provided at least one internally inconsistent response. All three
respondents believed that these dentists do not treat any patients with HIV. The
last three respondents reported being refused care and receiving no treatment
but did not respond to all survey questions.
We classified three refusals as nondiscriminatory. One respondent, who
reported serious oral symptoms, believed that he received a legitimate medical
referral from a dentist who treated other patients with HIV. The respondent
intended to return to the dentist for care in the future. A second respondent,
who reported five refusals since learning he was HIV positive, offered
contradictory responses concerning the most recent referral, but he agreed that
the refusing dentist was both competent to treat people with HIV and treated
them with respect and understanding. He also stated an intention to return for
further treatment. The third respondent stated that the referring dentist did not
know of his or her H1V status, that the referral was to an oral surgeon, and
that the reason the patient would not return to the dentist for treatment in the
future was that the practice was located in a distant city. Thus forty-nine
members of the sample (18%) experienced one or more probable or possible
discriminatory denials of treatment. The refusal rate could not be determined
based on our data. 7
These findings support the view that discrimination by dentists remains
a serious problem. The level of discrimination is at the high end of the
reported data. This outcome likely reflects the fact that individuals who have
trouble getting dental care in the Philadelphia region have tended to be directed
87. Reported refusals to treat were constant or slightly rising over time. Twenty-eight were
refused between 1991 and 1993. Eighteen were refused between 1986 and 1990. Six respondents
did not report a date of refusal.
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to the Temple Clinic; 8 it may also reflect our restriction on participation to
people who had actually sought dental care in recent years. The level of
discrimination would have been higher had we included other arguably
discriminatory behavior, such as the assessment of an additional fee (for
"draping" the office) or the scheduling of patients with HIV outside normal
office hours.89  Significantly, almost 80% of the patients reporting
discrimination had had a prior dentist-patient relationship with the refusing
dentist.
b. Causes of Discrimination
Our findings indicate that discrimination arises from the dentist's
discovery that a patient has HIV and not from a dentist's suspicion that a
person is "a member of a high risk group." Every respondent experiencing
possible or probable discrimination reported that the dentist or a member of
his staff was aware of the patient's HIV infection.90 Eighty-two percent had
informed the dentist of their status. In the remaining cases, the dentist found
out from the medical chart, an examination, or an HIV test.
While our data cannot be used to directly determine how the dentists
perceived the sexual orientation or drug-use history of individual respondents,
the discrimination experienced was not significantly correlated with age,
gender, or high-risk behavior. 9 Our findings are consistent with Hazelkorn's
finding that dentists did not discriminate in the treatment of a person portraying
a homosexual or a drug user,92 and with the several studies finding that far
more dentists have treated patients they believe to be at high risk than have
treated patients they knew to have HIV.93 Without denying the complex
relationship between attitudes and behavior94 or the importance of addressing
88. Twenty-four percent of respondents at the Temple Clinic experienced probable or
possible discriminatory refusal, compared to 14% of the individuals surveyed at the community-
based organizations. Separating the two samples did not significantly change the outcome of our
statistical analysis.
89. Ten respondents (3.7%) reported being charged a higher fee, and 22 (8%) said they
had been asked to come "at the end of the day or other special time" because of their HIV status.
90. In one case, the respondent reported being informed by the "nurse" that the dentist
did not treat patients with HIV.
91. Of those experiencing possible or probable discrimination, 49% reported male
homosexual activity, and 33% intravenous drug use within the previous ten years.
92. Hazelkorn, supra note 25, at 610-18.
93. See, e.g., Moretti et al., supra note 28, at 145 tbl. 2 (19% had treated one or more
patients with AIDS or ARC in past year; 78% had treated one or more patients "who fell into
one of the high-risk categories"); Bennett et al., supra note 32, at 511 (45% reported treating at
least one known HIV-positive patient in past year; 85% reported treating at least one "suspected"
HIV-positive patient).
94. See, e.g., Bennett et al., supra note 39; Meei-shia Chen, A Theoretical Model for





attitudes in crafting programs to reduce discrimination, this may explain why
discrimination actually occurs far less than attitudinal studies would suggest.95
Negative attitudes about homosexuals or drug users may indicate a
predisposition not to treat people with HIV, but do not necessarily translate
into active efforts to screen out such patients. Dentists who only refuse to treat
known HIV-positive patients may, in fact, frequently treat HIV-positive people
whose infection is unknown to the dentist.
A significant correlation exists between suffering discrimination and
several socio-economic indicators. (See Table III). An individual's chances of
experiencing discrimination increased slightly with the number of hours worked
per week. There was a statistically significant, but very weak, correlation
between rising income and discrimination. The chance of experiencing
discrimination decreased moderately if the respondent was receiving some
forms of public assistance. Refusal was moderately tied to not being on
Medicaid and was strongly tied to having private dental insurance.
Discrimination was strongly correlated with being White. We do not take these
results to indicate that dentists prefer treating poor, uninsured people of color
to insured, employed Caucasians. They are, rather, an artifact of the greater
"opportunity" to be refused enjoyed by people who can afford to go to any
dentist they wish, as often as they need.96 Poorer people, dependent on
charity, are probably more quickly directed to a subsidized clinic. Those on
Medicaid have a limited choice of dentists, and dentists accepting Medicaid
are likely to be either more charitable or wanting for patients. In our sample,
Whites' self-reported spending on dental care was not significantly higher than
non-Whites' (P=.177),97 but Whites reported significantly more visits
(P=.000; 7=-. 172).
One legitimate explanation for a high rate of refusal to treat would be
that patients with HIV tend to present more complicated oral pathologies. This
was not borne out by our study. The majority of respondents who suffered
discrimination described themselves as HIV-positive and asymptomatic when
refused treatment.9" Most respondents reported no oral symptoms related to
95. See infra Section H.A.
96. Fife and Mode found that, among people with AIDS in Philadelphia, "[pirivate medical
insurance increased with income, was more common among those who were White than those
who were non-White, and was more common among those with homosexual contact than those
with other modes of exposure to lIV infection." Daniel Fife & Charles Mode, AIDS Incidence
and Income, 5 J. ACQUIRED IMMUNE DEFICIENCY SYNDROMES 1105, 1106 (1992).
97. These data, which depend upon patients, most of whom have some sort of insurance,
recalling their annual dental expenditures for the past five years, should be viewed cautiously.
98. Sixty-seven percent described themselves as HIV-positive and asymptomatic when
refused treatment. Twenty-seven percent reported that they were HIV-positive with occasional
or minor symptoms. Six percent described themselves as HIV-positive with serious symptoms.
These self-assessments were generally consistent with the individuals' reported T-cell counts, a
rough marker of the state of their immune system and the progression of IV disease.
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Table Ill. Significant Correlations Between Reporting a Discriminatory
Experience and Respondents' Socio-Economic Characteristics
Table IV. Patients' Reported Oral Health and Reason for Visit at Time
of Discrimination
Oral Symptoms at Time Percent Patient's Reason for Visit Percent
of Discrimination n=49 n=49
None 63 Pain 39
Candidiasis 10 Check-up 65
Hairy Leukoplakia 6 Cosmetic need 10
Periodontal disease 6 Cavity 47
Aphthous ulcer 2 Dentures 18
Dry mouth 6 Oral lesion 4
Kaposi's sarcoma 0 Referred by physician 10
Characteristic X2  P y
Hours worked per week 10.21 .037 .281
Income 101.27 .000 -. 103
Not on Medicaid 6.72 .035 -. 349
Has private insurance 11.13 .004 .559
Has any insurance 16.21 .003 -.446
White race 16.10 .003 .569
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HIV at the time of refusal, and had gone to the dentist for a check-up, or
because of common complaints like pain or cavities. (See Table IV). Thus
most of the respondents, including patients who ended up attending the
dedicated dental clinic, were seeking routine care.
Most patients perceived that they were being discriminated against simply
because they had HIV. Dentists were reportedly frank about their unwillingness
to treat; almost half admitted that they did not treat HIV patients as a rule.
Other frequent explanations reportedly given by discriminating dentists include
a lack of knowledge needed to treat patients with HIV (29%), the need for
patients with HIV to get specialist care (43 %), the belief that the patient would
get better care from a different dentist (25%), and the concern that staff or
other patients would be upset if the dentist treated a person with HIV
(13%).99 Individual respondents identified other reasons dentists purportedly
offered, including a lack of the proper equipment. One patient reported that
the dentist said "he did not want to be in contact with the AIDS virus."
The reported explanations are remarkable for their generality and lack
of any apparent effort to link refusal to specific medical or dental attributes
of the patients. No patients reported that dentists attributed refusal to the
patient's poor overall health, and only a few reported other medical reasons
such as an unfamiliar dental condition too hard for the dentist to treat (four),
or a patient's history of serious medical problems (two). Moreover, few of
these patients reported serious health problems. Of the four patients who
indicated that they were refused treatment because the dentist said that they
had a specific symptom or condition that was related to HIV that was too hard
or unfamiliar for the dentist to treat, two reported no oral symptoms at the time
of refusal, and one reported having oral candidiasis. The fourth patient was
having serious HIV symptoms by self-report, with oral hairy leukoplakia and
recurrent major aphthous ulcerations. The dentist in that instance, however,
also reportedly stated that he did not treat any patients with HIV. Both patients
whose refusal was reportedly attributed in part to a history of serious medical
problems also reportedly were told that the dentist did not treat anyone with
HIV. Moreover, in one of the cases, the refusing dentist belonged to a major
university dental clinic that ordinarily would be expected to accept patients
with such a history."
99. Three patients reported being told that the dentist would not treat because he did not
use protective infection control procedures. One reportedly said he did not treat gay people, and
two said that they did not treat IV. drug users.
100. Three dentists (6%) reportedly attributed their refusal to provide care to the fact that
they did not accept the patient's form of insurance. In each case, however, the patient had received
care from the dentist before the dentist learned of the patient's HIV and refused further care.
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c. Current Access to and Satisfaction with Dental Care
In addition to the respondents from the Temple Clinic, seventy-seven of
the respondents from CBOs reported that they were currently receiving care
from a dentist, and fifty-eight of these identified that dentist. Fourteen
identified the Temple Clinic as their current source of dental care. Thirty-eight
other individual dentists or dental clinics were identified. With some caveats,
these data support the conclusion that many local dentists are treating patients
with HIV. The major limitation of this study is that the respondents at CBOs
were not asked if their current dentist was aware of their HIV status. Given
the finding that discrimination results from a dentist's knowledge of a patient's
HIV status, rather than the HIV status itself, we cannot assume that a large
number of dentists will knowingly treat people with HIV. Moreover, a quarter
of the respondents at CBOs who identified a current dentist named the Temple
Clinic.
Clinics dedicated to the care of people with HIV are problematic to the
extent that they are, or are perceived as, "ghettos" for those patients whom
no one else will serve. In addition to the stigma of separation, patients may
be concerned that as "undesirables" they might receive second-rate care. Our
study did not find evidence of these concerns. Most respondents were satisfied
with their current dentist, but patients receiving care at the Temple Clinic were
significantly more likely to agree or strongly agree that their current dentist
was competent to treat patients with HIV (P= .000; -y= .471) and treated HIV-
positive patients with respect and understanding (P=.000; -Y=.575). Clinic
patients were also significantly more likely to agree that patients with HIV are
best cared for in special clinics (P= .000; -y= .422). None felt that the clinic
dentists were not competent, whereas 8% of those receiving care outside the
Temple Clinic disagreed or strongly disagreed that their current dentist was
competent to meet the dental needs of a person with HIV. Respondents who
had been refused treatment had a similar rate of approval of special clinics,
but were much more likely than non-refused patients to disagree or strongly
disagree with the statement. This suggests that what may be acceptable as a
free choice is less desirable as one's sole option."°'
101. Only one other published study, of British patients, has closely probed HIV-positive
patients' satisfaction with clinic care. It found that patients attending a dedicated HIV clinic
'expressed satisfaction with the technical competence of their treatment and the effective behavior
of their dentist comparable with satisfaction expressed by patients treated by the same dentist in
general dental practice." P. Robinson & R. Croucher, The Satisfaction of Men with HIV Infection




The issue of dental discrimination is often framed in terms of competing
rights or interests, such as the rights of dentists to know the status of their
patients and to refuse treatment versus the right of patients to maintain their
privacy. Our data suggest that this is, in practice, a false opposition.
Respondents were asked for their opinions on two normative
questions-whether a dentist should have the right to refuse to treat people
whom the dentist does not wish to care for, and whether people with HIV are
morally obligated to inform dentists of their infection. Over one-third of all
respondents, and almost two-fifths of those who had experienced
discrimination, agreed or strongly agreed that dentists should be able to decline
to care for HIV-positive people. Less surprisingly, respondents who had
experienced discrimination also disagreed with the statement in greater
proportion than those who had not. (See Graph I).
The vast majority of respondents believed they had a moral duty to
inform their dentist about their HIV status. Eighty-four percent of the overall
sample, and 86% of those who had experienced discrimination, agreed or
strongly agreed with the proposition. Again, those who had experienced
discrimination were more likely to disagree or strongly disagree than those
who had not (14% versus 8%). We know that virtually all the respondents
experiencing discrimination had acted on this belief. We do not know how
many of those who were not refused actually told their dentists. While
disclosure of HIV may engender discrimination, it is also necessary to ensure
optimum medical care. Fear of discrimination, rather than a more or less
abstract concern for privacy, appears to be the main barrier to openness in the
dentist-patient relationship. Rather than a dispute between dentists and patients
about the need or right of dentists to ask medical questions, it is more accurate
to characterize patients and dentists as equally hindered in achieving clinical
openness by dentists' general reputation as unwilling to treat patients with HIV.
This suggests that state statutes that require patients to announce their HIV
status are both unnecessary and likely to produce discrimination. °2
Patients' sense of the equities and rights of the issue notwithstanding, it
is important to recognize that the rate of discrimination reported by the patients
bears no relation to the volume of complaints brought before courts and human
rights agencies in this area during this period. As far as can be determined
from the public record, none of these patients ever filed a complaint under
state or federal law arising from their experience.'03
102. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-15-903 (Michie 1992).
103. The only dental discrimination cases brought in Philadelphia since the beginning of
the epidemic were the cases brought by the ACLU and AIDS Law Project in 1990. See supra
notes 70-71 and accompanying text. It is possible that one of the two surviving plaintiffs in those





cases was one of the respondents in the Glick-Burris survey.
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C. New Data: Agency Experiences and Referral Patterns
In the Spring of 1994, Temple law students working under the
supervision of the author surveyed fifty-five member agencies of the
Pennsylvania Coalition of AIDS Service Organizations (PCASO) concerning
their experiences in assisting clients with HIV to obtain dental care." These
organizations generally assist clients in securing a wide range of medical and
social services. Twenty-two agencies could be reached and were eligible to
participate in the survey. 105
Nineteen respondents (86%) reported that they were aware of clients who
had had difficulty securing dental care. Of those respondents, more than half
were aware of problems occurring within the past six months, and most were
aware of more than five incidents." In their experience, however, the
problem was as much one of finances as of animus. Only about 40% of the
American population has private dental insurance, and dental health varies
significantly with socio-economic status. 07 While people with AIDS are often
eligible for Medicaid, which can include dental coverage, the rates of
reimbursement are so low, and the volume of paperwork so high, that only
a small number of dentists participate in the program.' Indeed, one
respondent, an experienced case manager from a smaller city, commented that
the discrimination issue was "moot" given the difficulty in finding providers
who would accept Medicaid. While two respondents attributed the difficulty
squarely to HIV discrimination, four had experienced the problem entirely as
one of finances, and the majority (twelve) identified both discrimination and
financial problems as limiting their access to care. (One complained of a
general lack of services in his rural area.)
The respondents were asked where they refer clients for dental care. The
most common response was to a clinic specializing in, or widely known to
accept, HIV-infected patients. Although most of the agencies also reported
104. The survey took the form of semi-structured telephone interviews, conducted by law
students, combining closed- and open-ended questions. Respondents were agency staff who stated
that they were familiar with agency practices concerning dental care.
105. Agencies that did not provide dental care referrals were excluded. No effort was made
to determine the basis for non-participation of other agencies, though in most instances it was due
to the surveyor's inability to contact any person at the agency who had knowledge of the agency's
practices, if any, in relation to dentistry.
106. Seven agencies reported more than ten incidents; two reported five to ten; four
reported two to five; one reported one; and five did not specify a number.
107. R. Schoen, Dentistry and National Health Insurance, CURRENT OPINION DENTISTRY,
Sept. 1992, at 1.
108. Dentists also complain about a higher rate of missed appointments among Medicaid
patients. R. Venezie & W. Vann, Jr., Pediatric Dentists' Participation in the North Carolina
Medicaid Program, PEDIATRIC DENTISTRY, May-June 1993, at 175; Peter C. Damiano et al.,
Factors Affecting Dentist Participation In a State Medicaid Program, 54 J. DENTAL EDUC. 638
(1990).
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having at least one private dentist available for referrals, responses still suggest
a heavy reliance on clinics.
All the Philadelphia area agencies reported that they referred their
patients to one of three local clinics. Most referred to the Temple Infectious
Disease Clinic, but they also referred to the University of Pennsylvania School
of Dental Medicine and a charitable clinic, ChesPenn, located in an
economically depressed suburban town. The agencies reported limited or no
referrals to dentists in private practice. One suburban agency had found it
necessary to contract with three local dentists, using Ryan White funds, to care
for its clients." In Pittsburgh, both respondent agencies reported relying on
two clinics affiliated with the University of Pittsburgh, but the Pittsburgh AIDS
Task Force also had 5-10 private dentists to whom it referred patients.
Fourteen of the respondent agencies were located in smaller cities and rural
areas. Eight reported sending patients to clinics in Pittsburgh or Philadelphia.
In some instances, this involved several hours of travel. Three reported relying
on local hospital clinics, but two complained of long waiting lists. Only one
agency reported exclusive reliance on a clinic. Eleven reported anywhere from
one to five local private practitioners who would accept patients.
The major clinics all accepted Medicaid and/or provided free care to
indigent patients. Among rural respondents, privacy concerns provided
additional impetus to go to a distant urban clinic. Some clients in smaller
communities preferred to receive some or all of their medical care in a place
where confidentiality was protected by relative anonymity.
These data have serious limitations. The response rate to the survey was
low, and the role of any agency in helping clients get dental care probably
varies among clients and agencies. Presumably, many agency clients make
their own dental arrangements without seeking a referral from the agency. This
includes both patients who do not reveal their HIV status, and those who do
and nevertheless receive treatment from a private dentist. Moreover, people
with HIV or AIDS do not uniformly seek services from the PCASO agencies.
Nevertheless, these data suggest that agencies have responded to problems in
dental care access in the most immediately efficient way, by identifying one
or more providers who will readily accept patients. Even in large urban areas,
where there are private dentists who treat people with HIV, the main provider
tends to be a clinic. Clinics are likely to be the only providers accessible to
patients without insurance or on Medicaid. It follows that the attraction of
clinics may not entirely be their willingness to or competence in treating, but
their fee schedule.
109. The Ryan White Comprehensive AIDS Resources Emergency Act of 1990, Pub. L.






None of these studies, alone or in combination, allow reliable
quantification of discrimination. The link between dental attitudes and actual
behavior is elusive. HIV is often undetectable without a blood test, so many
asymptomatic patients who do not know about or disclose their infection will
not be eligible for discrimination, even if a dentist would refuse to treat if she
were informed. The accuracy of patient reports of dentists' statements or
behavior is uncertain. Probability samples of patients cannot be feasibly
obtained."' Taking these limits into account, the studies reported here
generally are well constructed, with adequate and in some cases ample
samples" 1 and high response rates. They cover patients and dentists from
urban areas across the country. They establish beyond a reasonable doubt that
many dentists are uncomfortable with and unwilling to treat patients with HIV,
and that many patients with HIV experience discrimination."'
The data also show that despite widespread discrimination, patients with
HIV can get care by going to dentists reputed to accept patients with HIV or
by concealing their status. The studies do not measure the practical or psychic
burdens this process imposed on patients, nor do they quantify how many
people with HIV are deterred from seeking care by concerns about
discrimination. Patients who conceal their HIV status may be compromising
their care. Without derogating from the importance of confidentiality
protection, the evidence suggests that most patients are not concealing their
HIV status owing to abstract privacy concerns but because they fear that
disclosure will result in denial of care." 3 Of course, the data also show that
many dentists do not discriminate against people with HIV.
Fear of infection, fear of pecuniary loss, competency concerns, and
110. Convenience samples like those in the Burris-Glick or Kass studies, comprised of
people who have sought out medical or dental care, may be biased in a way that increases their
reliability. Such people may be more likely than the average person with HIV to seek care, and
therefore to be refused, but obviously people who do not seek care are not eligible for refusal.
Or the sample may lead to an undercounting of discrimination, because individuals who are
committed to getting dental care may be more likely to identify a practitioner known to accept
patients with HIV, and so avoid discrimination that a less determined patient might suffer.
111. The tendency to limit samples to males is a common and regrettable aspect of HIV
research generally. The problem also applies, to a lesser extent, to IV. drug users. The Burris-
Glick study, however, which did include women and IV. drug users in the sample, did not find
that either group was significantly more or less likely to suffer discrimination than gay men.
112. Because the Burris-Glick study was limited to individuals who had actually sought
dental care in the past five years, it certainly inflates the per capita rate of discrimination against
people with HIV, though this seems sensible given that discrimination is not a problem for people
who don't seek care. Conversely, we would expect the development of formal and informal
referral networks to reduce incidents of refusal even if the propensity to refuse remained
unchanged.
113. For a thorough discussion of the moral and legal concerns of a patient considering
disclosure, see Montoya, Jr., supra note 16.
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disdain for people with HIV all contribute to negative attitudes, and play some
role in actual discrimination. The evidence points toward actual knowledge of
a patient's HIV status as the main factor triggering refusal to treat. The large
majority of patients who suffered discrimination in the Burris-Glick study had
told the dentist of their HIV status. In Jacobson's study, about half the
respondents did not disclose their HIV infection to their dentist, and none of
these patients encountered difficulties in securing treatment.,14 This
conclusion is also supported by Hazelkorn's finding that dentists did not
discriminate against a person pretending to engage in high-risk behaviors, and
by the consistently wide divergence between the number of dentists reporting
treatment of patients they suspect of being high risk and the number reporting
treatment of patients they know have HIV.'
Significantly, clinical complexity in either the patient's general health or
oral condition does not seem to drive discrimination. The simplest explanation
for this lack of correlation is that most dental patients with HIV do not suffer
from complex conditions, but the finding has important implications. First, it
undermines any claim that discrimination merely reflects valid patterns of
specialization that are based on objective medical criteria. Second, it suggests
that people with HIV do not as a group impose substantially higher, and
practically unreimburseable, costs on dentists.
116
The studies to date have generally not addressed forms of discrimination
more subtle than outright refusal to treat. The Burris-Glick study found that
more than eleven percent of patients reported being charged more, or asked
to come at a special time. A dentist who does not wish to treat patients with
HIV can effectively deter return visits by all the forms of rudeness at his
disposal. More significantly, unwillingness to treat a patient with HIV may
affect a dentist's decision about a treatment plan. There has been no published
research exploring whether or not HIV influences dental care choices in a way
that significantly compromises the patient's care.
117
Several factors seem to reduce poor attitudes and, presumably,
discriminatory behavior. The work of Bennett, Weyant, and colleagues is the
most nuanced and ambitious, and its conclusions about the importance of that
"professionalism"-an amalgam of peer esteem, example and ethical
values-deserve considerable weight.1 8 This work suggests that professional
and social authorities must project norms of nondiscrimination in addition to
114. Jacobson et al., supra note 25, at 606-07.
115. See supra Section lI.A-B.2.
116. This assumes the routine use of barrier precautions for all patients.
117. Early research suggests that this may occur in medical care. See Nancy E. Kass et
al., The Influence of HIV Serostatus on Physicians' Clinical Decisions, 9 AIDS & PUB. POL'Y
J. 93 (1994).
118. Bennett et al., supra note 32; Weyant et al., supra note 57, at 57.
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providing accurate information about HIV and infection control. As I discuss
below, the influence of norms arising from within the dental culture is central
to any coherent strategy to reduce discrimination through positive regulatory
action.
Dentists' attitudes about HIV, like everyone else's, are complex.
Attitudes about clinical competence, sex, risk, death, and disease mix with
economic concerns in ways that are difficult to measure finely and which
ultimately operate synergistically. 1 9 Although education, like every other
intervention, has its limits, the empirical literature generally supports the view
that more thorough training in infection control, epidemiology, and treatment
of HIV and other infectious diseases will produce dentists who are better
qualified to care for all their patients and who may be more willing to treat
people with HIV. Designing dental education to include actual treatment of
patients with HIV appears to be valuable. Of great practical significance is the
fact that changes in attitude based on experience seem to be permanent,
offering hope that behavior change is self-reinforcing. Education itself sends
the message that dentists are expected to treat patients with HIM. 2
The work of Bennett, Weyant, and colleagues,"' finding that education
had a limited impact on negative attitudes and that generalized attitudes about
risk and illness strongly affect willingness to treat, sounds a cautionary note
but does not contradict other studies that find that education can matter. Facts
do not dictate behavior, any more than comfort with HIV eliminates discomfort
with homosexuality. Educational experiences that provide students insight into
their own attitudes and heuristics about risk are a necessary element of any
response.
Education of dentists does not directly address the frequently reported
concern about the reaction of patients. Gerbert and colleagues, surveying 2000
adults in 1988, found that over 40% would switch dentists if they discovered
their current provider also treated patients with HIV.122 In 1991, in the wake
119. See Chen, supra note 94, at 710.
120. If further research finds that perception of risk is a largely immutable personality trait,
"then perhaps selecting [dental] students who are less 'risk averse' is the only solution." Weyant
et al., supra note 57, at 121. A willingness to accept the treatment obligations entailed in
professional qualification seems a reasonable, indeed salutary, criterion for dental school
admission. Enforcing such a requirement would, however, be difficult.
121. See Bennett et al., supra note 39; Weyant et al., supra note 57.
122. Barbara Gerbert et al., Patients' Attitudes Toward Dentistry and AIDS, J. AM.
DENTAL ASS'N, Nov. 1989, (Supplement) at 16S.
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of the Acer case, almost 54% of patients said they would switch." On the
other hand, more than half the patients in one study agreed that dentists should
treat patients with HIV like any other patient, and more than 70% believed that
dentists had a moral and ethical obligation to treat patients with HIV. 24
As in the studies of dentists' attitudes, the expressed intention is not
necessarily a good predictor of actual behavior. A survey of patients in a
private practice found that almost 10% agreed with the statement, "I have been
avoiding dental treatment because of my concern about contracting AIDS
and/or other infectious diseases from my hygienist or dentist," but every
respondent was, in fact, seeing his or her dentist." z Only a third of the
respondents in Gerbert's survey had ever thought about the possibility of
contracting HIV from a dentist. Similarly, while almost 90% of patients
expressed comfort at the prospect of talking with their dentist about HIV, less
than 15% had actually done so.'26 As with dental attitudes, the factors that
would actually lead a patient to switch dentists, and therefore the objective
magnitude of the switching problem for dentists who treat people with HIV,
cannot be quantified. One study justifiably suggests that:
educational efforts that encompass HIV transmission as well as the
procedures health-care professionals use to prevent HIV
transmission are necessary not only to increase public understanding
of HIV transmission in health-care settings, but also to combat and
reduce unfounded patient fears and anxieties.
...[A]ctive steps on the part of health-care professionals,
such as acknowledging patients' HIV transmission fears,
maintaining visible infection control procedures, providing
educational materials, and initiating discussions about infection
control procedures are warranted to alleviate patient concerns.1 27
We know relatively little about dentists' attitudes toward legal constraints
on their treatment decisions. First, we have no direct evidence of dentists'
specific knowledge of the ADA and other legal prohibitions against
123. Eileen M. Gentry et al., Addressing the Public's Concerns About Human
Immunodeficiency Virus Transmission in Health-Care Settings, 153 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED.
2334, 2338 tbl. 4 (1993); see also Leonard Horowitz & Robert Lipkowitz, Survey on AIDS, Fear
and Infection Control: Attitudes Affecting Management Decisions, CLINICAL PREVENTIVE
DENTISTRY, Nov.-Dec. 1992, at 31 (reporting that nearly 70% of patients in small, single practices
would be afraid if they knew their dentist was treating people with HIV).
124. Horowitz & Lipkowitz, supra note 123, at 31-32.
125. Id. at 32.
126. Gerbert et al., supra note 76, at 195.
127. Gentry et al., supra note 123, at 2340.
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discrimination. Bennett's finding that 37% of dentists surveyed in 1993 were
"unsure of their legal obligations" suggests a problem, but more research is
needed. Second, we have a little more but still ambiguous evidence of dentists'
attitudes towards legal regulation in this area. Large numbers continue to claim
a "right" to decide whom to treat. This opinion is clearly inconsistent with the
protections of antidiscrimination law. High rates of refusal may indicate
ignorance of the law, confidence in its inefficacy, disdain for its requirements,
or a combination of all of the above. 2 ' Similar views have been detected in
dentists' responses to questions about bloodborne pathogen regulations. These
responses raise questions about the legitimacy of antidiscrimination rules. The
fact that so many refusing dentists were so candid about their categorical
unwillingness to treat patients in the Burris-Glick study strongly indicates that
the law did not concern them, despite the recent and widespread publicity in
the Philadelphia area and the dental press of law suits against dentists. 29 This
area clearly requires further research. 30 Finally, we do not have data directly
addressing why, if so many patients believe they have experienced
discrimination, so few have filed legal claims. It is very unlikely that the rate
of cases filed is a better indicator of patient experience than self-reported
survey data. The widespread belief among patients that dentists have a right
to decide whom to treat may be a factor, but we are unaware of how much
patients know about the law and whether they trust the procedures or value
the remedies it provides.
III. Using Law to Reduce Discrimination
Discriminatory behavior by dentists is potentially discouraged by several
regulatory systems, including health care financing rules, professional
licensure, tort law, disability discrimination law, and public health law. 3 '
Yet although discrimination on the basis of HIV in routine care is illegal under
the ADA and other federal, state, and local antidiscrimination statutes, we
cannot simply assume that law either ought to or may be used effectively to
reduce the rate at which dentists decline to care for patients with HIV. Both
128. The phrasing of questions in dental attitude studies was effective for identifying
negative feelings but not for determining attitudes about the law. For example, asking dentists
whether they would avoid treating patients with HIV "if they had the choice" may assume, but
neither identifies nor quantifies, the legal limits on their choice.
129. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
130. See Chen, supra note 94, at 714-15 (identifying other data needs).
131. I will use the term "regulatory environment" to denominate the constellation of
substantive and procedural rules applicable to the dentist, and the administrative and professional
structures that mediate them. For the process by which dentists construct and respond to legal
rules, I follow Lauren B. Edelman, Legal Ambiguity and Symbolic Structures: Organizational
Mediation of Civil Rights Law, 97 AM. J. Soc. 1531, 1531-32 (1992).
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regulation and the antidiscrimination principle itself are under attack. Even
assuming, as a matter of principle, that state power should be used against
discrimination, we must address serious questions about how, or whether, this
power may effectively be deployed.' 32 In this section, I will address both the
questions of whether we should regulate, and, if so, how. For clarity's sake,
I begin with an overview of the regulatory environment, identifying possible
regulations and discussing their advantages and disadvantages. I then consider
the leading objections to such legal interventions against discrimination.
Finally, I apply socio-legal research on compliance with law and some of the
experience in public health behavior change campaigns to identify a package
of regulations that is likely to reduce discrimination significantly and at
reasonable cost.
A. The Regulatory Environment: Options for Action
1. Dental Ethics
Ethics, as a system of regulation, operate largely through moral force
diffused through the professional culture-what Weyant and colleagues studied
under the rubric of "professionalism." Ethics have some impact on customary
legal standards, albeit indirect, as counsel for professional organizations in
health care largely avoid drafting ethical advisories in any form that could be
imported verbatim into a legal standard of care. Two questions follow: Does
the dental profession have an ethical prohibition of discrimination, and if so,
how is it conveyed to dentists?
Most ethicists in medicine and dentistry have posited a straightforward
obligation to provide patients with HIV the care professionals routinely provide
to other patients. As with antidiscrimination law, ethics does not require a
dentist to provide care to a patient with HIV that is medically contraindicated,
outside the bounds of his competence, or that he would not provide to a patient
132. Peter Schuck has recently complained that most academic legal writing about social
policy proceeds from undefended normative premises to a focus on the role of courts in legal
reform. "This line of inquiry invites an obvious follow-up question: to what extent do these
normative theories accurately reflect what courts do, and how courts affect social reality?
Regrettably, legal scholars seldom ask (much less answer) this question, a fact that should dismay
all of us who believe that empirical reality must inform the normative theories that we embrace
.... " Peter H. Schuck, Public Law Litigation and Social Reform, 102 YALE L. J. 1763, 1764
(1993). Judge Posner has recently launched a similar attack. See RICHARD POSNER, OVERCOMING
LAW (1995). For an outstanding example of empirical investigation of the effects of the law, see
Peter D. Blanck, Employment Integration, Economic Opportunity, and the Americans with
Disabilities Act: Empirical Studyfrom 1990-1993, 79 IOWA L. REV. 853 (1994) (prospective study
of impact of the ADA on cohort of mentally disabled people) [hereinafter Blanck, ADA]; Peter
D. Blanck, Empirical Study of the Employment Provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act:
Methods, Preliminary Findings, and Implications, 22 N.M. L. REV. 119 (1992).
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without HIV.'33 Ethical codes, which are premised on the special
professional status of health care workers,' 34 also include an obligation to
remain current in matters such as infection control and the diagnosis and care
of prevalent health conditions."'
The American Dental Association's ethical position is ambiguous. While
its policy statement provides that "[a] decision not to provide treatment because
the individual has AIDS or is HIV seropositive, based solely on that fact, is
unethical," 36 the policy leaves room for dispute over the full extent of the
obligation:
Decisions with regard to the type of dental treatment provided or
referrals made or suggested, in such instances, should be made on
the same basis as they are made with other patients, that is, whether
the individual dentist believes he or she has need of another's skills,
knowledge, equipment or experience and whether the dentist
believes, after consultation with the patient's physician if
appropriate, the patient's health status would be significantly
compromised by the provision of dental treatment. 137
The loophole appears in the term "believes." Perhaps the association intended
to imply that the dentist's evaluation of her capacity and the patient's needs
be objectively reasonable, but the canon's plain terms suggest a subjective
133. See Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Do Physicians Have An Obligation to Treat Patients With
AIDS?, 318 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1686 (1988); Rogers, supra note 57; M. Davis, Dentistry and
AIDS: An Ethical Opinion, J. AM. DENTAL ASS'N, Nov. 1989, (Supplement) at 9S-1 IS; see also
James W. Tegtmeier, Note, Ethics and AIDS: A Summary of the Law and a Critical Analysis of
the Individual Physician's Ethical Duty to Treat, 16 AM. J. L. & MED. 249 (1990) (reviewing
ethical and legal developments).
The position of the American Dental Association may be compared with both stricter and
looser commandments issued by medical bodies. The American Medical Association's position,
as articulated in 1988, by the Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, adds to language similar
to the ADA's the proviso that "[piersons who are seropositive should not be subjected to
discrimination based on fear or prejudice." In contrast, the Texas Medical Association took the
position that "[a] physician shall either accept the responsibility for the care and treatment of a
patient with AIDS . . . or refer the patient to an appropriate physician who will accept
responsibility." Second Supplemental Report of the Texas Medical Association Board of
Councilors (Nov. 20, 1987), quoted in Amir Halevy & Baruch Brody, Acquired Immunodeficiency
Syndrome and the Americans with Disabilities Act: A Legal Duty to Treat, 96 AM. J. MED. 282,
284 (1994).
134. See Emanuel, supra note 133.
135. See AMERICAN DENTAL Ass'N, ADA PRINCIPLES OF ETHICS AND CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT § 2 (rev. ed. 1988) ("The privilege of dentists to be accorded
professional status rests primarily in the knowledge, skill and experience with which they serve
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standard. As George Annas has noted, allowing the psychological
unwillingness to treat to qualify as the lack of objective competence to treat
"is the same as saying a doctor must treat an AIDS patient if the doctor wants
to treat an AIDS patient."' 38
Given the ambiguity in the standard, the association's public statements,
educational efforts, and overall example become particularly important in
establishing an ethical norm against discrimination. The association's public
comments on discrimination cases have been circumspect regarding the extent
of the dentist's obligation. In response to the several suits initiated by the
Department of Justice under the ADA, the dental association has repeated its
low estimate of the risk of transmission in the dental setting and reiterated the
need for dentists to treat patients with HIV in a compassionate manner. 139
Its words have been so cautious, however, that only one headline writer has
interpreted these bromides on compassion and infection control as constituting
outright support for the DOJ's position in dental suits. 4 Some of the dental
association's officers have appeared to cast doubt on the need for the project.
A story on the filing of the Department's first two cases, in 1993, reported
that:
Mary Logan, the American Dental Association's general counsel,
said that while cases of discrimination against HIV-positive
individuals have been found in 'isolated instances,' she does not
believe it is widespread. 'Universal precautions' that require
dentists to wear gloves and use disposable instruments have been
required [by OSHA] for more than a year and are not considered
controversial by the association's 140,000 members, Logan said."4
138. George J. Annas, Not Saints But Healers: The Legal Duties of Health Care
Professionals in the AIDS Epidemic, 78 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 844, 847 (1988).
139. See John Pope, Dentist: Patients were Referred Because of AIDS, NEW ORLEANS
TIMES PICAYUNE, Nov. 19, 1993, at B1.
140. Dentists' Association Backs AIDS Lawsuit, NEW ORLEANS TIMES PICAYUNE, Oct.
6, 1993, at A2.
141. William Pack, Experts: Fear of Patients Loss Leads to Refuisal, Hous. POST, Oct.
6, 1993, at A18. The statement is remarkable for the fact that the dental association had finally
lost its attack on the universal precautions rules only two days before, when the Supreme Court
denied certiorari. American Dental Ass'n v. Martin, 114 S. Ct. 172, denying cert. to 984 F.2d
823 (7th Cir. 1993); see supra note 51.
The clearest explication of a rule against discrimination by anyone connected with the
association came in a declaration provided to the Justice Department for use in a dental
discrimination case by Enid A. Neidle, Ph.D., of Columbia University, who was formerly
Assistant Executive Director, Scientific Affairs of the Association. As described by the court, her
affidavit stated unambiguously that the dentist's "policy of sending all patients with HIV or AIDS
to another general dentist-regardless of their then-current medical status, dental condition, or
dental needs-is in direct contravention of the Association's policies and constitutes a breach of
[the dentist's] professional and ethical obligations." United States v. Morvant, 898 F. Supp. 1157,
(E.D. La. 1995) (citing Plaintiffs Exhibit 60, at 15). One is left to wonder whether Dr. Neidle
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The association has taken a position that can be read as condemning
discrimination, but has avoided an unambiguous criticism of the practice, even
in cases where illegal bias was admitted or adjudicated. Like the AMA's, the
dental association's ethical position mirrors rather than resolves its members'
ambivalence about treating patients with HIV.' For those dentists who
believe that nondiscrimination is a requirement of professionalism, the
association's statement offers its general words. For those dentists who do not
wish to treat, the statement offers its lacunae. A serious and effective ethical
system would entail not only a less ambiguous norm,' 43 but also a
thoroughgoing effort to propagate and support the rules through education,
public positions on cases, and example.
2. Financing
Where, or whether, one receives health care largely depends on who
pays. A major reason people with HIV, and Americans generally, cannot get
dental care is inability to pay for it. By one estimate, 150 million Americans
lack dental insurance." Medicare has no provision for outpatient dental
care. Medicaid mandates it only for recipients under eighteen, and most state
Medicaid programs do not provide dental benefits for all participants.145
Those individuals receiving benefits find that few dentists will accept their
coverage. The majority of dentists decline or severely limit program
participation." More than a decade ago, when dental benefits were more
common, a study found that only a quarter of the million people in Michigan
with Medicaid dental benefits were receiving dental care, despite the fact that
40% of dentists surveyed, including 40% of dentists who did not take
Medicaid, reported a need for more business.'47 Not surprisingly, dental care
could have so averred had she still been employed by the Association.
142. See Benjamin Freedman, Health Professions, Codes and the Right to Refuse to Treat
HIV-Infectious Patients, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Apr.-May 1988, at 20.
143. For an example of language setting an objective standard for treating, see MD. CODE.
ANN., HEALTH OCC. § 4-315(a)(27) (1994); see also infra text accompanying note 155 (quoting
§ 4-315(a)(27)).
144. Chester Douglas & Joseph Henry, Mouth and Body, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 1994,
at El5.
145. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(a)(12) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992); THOMAS P. MCCORMACK,
THE AIDS BENEFITS HANDBOOK 97 (1990).
146. Venezie & Vann, Jr., supra note 108, at 179 (75% of pediatric dentists limit
participation); W. Paul Lang & Jane A. Weintraub, Comparison of Medicaid and Non-Medicaid
Dental Providers, 46J. PUB. HEALTH DENTISTRY207, 207-08 (1986) (half of respondents reported
not seeing any Medicaid patients).
147. Lang & Weintraub, supra note 146, at 207-09. The main reasons given by dentists
for avoiding the program are the low reimbursement rates, doubts about the actual payment of
reimbursable fees, concern about broken appointments, excessive paperwork (including pre-
approval of some procedures), and the bureaucratic complexity of the system. Id. at 210; Eli
Capilouto, The Dentist's Role in Access to Dental Care by Medicaid Recipients, 52 J. DENTAL
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is not evenly distributed in society.' 48 Poverty reduces a person's ability to
obtain dental care. People with HIV, many of whom tend also to be poor
(either from the start or because of their illness), frequently face a double
burden in getting care.
The present financing system presumably encourages patients with HIV
to get their care in dedicated clinics. Most HIV patients depend on Medicaid
or charity to obtain private dental care. Some social service agencies charitably
pay the market rate for individual clients in need of dental care, but these
resources are limited. Clinics tend both to accept Medicaid and to provide free
care to those unable to pay. 149
Could financing be used to improve dentists' willingness to treat patients
with HIV? Obviously, for patients whose access is limited primarily by poverty
(caused by HIV status or otherwise), universal dental insurance, or augmented
coverage for low income and indigent patients, would expand market access.
Short of that, providing dental benefits to all Medicaid and Medicare recipients
would address some of the problems of the indigent uninsured. Reimbursement
rates that were competitive with market levels, even accounting for the
bureaucratic costs of participating in the program, would also contribute to
better access. By the same logic, above-market reimbursement rates for HIV-
infected patients would give dentists a positive incentive to provide
treatment.150 Better financial support for dedicated clinics would also be
helpful. Funding for these dedicated'services is often precarious since it
depends on annual appropriations to health care and social service
organizations that face many competing priorities.
Injecting some experience into this logic confronts us with a case of
market economics foundering on the shoals of public choice. Universal dental
insurance is simply not going to happen in the foreseeable future. There is
even less chance that current financing reforms will widen Medicaid and
Medicare eligibility or increase reimbursement rates. In some states, a focused
effort to get dental coverage, paying market rates, only for people with HIV,
based on their medical needs and the discrimination problem, might face better
political odds, but, in addition to the usual problems of special pleading, it
EDUC. 647 (1988); Venezie & Vann, Jr., supra note 108, at 180; Damiano, supra note 108.
148. Schoen, supra note 107.
149. The Temple Clinic, for instance, accepts Medicaid and private insurance and seeks
grants from public and private agencies. Clinic personnel conduct funded research and receive
some salary and other support from the host institution. Telephone Interview with Michael Glick
(May 8, 1995).
150. Ian Ayres suggests that the government might provide an economic incentive to
provide care, and help educate dentists and the public about the low risk of HIV transmission,
in one cheap, fell swoop,, by offering free HIV-infection insurance for all dentists who treat
patients with HIV. This is a nice illustration of the ideal of complementary reinforcement of
educational and regulatory interventions. See infra Section Im.B.3.
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would require advocates for people with HIV to argue that care for HIV
patients is more expensive. In this light, the importance of dedicated clinics
in providing care may reflect the greater ability of advocates for HIV dental
care to fund specific programs at the margins than to fundamentally alter social
insurance.
In theory, health care financing tools could dramatically increase basic
access to care for indigent people with HIV. In practice, however, public
financing tends to support segregated care, and so, paradoxically, may actually
encourage private dentists to refer rather than treat.
3. Licensing Law
Every state has laws or regulations governing the licensure of individuals
to practice dentistry. Licensing rules generally impose substantive standards
of professionalism, competence and good conduct. ' As an element of
license renewal, thirty-four states require practitioners to meet continuing
professional education standards, generally leaving to the discretion of the
dental board the specific subject matter.152 State licensure law has the
potential to articulate and enforce clear norms of nondiscrimination against the
HIV-infected, and to promote education that reduces fear and other negative
attitudes.
a. Discipline
A survey conducted in 1993-94 asked state dental licensing boards to
summarize their policies with respect to HIV-based discrimination.'53 Eighty-
five percent of the fifty-four state and territorial boards responded. The authors
interpreted the responses of 26% of the boards as indicating a formal policy
against HIV-based discrimination, although for the most part this consisted of
151. See COUNCIL ON LICENSURE, ENFORCEMENT AND REGULATION, THE DIRECTORY
OF PROFESSIONAL AND OCCUPATIONAL REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA 216-17
(1994); see also MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH OCC. § 4-315(a)(16) (1994); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63,
§ 123.1(a)(8) (1995); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 29.1, 29.2, 29.5 (McKinney 1995); ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 225, para. 25/23(11) (Smith-Hurd 1994); NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-147(10) (Supp. 1994); WASH.
REV. CODE § 18.32.530 (1994).
152. LOUIS PHILLIPS ET AL., CONTINUING EDUCATION FOR SELECTED PROFESSIONALS
(1994). In four other states, enabling legislation is in place authorizing the dental board to require
continuing education. Id.; see, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 225, para. 25/16.1, NEB. STAT. § 71-185
(1990); N.J. REV. STAT. § 45:6-10.1 (1995).
153. Bernard Friedland & Richard W. Valachovic, State Dental Boards' Policies on a
Practitioner's Duty to Care for HIV Seropositive or AIDS Patients, J. AM. COLL. DENTISTS, Fall
1995, at 37.
The Yale Journal on Regulation
a citation to a state statute generally prohibiting HIV discrimination."5 4 Only
one state, Maryland, has an explicit antidiscrimination provision in its dental
licensure statute. The law authorizes the Board of Dentistry to reprimand,
place on probation, suspend, or revoke the license of any licensee who
"[r]efuses, withholds from, denies, or discriminates against an individual with
regard to the provision of professional services for which the licensee is
licensed and qualified to render because the individual is HIV positive."'"5
A few other states have included a specific prohibition against health care
discrimination in their HIV testing and confidentiality statutes, which include
reference to licensure law. Vermont prohibits health care providers, including
dentists, from refusing to provide care based on HIV and, in addition to a
private right of action for damages and injunctive relief, provides that
"[f]ailure of a health care provider to comply with any provision of this section
shall constitute grounds for disciplinary action or any other regulatory action
authorized by law.'156 Wisconsin law prohibits dentists, among other health
care providers, from "[r]efus[ing] to treat [a person with HIV], if his or her
condition is within the scope of licensure ... of the health care provider,"'57
or to "[p]rovide care to the individual at a standard that is lower than that
provided other individuals with like medical needs."15 Penalties include
actual damages, costs, and exemplary damages of up to $5,000 for wilful
violation. 159
Against a background of general antidiscrimination law and the more
specific ethical pronouncements of the American Dental Association, an
unjustified refusal to treat a patient with HIV arguably could be prosecuted
under many states' licensure law as "unprofessional" or "dishonorable"
154. Id. at 38 tbl. 1. The authors did not treat a reference to the ADA as a state policy,
noting that one board so responding had taken no action itself, while referring seven complaints
since 1990 to the Justice Department. The authors included within the rubric of formal policy any
statement by the board that it followed the American Dental Association policy, or otherwise
interpreted general language in state licensing law to prohibit HIV discrimination. Id. at 39.
155. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH OCC. § 4-315(a)(27) (1994). In the only other explicit
rule promulgated to date, the New Jersey medical licensing board issued a directive that a
"licensee of this Board may not categorically refuse to treat a patient who has AIDS or AIDS-
related complex, or an HIV-positive blood test, when he or she possesses the skill and experience
to treat the condition presented." See Mark Jackson & Nan Hunter, The Very Fabric of Health
Care: The Duty of Health Care Providers to Treat People Infected with HIV, in AIDS AGENDA:
EMERGING ISSUES IN CIVIL RIGHTS 123, 137 (Nan B. Hunter & William B. Rubenstein eds.,
1992).
156. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1128 (1995). Some states' general antidiscrimination
statutes require that administrative findings of discrimination be transmitted to the licensing board
by the human rights agency. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, 43 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 959(0(3) (1995).





conduct. 6 ' Such terms could derive their meaning from a variety of sources
apart from a dictionary definition, including the standards of the profession,
the intent of the legislature, or the rules and decisions of the dental board.' 6 '
Given the lack of action by dental boards so far, and the significant prevalence
of discrimination in the profession, recourse to professional custom or dental
board actions is problematic. Further, resort to ethical standards would not
necessarily cure the problem. The dental association's acceptance of a dentists'
subjective evaluation of his ability to treat in assessing a referral provides a
major loophole.' 62
The enforcement of an obligation not to discriminate would be a
departure from common practice for dental boards. Assuming that dental
boards operate like medical boards,' 63 their main concerns are seriously
incompetent practitioners, practitioners impaired by substance abuse or other
physical or mental disorders, and practitioners who violate prescription
laws.'" Professional boards have occasion to discipline practitioners who
have been found guilty of a crime, and they may also consider the outcomes
of malpractice actions. They have not themselves engaged in what is essentially
the application of legal rules of antidiscrimination to professional conduct, and
may find the process both unfamiliar and unpalatable. Even if a board is
willing to treat discrimination as unprofessional conduct, there is the question
of whether a board would undertake to apply discrimination law in the first
instance, rather than awaiting a decision in a court or human rights agency.
If it waits, the utility of the board as a source of initial control is lost. If it
160. See Annas, supra note 138, at 847-48. Unprofessional, Dishonorable or Immoral
Conduct, 70 C.J.S. Physicians and Surgeons § 39 (1987), provides a list of unprofessional conduct
including drunkenness, failure to keep complete and accurate records of controlled substances,
conviction of a crime, abandonment, deliberate falsification of patient's medical records, sexual
imposition, intentional dishonesty, and failure to supply subpoenaed patient records. Some states'
licensing schemes do not authorize discipline for simple "unprofessional" or disreputable conduct.
New Jersey, for example, authorizes discipline for a licensee convicted of a crime of moral
turpitude, or for willful and gross malpractice. N.J. REv. STAT. § 45:6-7 (1993).
161. See Megdal v. Oregon State Bd. of Dental Examiners, 605 P.2d 273 (Or. 1980).
162. Indeed, in the late 1980s, the Arizona State Board of Medical Examiners took the
position that refusal to treat patients with AIDS may only be deemed unprofessional conduct in
the absence of reasonable efforts to find another physician. Annas, supra note 138, at 848; MDs
Can Refuse AIDS Patients, AM. MED. NEWS, Nov. 6, 1987, at 37.
163. Information about the activities of dental licensing boards is sparse, so I have relied
upon data concerning doctors or that does not differentiate between doctors, dentists and other
licensed practitioners.
164. See, e.g., James Gray, Why Bad Doctors Aren't Kicked Out of Medicine, MED.
ECON., Jan. 20, 1992, at 126; Richard P. Kusserow et al., An Overview of State Medical
Discipline, 257 JAMA 820, 822-23 (1987). Public Citizen reported that only 11% of medical
actions involved incompetence or negligence, the rest being fraud, criminal convictions and drug
abuse and the like. Linda Oberman, Focusing on Quality: Medical Boards Increasing Commitment
to Competency Cases, AM. MED. NEWS, Apr. 12, 1993, at 2. See generally Timothy S. Jost,
Regulatory Approaches to Problems in the Quality of Medical Care: Diagnosis and Prescription,
22 U.C. DAvIs L. REv. 593 (1989).
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simply piles more punishment on a dentist who has already been sanctioned
under antidiscrimination law, 165 the marginal utility of the board action may
be slight, and may constitute overdeterrence.
In somejurisdictions, "unprofessional conduct" disciplinary actions could
offer a legally viable antidiscrimination mechanism, since constitutional
challenges for vagueness almost never succeed,' 66 and courts frequently
uphold charges of unprofessional conduct based on poor patient care. 67
Significantly, however, medical boards rarely extend the concept of
unprofessional conduct to embrace behavior not closely related to the practice
of dentistry or medicine, and when they have, courts have shown a reluctance
to accept the move. 168 If discrimination is seen as a matter of general civil
law, rather than as an element of professional practice, this theory could
preclude successful disciplinary actions against discrimination.
Even were a large number of state boards to articulate a clear rule against
discrimination or medically unjustified refusal to treat, a dentist who
discriminates might not feel compelled to change her behavior. Friedland and
Valachovic found that of eight boards presented with a total of thirty
complaints of possible discrimination, only one board had ever taken action,
twice "admonishing" the defendant dentists.' 69
More generally, the state boards that regulate health care professions have
a reputation for laxity and inefficiency. 70 Available statistics indicate a low
rate of action. The National Practitioner Data Bank (NPDB) is the repository
of nationwide data on disciplinary actions, including malpractice suits,
collected pursuant to the Health Care Quality Improvement Act (HCQIA) of
1986. ' 1 The 1968 licensure actions reported by state licensing agencies in
165. Friedland and Valachovic's findings suggest this might be the common response. See
supra note 153.
166. See, e.g., Chastek v. Anderson, 416 N.E.2d 247, 249 (I11. 1981) (citing cases). But
see Pennsylvania State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Cohen, 292 A.2d 277 (Pa. 1972) (licensure revocation
for conduct not specifically prohibited is unconstitutional).
167. See, e.g., Vance v. Fordham, 671 P.2d 124, 128-29 (Utah 1983); Kansas State Bd.
of Healing Arts v. Acker, 612 P.2d 610 (Kan. 1980); Strigenz v. Department of Regulation &
Licensing Dentistry Examining Bd., 307 N.W.2d 664 (Wis. 1981).
168. In an Oregon case, for example, the state supreme court refused to interpret the term
to cover fraud in the securing of malpractice insurance, holding that the board should have issued
prospective rules defining the conduct in question as unprofessional. Megdal v. Oregon State Bd.
of Dental Examiners, 605 P.2d 273 (Ore. 1980).
169. Friedland & Valachovic, supra note 153, at 38 tbl. 1, 39.
170. Kusserow et al., supra note 164, at 821. In one extreme instance, California's state
medical board literally shredded hundreds of uninvestigated case files in an effort to eliminate its
backlog. David Azevedo, A Bloodied Medical Board Fights for a Comeback; Medical Board of
California, MED. ECON., Sept. 27, 1993, at 36.
171. Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3784 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 11,101-
11,137 (1994)). In addition to payments made by or on behalf of a doctor or dentist, the Bank
collects actions affecting a practitioner's license by a state medical or dental board, actions
affecting a practitioner's clinical privileges that arise as a result of peer review action at a health
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the first year of the NPDB's operation included 694 sentences of probation
(35.3%), 338 sentences of suspension (17.2%), 249 revocations (12.7%), and
164 reprimands (8.3%).172 Although the rates vary significantly from state
to state (exhibiting an inverse relation between the number of practitioners in
a state and the rate of discipline), the mean rate of license actions per 1000
physicians in the United States was 2.7.173 (By way of comparison, the
Harvard Malpractice Study found that the 1984 rate of malpractice claims
against doctors in New York was 70 per 1000 licensed physicians, and 130
per 1000 in active practice.) 17 4 The Federation of State Medical Boards also
compiles statistics on physician discipline. In 1993 the Federation reported a
total of 3707 cases resulting in disciplinary action against a physician, up 337
from the year before. Sanctions ranged from license revocation to
reprimand. 1
75
Critics of medical regulation, such as Dr. Sidney Wolfe of Public Citizen,
claim that the prevalence of incompetence and impairment is much higher than
care facility, and actions affecting membership in a professional society. Health care institutions
and licensing agencies are supposed to use the data to prevent incompetent practitioners from
slipping through the many loopholes in the regulatory structure composed of more than fifty state
and territorial licensing agencies and thousands of health care entities.
172. Reinstatement/restoration of licenses, and "other" comprised the remaining 27%.
Fitzhugh Mullen et al., The National Practitioner Data Bank: Report From the First Year, 268
JAMA 73, 75 tbl. 2 (1992). The number of medical license actions reported by the NPDB was
about half that reported for the same period by the Federation of State Medical Boards, a
difference that cannot be explained entirely by differing criteria. Id. Thus the NPDB figures seem
to undercount the actual number of actions. Overall,
[a] total of 18,561 adverse actions and malpractice payments made were reported
to the NPDB during the first year of operation. . . . Fifteen percent of these reports
were the result of adverse actions taken with respect to a health care practitioner's
license, clinical privileges, or professional society membership. The vast majority
(85 %) of the reports were a result of malpractice payments. This pattern was evident
for physicians, dentists, and other health care practitioners. Of the adverse actions
reported, 71% were the result of licensure disciplinary actions and 28% involved
clinical privilege actions. An adverse action involving professional society
membership was an infrequent occurrence constituting less than 1 % of all adverse
actions (twenty-one reports).
Id. at 75.
173. Id. at 75; cf. FEDERATION OF STATE MEDICAL BDS. OF THE U.S., INC., PRESS
RELEASE, 1993 SUMMARY OF ACTIONS TAKEN BY STATE MEDICAL BOARDS (1994) [hereinafter
FEDERATION OF STATE MEDICAL BDS.] (reporting higher rate of discipline (4.31 per 1000
physicians) using different methods and data).
174. PAUL C. WEILER Er AL., A MEASURE OF MALPRACTICE: MEDICAL INJURY,
MALPRACTICE LITIGATION, AND PATIENT COMPENSATION 69 (1993).
175. FEDERATION OF STATE MEDICAL BDS., supra note 173; Charles Marwick, State
Medical Boards Discipline More, Want Role in Health System Reform, 271 JAMA 1723 (1994).
There was a substantial increase in disciplinary measures in 1994. The number of adverse actions
increased to 3,685, a rate of almost 6 per 1000 licensed physicians. Christopher Connell, Sharp
Rise Reported in Physicians Disciplined by State Medical Boards, PHILA. INQUIRER, Apr. 6, 1995,
at A17.
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the disciplinary rate. 176 The Department of Health and Human Service's
Office of Inspector General conducted a study in the late 1980s that concluded
that, while no definitive data allowed the quantification of incompetent and
impaired physicians, the data do "suggest quite strongly that even when all
appropriate caveats are taken into account, the universe of potentially
actionable events far exceeds the number of disciplinary actions actually
imposed by the boards."177 Even when professionals are ultimately
disciplined, few state boards make a sustained effort to publicize misconduct
or its punishment ."'s
While the unwillingness of professionals to police their peers is a likely
suspect, the low rate of disciplinary action can also be explained by fiscal and
legal impediments to enforcement. Such actions are often procedurally
cumbersome, involving lengthy appeals and high burdens of proof. Most states
require "clear and convincing evidence" of a licensing violation. 79 This is
a higher standard than is applicable under antidiscrimination statutes such as
the ADA, which requires only a preponderance of the evidence to establish
discrimination." 0 Litigating a disputed complaint can be expensive and
protracted, particularly if the dentist is fighting for her professional life."'
The cost, for the agency, can run into six figures." 2 A board's first
application of an antidiscrimination rule might well be litigated to the fullest
extent possible.
Licensing boards have not fared well in the appropriations process. In
the recent recession, many suffered substantial budget cuts. Between 1990 and
1992, for example, Connecticut's medical licensing board lost about a fifth of
its staff. During the same period, license fees were tripled, but the money went
into the state's cash-starved general fund. In Massachusetts, the board lost a
176. Gray, supra note 164, at 128.
177. Diane M. Gianelli, IG Report Suggests Medical Boards Don't Discipline Enough
Doctors, AM. MED. NEWS, June 15, 1990, at 1 (internal quotation omitted); see also Kusserow
et al., supra note 164 (earlier Inspector General's investigation).
178. State Boards Fail to Disclose Their Record; Physician Discipline, PEOPLE'S MED.
Soc'Y NEWSL., Apr. 1992, at 8; see also Linda Oberman, Release of Disciplinary Data Highly
Charged; the Disclosure of Physician Misconduct Proceedings, AM. MED. NEWS, Mar. 15, 1993,
at 7 (reporting that only 28 states medical boards publish newsletters identifying disciplined
professionals).
179. Gray, supra note 164, at 144-46; Kusserow, supra note 164, at 823.
180. The higher standard would be particularly burdensome in cases turning on the
propriety of a "referral," where arguments about the patient's dental needs and the dentists'
knowledge and competence could cloud the issue of intent.
181. On average, medical boards in the United States require almost 27 weeks to dispose
of or dismiss a complaint. Entering into a consent agreement averages 37 weeks, and disposition
through a full disciplinary hearing requires an average of 46.9 weeks. Marwick, supra note 175.
But "[it's not unusual for an accused doctor to practice through two years of investigation and
board hearings, and another five in appeals-sometimes a quarter of a career between the original
complaint and the ultimate implementation of board discipline." Gray, supra note 164, at 146.
182. Gray, supra note 164, at 146.
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third of its staff between 1988 and 1992.83 Perhaps the most extreme
example of legislative indifference to dental regulation came in 1994, when
the Texas Board of Dental Examiners was allowed to lapse under a state Sunset
law. "'
Despite the bleak prospects for actual enforcement of a rule against
discrimination by dental boards, clearer licensing regulations against dental
discrimination may still have significant value. A complaint, even if it does
not lead to discipline, may frighten an individual practitioner and, if
publicized, have some deterrent effect."8 5 "Weak" sanctions may also be seen
as flexible sanctions that shame but also reintegrate the wrongdoer into the
professional community, with consequent benefits for acceptance of the norm
and long-term behavioral change. 86 Practitioners may also fail to assess
correctly their actual chances of being disciplined.' 87 More important, dental
boards are substantially constituted by dentists themselves. In setting a norm
of nondiscrimination, they wield the power of professional regard. The mere
existence of the norm, even if enforced by other authorities in other forms,
has the capacity to legitimate the same rule promulgated by non-dentists.
b. Primary and Continuing Education
Given the impact of education on dentists' behavior, the educational
requirements of licensure law could prove useful in reducing discrimination
against patients with HIV. Dental boards in most states have the authority to
require regular continuing education for dentists and allied health personnel
on precisely the subjects researchers deem to be most relevant to the treatment
183. Leigh Page, Hard Times in States Afflict Underfunded Licensure Boards; Medical
Boards, AM. MED. NEWS, Mar. 2, 1992, at 1; see also Gray, supra note 164, at 143-44 (funding
for medical boards inadequate in many states).
184. Lisa Tanner, Dental Board's Sunset Has Industry Looking For Options, DALLAS BUS.
J., Mar. 4, 1994, at 7.
185. "Many complaints that don't lead to sanctions do, however, clean up marginal
behavior. Both the accused doctor and the colleagues who knew he was being investigated become
aware of being watched. We can't quantify it, but subliminal regulation does occur-and it works."
Gray, supra note 164, at 148 (quoting M. Roy Schwarz, AMA Senior Vice President for medical
education and science).
186. See infra text accompanying notes 335-40.
187. The Harvard Malpractice Study found that doctors systematically and substantially
overestimate their chances of being sued. WEILER ET AL., supra note 174, at 124-25. A far less
rigorous survey of readers conducted by American Medical News found that eighty-three of ninety-
eight doctors responding were deterred by fear of licensing action or criminal sanctions in their
prescription of pain medication for patients, giving less than they otherwise would. Flora Johnson
Skelly, Fear of Sanctions Limits Prescribing of Pain Drugs: Survey of American Medical News
Physician Readers, AM. MED. NEWS, Aug. 15, 1994, at 19.
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of patients with HIV.' s
Florida is the only state that requires dentists and other professionals to
complete a course on HIV/AIDS. Its statute, passed as part of a comprehensive
HIV bill that included privacy, criminal and other provisions, orders state
licensing boards to:
require each person licensed or certified . . . to complete a
continuing educational course, approved by the board, on human
immunodeficiency virus and acquired immune deficiency syndrome
as part of biennial relicensure or recertification. Such course shall
include information on the modes of transmission, infection control
procedures, clinical management, and prevention of human
immunodeficiency virus and acquired immune deficiency syndrome
and its impact on testing, confidentiality of test results, and
treatment of patients.189
Continuing education should also include training on communicating risk
to patients, many of whom are uncertain about the facts and how to interpret
them. 190 We should not assume that health care professionals are themselves
comfortable talking about HIV, or that they are able by virtue of their general
training to educate patients effectively about this particularly volatile matter.
Training in risk communication may also increase dentists' confidence in
treating patients with HIV in so far as it equips them to understand and address
their other patients' fears, and so diminishes dentists' own concerns about
losing business.
Professional education in infection control is also justified as a means of
promoting compliance with infection control rules . Once in practice, dentists
in private offices are largely unregulated. Although subject to OSHA rules on
infection control, 9 ' the chances of any particular dentist being monitored
are astronomically low. Once in private practice, dentists are not subject to
review by peers or others, are not exposed to new information or standards
through collegial work, and are left to their own devices in obtaining
188. Dental boards set the requirements for initial licensure, usually in broad terms that
defer to the specific requirements of accredited dental schools. Infection control is now part of
all dental school curricula, but dental schools have not uniformly required students to take one
or more courses in the treatment of patients with infectious diseases. Telephone Interview with
Michael Glick (May 8, 1995). Given the evidence that suggests a relation between actual
experience treating patients with HIV and subsequent willingness to treat, licensing authorities
may consider clearly requiring such training as a condition of initial licensure if, in the next few
years, dental schools do not themselves begin to require such training.
189. FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 455.2226(1) (1995).
190. See Gentry et al., supra note 123, at 2339-40.
191. See David I. Schulman, The Dentist, HIV and the Law: Duty to Treat, Need to




No board can "enforce" learning or screen out those practitioners who
do not accept the message offered."" In setting basic standards of
knowledge, however, boards could help legitimate and continually reinforce
norms of treatment. No other policy would do more to create conditions under
which these norms would take root.
4. Tort Law
The tort system is the major legal regulator of health care worker
behavior. It is also politically controversial, unpopular among the regulated,
and underutilized by those it is designed to protect.193 For all that, its
workings are, in important areas, largely unknown. 94
There are several tort theories under which dentists who refuse to treat
patients with HIV have been or may be sued, including abandonment,
malpractice, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Although the
common law does not require a dentist to contract with a patient, the tort of
abandonment does limit a dentist's capacity to terminate a patient relationship
at will. 9 ' Abandonment, however, is a limited constraint on dentists'
behavior, barring only the withdrawal of presently necessary assistance without
giving a patient sufficient notice to find another provider.196 Presumably, it
would apply only to patients with very acute dental needs, and then only for
the immediate care required to take care of the emergency aspects of a
patient's condition. While some dental care is long term, dentists are fungible
enough that, with reasonable notice, a patient would be hard put to make out
a case that a refusal to treat constituted abandonment. This is not to say that
192. See Jost, supra note 164, at 601 ("Licensure exams screen out candidates ... who
lack basic knowledge or cognitive skills, but the exams do little to address the interpersonal
element of care.").
193. See generally WEILER ET AL., supra note 174.
194. For a thorough account of what is not known, see Michael J. Saks, Do We Really
Know Anything about the Behavior of the Tort Litigation System-And Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L.
REV. 1147 (1992).
195. Troyen A. Brennan, Patients and Health Care Workers, in AIDS LAW TODAY: A
NEW GUIDE FOR THE PUBLIC: 377, 381, 396-97 (Scott Burris et al. eds., 1993) [hereinafter AIDS
LAW TODAY].
196. See, e.g., Ricks v. Budge, 64 P.2d 208, 212 (Utah 1937) ("A physician has the right
to withdraw from a case, but if the case is such as to still require further medical or surgical
attention, he must, before withdrawing from the case, give the patient sufficient notice so the
patient can procure other medical attention if he desires.") Abandonment is not necessarily an
independent tort in all jurisdictions. See, e.g., Woolfork v. Duncan, No. CIV. A. 94-1532, 1995
WL 11976 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 5, 1995) (abandonment a species of negligence under Pennsylvania law).
For a discussion of the tort as it might apply to a patient with HIV, see Troyen A. Brennan,
Ensuring Adequate Health Care for the Sick: The Challenge of the Acquired Immunodeficiency
Syndrome as an Occupational Disease, 1988 DUKE L.J. 29, 35-36 (1988).
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a plaintiff who got that far could not, with a sympathetic story of rude and
inconvenient treatment, convince a jury to find abandonment under the general
cover of "reasonableness. "197
Similarly, one can imagine circumstances in which the description of a
refusal to treat when presented to "an average member of the community
would arouse his resentment against the [dentist], and lead him to exclaim
'outrageous'."198 This tort of outrage (also called intentional infliction of
emotional distress), with its declamatory test, has been applied to instances of
racial discrimination, and would take into consideration the dependent
relationship between patient and dentist. Its effectiveness depends, however,
upon the "average member of the community's" attitudes toward people with
HIV. 199
Like other professionals, dentists are subject to liability for harms to a
patient arising from an unreasonable failure to provide the level of care
customary to the profession. 2" A dentist whose discrimination took the form
197. Depending on the nature of the treatment, there might also be a breach of contract.
198. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d; see, e.g., Gomez v. Hug, 645 P.2d
916 (Kan. Ct. App. 1982). Such a claim was made in Howe v. Hull by a patient refused admission
to a hospital because he had HIV. In denying summary judgment for defendants, the court
reasoned that refusing to care for someone because of HIV was an act sufficiently bad to justify
a jury in finding both that the act itself was outrageous and that it was performed with reckless
disregard of a high probability that harm would occur. Howe v. Hull, No. 3:92CV7658, 1994
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17,417 at *28-34 (N.D. Ohio 1993); accord Miller v. Spicer, 822 F. Supp.
158, 169-70 (D. Del. 1993). The jury subsequently found for the defendants on the intentional
infliction of emotional distress claim, though the plaintiff prevailed on ADA and section 504
claims. Howe supra, at 17,443; see also Woolfork v. Duncan, No. CIV.A. 94-1532, 1995 WL
11,976 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 5, 1995) (denying summary judgment on patient's intentional infliction
claim).
199. HIV litigation is subject to general influences, like the race, class and sexual
preference of plaintiffs, and the social power of institutional or otherwise privileged defendants.
Studies of litigation have found that "have-not" plaintiffs with HIV tend to lose more often than
they win (at the appellate level), but that they nevertheless win more often than a cold view of
their social status might predict. See Jane Aiken & Michael Musheno, Why Have-Nots Win in the
HIV Litigation Arena: Socio-Legal Dynamics of Extreme Cases, 16 LAW & POL'Y 267 (1994);
Michael C. Musheno et al., Court Management of AIDS Disputes: A Sociolegal Analysis, 16 LAW
& SOC. INQUIRY 737 (1991).
The case law affords room to fashion other more or less far-fetched claims as well. For
example, a few decisions have suggested, in cases involving emergency rooms, that a clearly stated
public policy requiring a facility to provide care, or even a well-established custom, could ground
a duty to do so in tort law. See Guerrero v. Copper Queen Hosp., 537 P.2d 1329, 1332 (Ariz.
1975); Wilmington Gen. Hosp. v. Manlove, 174 A.2d 135, 140 (Del. 1961); Brennan, supra note
196, at 38-39. It might be argued that the Americans with Disabilities Act and similar state statutes
constitute such a policy, though the existence of specified modes of relief under these statutes
would raise the question of the propriety of a parallel action in tort. The Emergency Medical
Treatment and Active Labor Act also speaks to this behavior, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(2)(A)
(1994), but would simply not apply to private dentists, no matter how urgent the patient's needs
were.
200. See, e.g., O'Brien v. Stover, 443 F.2d 1013, 1017 (8th Cir. 1971); Morrison v.
MacNamara, 407 A.2d 555, 561 (D.C. 1979). For an overview of the common law of medical
malpractice, see FRANK M. MCCLELLAN, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: LAW, TACTICS, AND ETHICS
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of providing inferior care-not performing a necessary procedure, or
substituting a simpler treatment for a better one-could be alleged to have
breached the professional standard of care, but only if the alternative treatment
caused the patient harm. 21' At least one such case, against an obstetrician
who refused treatment to a woman with HIV and advised her to have an
abortion, has survived summary judgment."
Damages would be limited in most tort cases involving dentistry. Few
dental problems are immediately life threatening, so a person in need of care
will normally have the time to find a dentist who can provide proper treatment.
Moreover, the alternative treatment offered by the dentist may effectively
stabilize or even eliminate the patient's problem. In that case, the damages will
mostly be dignitary. Patients with HIV do on occasion recover substantial sums
for dignitary harms, notably in the realm of privacy.2 3 Given the public's
ambivalence about dentists treating people with HIV, however, the sympathy
factor may not loom large in dental cases, particularly where no physical harm
was suffered.
While tort claims are available to victims of discrimination, their effect
on dental behavior is uncertain. A rule against discrimination articulated by
judges and enforced in the tort system is likely to be accorded little legitimacy
by dentists. The Harvard Malpractice Study found that physicians did change
their self-reported behavior in response to concerns about malpractice
liability,2" but the implications for dental discrimination are not
straightforward given the weak analogy between negligence and intentional
discrimination. The incidence of discrimination and discrimination-based claims
will never remotely approach the rate of malpractice litigation. Indeed, the
behavioral analogy with malpractice may hold only in negative terms. In
response to malpractice fears, physicians' behavior tends to involve greater
29-44 (1994). While most jurisdictions use a national standard, some retain local or case-by-case
standards focussing on the resources and training available to the defendant. Id. at 31. In such
a jurisdiction, a widespread local ignorance or lack of resources could be used by dentist as the
basis for an argument that the standard of care had not been breached.
201. Proving causation in a case of omitted treatment can be difficult, particularly in the
case of an individual with a serious, multifaceted and fatal illness like HIV. Some jurisdictions
relax the ordinary rules of causation, see, e.g., Hamil v. Bashline, 392 A.2d 1280 (Pa. 1978),
or allow recovery for a "loss of chance," see, e.g., O'Brien, 443 F.2d 1013 (applying Iowa law).
But see Cooper v. Sisters of Charity of Cincinnati, N.E.2d 97 (Ohio 1971). See generally
MCCLELLAN, supra note 200, at 43-44.
202. Doe v. Abitbol, 608 N.Y.S.2d 518 (App. Div. 1994). In this case, the availability
of a tort claim helped the plaintiff maintain a suit against an individual who was held not to be
covered by federal antidiscrimination law.
203. See, e.g., Multimedia WMAZ, Inc. v. Kubach, 443 S.E.2d 491 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994)
(awarding $500,000 for breach of privacy to man whose family and friends were already aware
of his infection); see also Scott Burris, Testing, Disclosure and the Right to Privacy, in AIDS LAW
TODAY, supra note 195, at 115, 139 (describing other cases).
204. WEILER ET AL, supra note 174, at 124-29.
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use of "defensive" measures and more paperwork rather than the increased
care the tort model predicts.2"5 The effect of tort liability on dentists who
discriminate may likewise be more careful discrimination rather than
nondiscriminatory treatment.
Even if they do not help legitimize the norm against discrimination, nor
directly deter dentists from discrimination, tort claims have important
consequences in lawsuits that are based primarily on antidiscrimination law.
Malpractice and intentional tort claims may add to the stigma of the
antidiscrimination suit.2' 6 In addition, intentional tort suits may expose a
dentist to personal liability outside the limits of her insurance policy. Given
the breadth of the antidiscrimination laws, an independent tort claim will rarely
be needed to establish liability, but tort claims may make up for the absence
of monetary damages under the ADA.2"7
5. Antidiscrimination Law
The legal response to the HIV epidemic has been shaped by the
conceptualization of communicable disease as a disability, subject to protection
under federal and state law.20 s Although the Supreme Court has reserved
decision on the issue, lower courts have uniformly held that HIV and AIDS
are disabilities under a range of state and federal statutes.2" Several states
205. Id. The study was unable to find a statistically significant correlation between
malpractice litigation and levels of negligently caused injury. Id. at 129-31.
206. See Jost, supra note 164, at 605-06.
207. There are also disadvantages to tort law. Tort claims, particularly those like
malpractice that would depend on expert testimony on the professional standard, may be more
difficult to prove and somewhat more costly to prosecute than claims under the ADA and other
antidiscrimination statutes. In Miller v. Spicer, 822 F. Supp. 158 (D. Del. 1003), for example,
plaintiff's discrimination claims survived summary judgment, while his negligence claim (cast as
breach of contract) was dismissed for lack of expert testimony, among other grounds.
208. See Arthur S. Leonard, Discrimination, in AIDS LAW TODAY, supra note 195, at
297; Scott Burris, Public Health, "AIDS Exceptionalism, "and the Law, 27 J. MARSHALL L. REV.
251 (1994) [hereinafter Burris, "AIDS Exceptionalism ]; Scott Burris, Rationality Review and the
Politics of Public Health, 34 VILL. L. REv. 933 (1989); Robert A. Kushen, Asymptomatic
Infection with the AIDS Virus as a Handicap Under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 88 COLUM.
L. REv. 563 (1988); cf. Gary Lawson, AIDS, Astrology and Arline: Towards a Causal
Interpretation of Section 504, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 237 (1989) (arguing against treatment of AIDS
as a disability); Halevy & Brody, supra note 133. The leading case is School Bd. v. Arline, 480
U.S. 273 (1987), which involved a plaintiff with tuberculosis.
209. See, e.g., Chalk v. United States Dist. Court, 840 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1988)
(Rehabilitation Act); United States v. Morvant, 843 F. Supp. 1092 (E.D. La. 1994) (ADA Title
II); Doe v. Kohn Nast & Graf, P.C. 862 F. Supp. 1310 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (ADA Title I); Cain
v. Hyatt, 734 F. Supp. 671 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (Pennsylvania Human Relations Act); Support
Ministries for Persons with AIDS, Inc. v. Village of Waterford, N.Y., 808 F. Supp. 120
(N.D.N.Y. 1992) (Fair Housing Act).
This is not to say that every state disability statute would prohibit the form of discrimination
at issue here. For example, the Louisiana Attorney General opined that a dentist could refuse to
treat a patient with HIV despite the Louisiana Disability Discrimination Law because a dentist can
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have amended their general disability discrimination statutes to include
HIV.21
In addition to covering HIV and AIDS under disability discrimination
statutes, several states have passed HIV-specific antidiscrimination statutes211
or statutes explicitly prohibiting HIV discrimination in health care."'
The most important prohibition against dental discrimination lies in Title
III of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), governing public
accommodations.213 Although the question whether a professional office
qualifies as a "public accommodation" has been contentious in cases under
state law,214 the ADA definition explicitly includes the "professional office
already refuse to accept a patient for any reason. Office of Louisiana Attorney General, No.
87-707, 1987 La. AG LEXIS 223 (Oct. 8, 1987) (construing LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 37:751-
:793). Similarly, in Doe v. Kahala, 808 P.2d 1276 (Haw. 1991), the court ruled that, while refusal
to treat based on HIV would be illegal, a dentist could refuse to treat a patient who refused to
reveal his HIV status. But see $10,000 Settlement Reached in Suit Over Unauthorized HIV Test,
AIDS Lm. REP. (Andrews), Aug. 9, 1994, at 12,262 (reporting tort and confidentiality law
settlement by dentist who had tested patient for HIV without consent).
210. See Leonard, supra note 208, at 297-98; Josephine Gittler & Sharon Rennert, HIV
Infection Among Women and Children and Antidiscrimination Laws. An Overview, 77 IOWA L.
REV. 1313, 1383-85 (1992). These, like Title I of the ADA, are frequently enforced at least
initially through an administrative procedure, and like the EEOC, many state agencies have a
substantial backlog. In 1990, the ACLU of Pennsylvania and the AIDS Law Project of
Pennsylvania brought eleven cases against local dentists to the Pennsylvania Human Relations
Commission, in part to test the efficacy of the procedure. At the time the cases were settled, after
three years, the Commission had not yet held a single hearing on the matter and had a backlog
of 7000 cases. Lawsuits, supra note 71.
211. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ch. 760.50(4)(a) (1994) (prohibiting discrimination based on
HIV in public accommodations); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 130-148(i) (1992) ("[Ilt shall be unlawful
to discriminate against any person having AIDS virus or HIV infection on account of that infection
in determining suitability for ... the use of places of public accommodation, as defined in [N.C.
Gen. Stat.] 168A-3(8) . . ").
212. ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-15-905(d) (Michie 1991), prohibits denial of "appropriate
care" but establishes no penalty or civil action. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 19,203-A(3) (West
1991), prohibits denial of care based on a patient's refusal to take an HIV test, and § 19,206
provides for liquidated damages of up to $5000 for a willful violation; OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 3701.245 (Baldwin 1995), prohibits denial of health care based on the patient's refusal to consent
to an HIV test or disclose his status; W. VA. CODE § 16-3C-6(a) (1991) forbids the use of an HIV
test result to deny "quality care" but provides no penalty.
213. The ADA states: "No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of
disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages,
or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or
leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation." 42 U.S.C. § 12,182(a) (Supp. II 1990).
The Rehabilitation Act, where applicable, contains essentially the same limits, though few dentists
accept Medicaid, the necessary "federal financial assistance" to trigger coverage. See Howe v.
Hull, No. 3:92CV7658, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17417, at *28-30 (N.D. Ohio 1994).
214. Compare Hurwitz v. New York City Comm'n on Human Rights, 535 N.Y.S.2d 1007
(Sup. Ct. 1988) (finding dental clinic is a public accommodation), decided sub nom. Campanella
v. Hurwitz, No. GA-0021-03/04/87 (N.Y. City Comm'n on Human Rights June 30, 1993) (final
decision and order awarding complainant $7500 in damages) and Lewis v. Runde, No. 92-154-
PA[N] (D.C. Comm'n on Human Rights July 1, 1993) (dental office a place of public
accommodation) with Sattler v. City of N.Y. Comm'n on Human Rights, 580 N.Y.S.2d 35 (App.
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of a health care provider."25 Several early cases under the ADA held that
medical and dental practices are within the coverage of Title 111.216
Denial of routine care based on HIV is certainly a violation of the ADA.
In United States v. Morvant, the first ADA dental case to reach a decision, the
court found against a Louisiana dentist who had declined to treat at least two
patients because they had HIV.2" 7 Two other major cases have already
settled,218 and there have been several judgments for HIV-positive patients
who suffered discrimination at the hands of doctors.2 19 The Morvant decision
rejected a justification commonly offered by dentists for discrimination-that
HIV is too complicated, and too dangerous, for the average dentist to
treat.22° In pre-ADA litigation, courts have also rejected the "harm-to-self"
Div. 1990) (finding one-chair dental practice not a public accommodation), appeal denied, 594
N.Y.S.2d 715 (1992) and Cahill v. Rosa, No. 94-09592, 1995 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 10248
(App. Div. Oct. 16, 1995) (private dental offices are excluded from definition of public
accommodation in N.Y. statute unless they are clinics).
215. 42 U.S.C. § 12,181(7) (Supp. II 1990). Early decisions suggest that the term will
be read broadly. See, e.g., Carparts Distribution Ctr., Inc. v. Automotive Wholesaler's Ass'n,
37 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 1994) (holding that insurance plan qualifies as "public accommodation");
cf Aikins v. St. Helena Hosp., 843 F. Supp. 1329 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (holding that physician
working as independent contractor in hospital does not operate a public accommodation). But see
Pappas v. Bethesda Hosp. Ass'n, 861 F. Supp. 616 (S.D. Ohio 1994).
216. Woolfork v. Duncan, No. 7C. A. 94-1532, 1995 WL 11976 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 5, 1995)
(doctor's office); Mayberry v. Von Valtier, 843 F. Supp. 1160 (E.D. Mich. 1994); United States
v. Morvant, 843 F. Supp. 1092 (E.D. La. 1994).
Given the concern of dentists regarding the negative reaction of others to their treating
patients with HIV, it is worth noting that discrimination law would also protect a dentist from
retaliation from landlords or others based on her treatment of patients with HIV. See, e.g., Barton
v. New York City Comm'n on Human Rights, 542 N.Y.S.2d 176 (1989) (upholding determination
of discrimination against dentist who terminated another dentist's sublease of office space on
ground that the sublessee was providing dental treatment to persons with AIDS).
217. United States v. Morvant, No. 93-3251, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3739 (E.D. La. Mar.
22, 1995).
218. In United States v. Castle, AIDS Litig. Rep. (Andrews) 12,602 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 2,
1994), a dental provider and its management company agreed to pay $100,000 in civil penalties
and compensatory damages, to implement non-discriminatory polices, and to educate all staff in
infection control and HIV care. A similar agreement, with $29,000 in fines and damages, was
reached without the filing of a DOJ lawsuit in a case against three Hartford, Connecticut dentists.
See Settlement Agreement, supra note 2.
219. See, e.g., Miller v. Spicer, 822 F. Supp. 158 (D. Del. 1993); Howe v. Hull, 873
F. Supp. 72 (N.D. Ohio 1994).
220. Morvant, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3739, at *11-13. The danger argument arises in
general case law in the form of the Arline "significant risk" analysis. See, e.g., Chalk v. United
States Dist. Court, 840 F.2d 701, 709 (9th Cir. 1988). It has been codified in slightly different
terms in the ADA and amendments to § 504:
Nothing in this subchapter shall require an entity to permit an individual to participate in
or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages and accommodations
of such entity where such individual poses a direct threat to the health or safety of others.
The term "direct threat" means a significant risk to the health or safety of others that cannot
be eliminated by a modification of policies, practices, or procedures or by the provision
of auxiliary aids or services.
42 U.S.C. § 12,182(b)(3) (1994). In two cases concerning allegedly excessive infection control
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variant of the risk gambit, in which the provider contends that treatment would
pose a significant risk of harm to the patient.2 1
In addition to outright refusals to treat, disability discrimination law has
also been applied to cases in which the defendant's judgment about what sort
of treatment was necessary seemed to be improperly influenced by the patient's
disability.222 These cases potentially raise complex questions of professional
precautions in the mid-1980s, New York courts overturned agency findings of discrimination on
the grounds that the medical judgments involved were reasonable when made. North Shore Univ.
Hosp. v. Rosa, 600 N.Y.S.2d 90 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1993), aff'd, 1995 N.Y. LEXIS 3553 (Oct.
24, 1995) (draping consistent with professional practice when acts occurred in 1985); Syracuse
Community Health Ctr. v. Wendi A.M., 604 N.Y.S.2d 406 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1993) ("[Plroof
adduced at the factfinding hearing demonstrated that draping of surfaces that might become
contaminated by blood or saliva is an acceptable precaution against the spread of HIV infection.
It was also established that the treatment rooms are not visible from the waiting area, that the
doors to the treatment rooms are kept closed except when staff members go in and out, and that
no one but the patient and clinic staff members were aware that the precaution of draping had been
utilized.").
221. See, e.g., Minnesota exrel. Beaulieu v. Clausen, 491 N.W.2d 662 (Minn. Ct. App.
1992). It was accepted to a degree in the Wendi and Rosa cases, cited supra note 220, insofar as
it was taken to justify the use of some special precautions to protect the patient from infection.
The deliberate refusal to learn about HIV in order to be able to claim lack of competence
also ought to fail. Gittler & Rennert, supra note 210, at 1372-73.
222. See Glanz v. Vernick, 756 F. Supp. 632 (D. Mass. 1991). Another case summarized
the rule this way: "Discrimination in public accommodation can take the form of the denial of
the opportunity to receive medical treatment, segregation unnecessary for the provision of effective
medical treatment, unnecessary screening or eligibility requirements for treatment, or provision
of unequal medical benefits based upon the disability." Howe v. Hull, No. 3:92CV7658 1994 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 17443, at *15-16 (N.D. Ohio May 26, 1994) (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 12,182(b)(1)(A)(i)-
(iii), 12,182(b)(2)(A)(i)). But see North Shore Univ. Hosp. v. Rosa, 600 N.Y.S.2d 93 (Sup. Ct.
App. Div. 1993) (use of additional precautions a valid medical judgment); Syracuse Community
Health Ctr. v. Wendi A.M., 604 N.Y.S.2d 406 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1993) (same).
In medical discrimination cases, some defendants have argued that courts should not
substitute their views for an independent professional evaluation of the patient's needs or the
provider's own competency. Cases in several circuits have posited a doctrine reflecting this
concern, under which a Rehabilitation Act plaintiff may not invoke disability discrimination law
in the medical context to challenge treatment decisions arising from the disabling condition itself.
See United States v. University Hosp., 729 F.2d 144, 157 (2d Cir. 1984) ("Where the
handicapping condition is related to the condition(s) to be treated, it will rarely, if ever, be possible
to say with certainty that a particular decision was discriminatory"); accord Johnson v. Thompson,
971 F.2d 1487 (10th Cir. 1992); Toney v. United States Health Care, 840 F. Supp. 357 (E.D.
Pa. 1993). See generally Mary A. Crossley, Of Diagnoses and Discrimination: Discriminatory
Nontreatment ofInfants with HIVInfection, 93 COLUM. L. REv. 1581, 1606-12 (1993) (discussing
this line of cases in HIV context). The Supreme Court has neither adopted nor rejected this
doctrine, which grew out of the controversy over denying treatment to catastrophically disabled
newborns, Bowen v. American Hosp. Ass'n, 476 U.S. 610 (1986), but its relevance is limited
in the realm of dental discrimination, as both the empirical research and the case law suggest that
most dental discrimination arises in the course of providing routine care for common dental
conditions that are not meaningfully related to HIV disease.
Cases in which HIV is substantially unrelated to the treatment at issue have proven
straightforward, and have generally resulted in liability. See, e.g., United States v. Morvant, No.
93-3251, 1995 U.S. Dist, LEXIS 3739 (E.D. La. Mar. 22, 1995); Miller v. Spicer, 822 F. Supp.
158 (D. Del. 1990); Howe v. Hull, 873 F. Supp. 72 (N.D. Ohio 1994); Minn. ex rel. Beaulieu
v. Clausen, 491 N.W.2d 662 (Minn. App. 1992); Lewis v. Runkle, AIDS Litig. Rep. (Andrews)
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judgment about precisely what care is needed and who ought to provide it. So
far, however, courts have been able to distinguish between discrimination and
disagreement over the course of care.2
Antidiscrimination doctrine thus seems capable of recognizing the most
prevalent forms of dental discrimination. While some have gone so far as to
say that the ADA "has rendered moot the inconclusive debate over the ethics
concerning the obligation of individual practitioners to treat HIV-infected
individuals,"224 the data on discrimination indicate that antidiscrimination law
has not yet solved the problem. The ultimate effectiveness of the ADA will
depend upon the degree to which dentists feel compelled, by moral beliefs or
fear of punishment, to obey it.
The legal risk of discrimination is probably very low for dentists, both
because of the low rate of claims filed and the remedies the law provides.
Fewer than ten cases have been brought against dentists under the ADA. Title
III of the ADA does not offer strong remedies. There is a private right of
action under Title III, but only for equitable relief, including attorney fees. 2"
This makes a certain amount of sense under the paradigm of barrier
removal-for example, to require the construction of a wheelchair ramp-but
it has obvious problems when requiring a dentist to put sharp instruments
unwillingly into the plaintiff's mouth. Indeed, all the law offers the individual
plaintiff, besides moral vindication, is dental care, and, high rates of
discrimination notwithstanding, that could probably be secured in most places
with far less effort by identifying the local dentists and clinics who are willing
to treat.226 This at least partially explains why so few complaints have been
filed.
The attorney general may also bring suits, and the relief available in such
10,641 (D.C. Comm'n on Human Rights July 1, 1993).
223. In Toney v. U.S. Healthcare Inc., 838 F. Supp. 201 (E.D. Pa. 1993), the plaintiff
felt that he was being neglected and mistreated, though it was not disputed that his HMO doctor
"treats HIV positive patients other than plaintiff, that she knew of plaintiff's HIV status when she
accepted him as a patient, that she saw him for appointments nine times in approximately ten
months, that she referred him to specialists three times, and that she or a member of her staff
returned thirteen of plaintiff's telephone calls." Id. at 203. Summing up, the court held narrowly
"that a determination by a physician of when her regular patient's condition warrants an additional
office visit is a medical treatment decision not subject to judicial review." Id. at 204. On the other
hand, in Howe v. Hull, 873 F. Supp. 72 (N.D. Ohio 1994), the court had no difficulty finding
a jury issue on whether or not a diagnosis of "probable toxic epidermal necrolysis" was a pretext
for a discriminatory transfer decision. Id. at 75. For a thorough discussion of how to treat these
sorts of cases, see Crossley, supra note 222, at 1643-60.
224. Halevy & Brody, supra note 133, at 287.
225. 42 U.S.C. § 12,188(b)(2)(A)(i) (1994); 28 C.F.R. § 36.501(a) (1995).
226. It may be possible in some cases to couple an ADA claim with one under § 504, or
state tort law, to get monetary damages. Since the Supreme Court's decision in Franklin v.
Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60 (1992) (monetary damages available under Title IX),
courts have generally held that compensatory damages are available under § 504. See, e.g., Miller




cases includes a civil penalty not greater than $50,000 for the first and
$100,000 for each successive violation. 227 Government enforcement of Title
III of the ADA is centralized in the Department of Justice in Washington. The
Public Access Section (PAS) of the Department of Justice has approximately
twenty-four lawyers to investigate and prosecute cases under Titles II (covering
state and local governments) and III throughout the nation.22 ' By March
1995, the PAS had received 6200 complaints, most having to do with barrier
removal in facilities. It was conducting between thirty and forty active
investigations of Title III discrimination against people with HIV, most having
to do with dental or medical care.229 The PAS had filed two suits and
intervened in two others. 23
In the early stages of enforcement, a few cases can have a large impact
because of the widespread press coverage they receive. In the long-term,
however, enforcement at such a low level of frequency is probably insufficient
to influence dentists' conduct substantially. A review of the status quo suggests
several changes that could increase the volume of cases. Staffing levels in the
Department of Justice could be increased, given the problems other agencies
have had in handling the additional workload created by the ADA. 1 The
PAS does not appear to be swamped by dental discrimination complaints, but
it may not have sufficient staff to investigate the profession affirmatively.
The empirical data presented above suggests that HIV-based dental
discrimination may share features with racial discrimination in housing. Both
appear to be more widespread than the level of complaints would indicate.232
In both contexts, the individual who has suffered discrimination may not be
227. 42 U.S.C. § 12,188(b)(2) (1994). In Morvant, which was one of the most egregious
violations prosecuted to date, the court did not impose a civil penalty requested by the Justice
Department. United States v. Morvant, 898 F. Supp. 1157 (E.D. La. 1995).
228. Telephone interview with Liz Savage, Special Assistant to the Assistant Attorney
General, Civil Rights Division, Department of Justice (Mar. 16, 1995). The Section also has six
investigators, numerous paralegals, and a technical assistance staff of about twenty.
229. Id. For an overview of the work of the section, see U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL
RIGHTS DIVISION, ENFORCING THE ADA: A STATUS REPORT FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
2 (Apr. 4, 1994); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION, ENFORCING THE ADA: A
STATUS REPORT UPDATE FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 2 (July-Sept. 1994).
230. See supra note 2.
231. For example, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has been overwhelmed
by increases in case load attributable to, among other things, its responsibilities under Title I of
the ADA. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, EEOC's EXPANDING WORKLOAD: INCREASES
IN AGE DISCRIMINATION AND OTHER CHARGES CALL FOR NEW APPROACH 3-4 (1994).
232. On housing, see Richard H. Sander, Individual Rights and Demographic Realities:
The Problem of Fair Housing, 82 Nw. U. L. REV. 874, 892-93 (1988) (reviewing data); Alex
S. Navarro, Note, Bona Fide Damages for Tester Plaintiffs: An Economic Approach to Private
Enforcement of the Antidiscrimination Statutes, 81 GEo. L.J. 2727 (1993). The perception that
AIDS discrimination is much more common than actual complaints has been detected in other
health care settings. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR
GENERAL, HIV/AIDS: NURSING HOME DISCRIMINATION COMPLAINTS 10 (1993).
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sure discrimination has actually occurred (in housing, because of the
plausibility of not getting a dwelling in a tight market; in the HIV case,
because of the evocation of medical necessity) or may prefer to move on to
the next provider rather than become involved in protracted litigation. The
desire to avoid litigation may be even stronger for people with HIV, who may
feel more keenly the opportunity costs of devoting time to litigation and who
may also wish to avoid becoming public figures. 3 To increase the level of
enforcement, the Department of Justice and state human rights agencies could
develop or fund testing programs under their general authority to investigate
widespread discriminatory behavior.234 Testing, which is well accepted in
the enforcement of the Fair Housing Act,235 is a generally useful way of
uncovering prevalent discriminatory treatment. As both a research method26
and an enforcement technique, it has been recognized as useful outside the
housing realm. Testing has proven workable in the enforcement of
antidiscrimination laws against dentists. 7 It is, perhaps, ideal for detecting
the outright refusal to treat that has been the most common form of
discrimination reported. Given the reluctance of individuals who have actually
suffered discrimination to come forward and bring actions, testing may be the
only means of developing a significant number of cases. The Department of
Justice has not provided any funding for research on testing methods, or
233. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 232, at 14-15. The same
desire for anonymity that may drive a rural patient to prefer a distant urban clinic would,
presumably, deter litigation if the patient suffered discrimination. See supra Section II.C.
234. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 957(f) (1991).
235. See Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982) (testers have standing).
For an excellent overview of testing and the economic rationale for increasing its use and the
damages for testers, see generally Navarro, supra note 232.
236. See Ayres, supra note 3.
237. See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text (describing ACLU tests in
Philadelphia).
The main barrier to use of testers under the ADA lies in the question of tester standing.
See Fair Employment Council of Greater Washington v. BMC Marketing Corp., 829 F. Supp.
402 (D.D.C. 1993) (upholding tester standing in Title VII case), rev'd in part and aff'd in part,
28 F.3d 1268 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (testers are not entitled to damages under § 1981 or Title VII and
lack standing to seek injunctive relief from employment agency); see also Equal Employment
Opportunity Comm'n, Decision No. N-915-062, 1990 WL 271407 (Nov. 20, 1990) (concluding
that testers have standing under Title VII). Whatever the merits of the dispute under other civil
rights laws, there is a reasonable case for tester standing under Title III of the ADA. The statute
authorizes investigation and enforcement by the attorney general, and provides the remedies and
procedures of 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3 "to any person who is being subjected to discrimination on
the basis of disability in violation of this subchapter or who has reasonable grounds for believing
that such person is about to be subjected to discrimination." 42 U.S.C. § 12,188(a) (1994). The
attorney general may be able to justify testing as a bona fide investigatory technique. Like the Fair




supported testing23 by any state, local or private entities. 9
The ADA and state law should also be amended to allow compensatory
and punitive damages for individuals denied the benefits of public
accommodations based on disability. If only a small proportion of dentists who
discriminate are being detected and sued, economic theory accepts the justice
and possible deterrent value of awarding exemplary damages. The availability
of damages will also increase the incentive for the individual to sue, thereby
reducing concerns about tester standing. 240
As will be discussed more thoroughly below, efforts to publicize the
norm and its enforcement are as important as the number of cases prosecuted.
Lack of suits may result from uncertainty among the protected class as to the
availability of relief or the complaint mechanism.24 In its report on nursing
home discrimination against people with HIV, the Department of Health and
Human Services Office of Inspector General recommended a public
information campaign targeting "state and local governments, hospitals,
HIV/AIDS clinics, health facility discharge planners, medical societies,
professional associations, and HIV/AIDS social service and advocacy
organizations" with the message that HIV discrimination (in that case, by
nursing homes) is illegal and identifying the proper agencies to which
complaints may be brought.24 2 The DOJ has used its technical assistance staff
to produce basic educational materials about Title III, which it provides along
with other assistance to trade organizations whose members it wants to reach.
It has worked with the American Dental Association and has sent a mailing
about Title III and HIV discrimination in health care to some 500 local AIDS
service organizations .243 Its efforts have not conformed with well-established
principles of public education, including frequent reinforcement of the message
in a variety of media, but that has not been its project.2' The Public Access
238. While potentially effective,
[a] properly administered testing program is quite expensive. The process of
assembling a testing program is elaborate. This process consists of several parts:
designing a program, creating manuals and forms for the testers, recruiting testers,
training, debriefing, producing affidavits, and analyzing the results. Indeed, there
are less than fifty fair housing groups in the United States that have developed the
capacity to engage in testing activities.
Navarro, supra note 232, at 2737 (citations omitted).
239. Interview with Liz Savage, supra note 227.
240. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 22.1 (4th ed. 1992);
see also Navarro, supra note 232 (applying standard economic theory to damages under FHA).
241. This was a problem for individuals and social service agencies experiencing
discrimination in nursing homes. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., supra note
232, at 13.
242. Id. at 16.
243. Interview with Liz Savage, supra note 228.
244. One study, of the effect of the barrier removal requirements of Titles H and III, has
found improved accessibility between January, 1992 and April, 1993, and a "notable" increase
in awareness of the ADA among business owners and managers (from 69% to 92% reporting they
63
The Yale Journal on Regulation
Section has a budget of approximately three millon dollars and a staff of twenty
to produce materials, make speeches, and provide case-by-case technical
assistance to the entire nation on all access questions under Titles II and III.
A search of the Westlaw newspaper database found that stories about the
ADA's prohibition against discrimination by dentists were confined almost
entirely to reports of the filing of the first two cases, Castle and Morvant, and
their outcomes. Coverage was widespread in the lay media, with stories
appearing in at least twenty-nine local newspapers and on the major wire
services, but no relevant stories were found on Medline (the complete
periodical index of the National Library of Medicine) or Westlaw's Health
Periodicals Database.245 The dental trade papers have, however, provided
ongoing coverage of these cases.
Apart from its value in establishing and publicizing the law, traditional
enforcement litigation is not well-suited to resolving individual cases. Given
that discrimination arises from an amalgam of misinformation, prejudice, fear,
and financial pressure, and a goal of "reforming" dentists who discriminate,
alternative dispute resolution (ADR) techniques such as mediation appear far
more useful. Mediation makes particular sense in a dispute within a therapeutic
relationship. Rigid legal arguments may obscure the underlying concerns of
both parties, which may best be resolved by encouraging the development of
a relationship in which traditional norms of ethical care can take root. If a
testing program or other systematic enforcement effort were to produce a
significant number of cases, mediation might well be a more effective, and
would certainly be a less expensive, way of resolving them than litigation. This
less punitive approach could also palliate the perception of unfair prosecution
or entrapment that testing can inspire.246
The ADA encourages the use of ADR methods to resolve disputes arising
under the law.247 In 1993, DOJ awarded grants for five trial Title II
mediation programs in San Francisco, Chicago, Boulder, Boston, and
Atlanta.24 In the past, ADR methods have been misused as docket-clearing
devices by state human rights agencies and the EEOC, suggesting that they
were familiar with the law and its requirements). U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT: EFFECTS OF THE LAW ON ACCESS TO GOODS AND SERVICES
5-11 (1994). We do not have baseline data about dental discrimination rates before the effective
date of Title Ell, much less an extensive, direct review of current discrimination.
245. The searches had the following basic structure: discrim! and (AIDS or HIV or
acquired w/3 syndrome) and (Department w/3 Justice) and (Americans w/3 disabilities). The
searches also produced one story about a Department of Justice investigation of a dentist in San
Francisco. Louis Freedburg, 2 S.F. Doctors Suspected of AIDS Bias, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 24,
1994, at A4.
246. See Peter D. Blanck, On Integrating Persons with Mental Retardation: The ADA and
ADR, 22 N.M. L. REV. 259 (1992).
247. 42 U.S.C. § 12,212 (1994).
248. Interview with Liz Savage, supra note 228.
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ought to be used selectively and with care by DOJ.249 While there is not
likely to be a high volume of dental discrimination cases even with the various
reforms suggested here, general ADA mediation programs would be useful for
resolving those cases that do arise.
The ADA is the foundation of any policy against HIV-based
discrimination by dentists, but it is no panacea. The construction of dentists'
refusal to treat as "discrimination" is itself potentially problematic,"
particularly to those dubious about discrimination law generally. The level of
enforcement and the sanctions available are not sufficient to command
obedience, nor is it clear that more vigorous enforcement would lead to
changes in dentists' behavior on a large scale. Section III.B will examine these
questions more closely.
6. Public Health Law
Protecting public health is among the core duties of the state. The
combination of "education" and regulation to bring about healthy behavior has
been recognized as a crucial tool of health promotion since the birth of public
health as a discipline,2"' and was early recognized as the chief means of
preventing HIV transmission. 52 All states have the authority to educate and
to fund education promoting health, although a duty to do so is neither
explicitly stated nor enforceable.2 3
Discrimination is thought to deter people at risk of HIV from seeking
education, testing, and treatment, and, in a larger sense, to construct the
disease in a way that promotes denial and risk-taking over acceptance and
behavior change." Acting on this belief, health officials have used public
249. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 231, at 21-22.
250. See Wendy E. Parmet, Discrimination and Disability: The Challenges of the ADA,
18 L. MED. & HEALTH CARE 331, 333-34 (1990) (discussing complexity of discrimination
paradigm in ADA).
251. See, e.g., ALLAN BRANDT, No MAGIC BULLET: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF VENEREAL
DISEASE IN THE UNITED STATES SINCE 1880 (expanded ed. 1987); SHEILA ROTHMAN, LIVING
IN THE SHADOW OF DEATH: TUBERCULOSIS AND THE SOCIAL EXPERIENCE OF ILLNESS IN
AMERICAN HISTORY 186 (1994). See generally INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, NATIONAL ACADEMY
OF SCIENCES, THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC HEALTH (1988).
252. See, e.g., INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES,
CONFRONTING AIDS: UPDATE 1988 at 64; C. EVERETT KooP, SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT ON
ACQUIRED IMMUNE DEFICIENCY SYNDROME 5, 31 (1986).
253. See C. Arden Miller et al., Statutory Authorizations for the Work of Local Health
Departments, 67 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 940 (1977).
254. See NATIONAL COMMISSION ON AIDS, AIDS: AN EXPANDING TRAGEDY 10 (1993)
("Discrimination, stigmatization, or other callous and inappropriate responses to people living with
HIV often arise out of unwarranted fear from lack of knowledge. Increased general awareness
of basic facts can reduce such ignorant responses substantially and lay a foundation for preventive
efforts."); see Don C. Des Jarlais et al., Targeted HIV-Prevention Programs, 331 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 1451 (1994); see also David Chambers, Gay Men, AIDS and the Code of the Condom, 29
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information programs like America Responds to AIDS to change public
attitudes about HIV. This sort of educational work has been going on for years
and has succeeded in inculcating basic facts about HIV in the population.255
The research suggests that dental discrimination may be attributable in
substantial part to dentists' perception of the attitudes of their patients. Patients'
fears can be addressed directly in no way other than by education. In many
respects, fear of transmission through dentistry is a good candidate for a public
information campaign.256 The substance of the message (though not
necessarily its presentation) is simple: with universal precautions, it is safe to
go to the dentist no matter who else she treats. The factual messages-that HIV
is not easily transmitted through dental care and that universal precautions
protect everybody-can be linked to concrete actions the patient can take to
achieve a sense of control in coping with the fear of HIV in the dental setting.
The patient can be taught to observe the dental staff's compliance with barrier
precautions, and be encouraged- to speak to the dentist about sterilization
practices and fear of infection generally.257 This would have the added
advantage of helping to police dentists' compliance with infection control
guidelines. A campaign focusing on dentistry would be a logical next step for
public education about HIV, given general concerns about HIV in healthcare,
and that the marginal returns for basic information are decreasing with
repetition of the message.
Authorities on HIV prevention recommend that these "universal"
messages about the medical facts and the evils of discrimination be linked to
"targeted" messages designed to change the actual behaviors of specific
communities where the risk of HIV are the highest.25 In this model, a
campaign focusing on dentists and their staffs, using elements like mailings,
training videos, and advertisements in dental trade journals, would be an
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 353 (1994); Rolf Rosenbrock, AIDS: Questions and Answersfor Public
Health, 8 AIDS & PUB. POL'Y J. 5 (1993); RONALD BAYER, PRIVATE AcTs/SOCIAL
CONSEQUENCES 231 (1989) (arguing that education is essential to changing cultural factors like
discrimination that promote HIV transmission or interfere with disease control).
255. For discussions and descriptions of the program, see Scott Burris, HIV Education
and the Law: A Critical Review, 20 L. MED. & HEALTH CARE 377, 380-81 (1992); Alan J. Bush
& Gregory W. Boiler, Rethinking the Role of Television Advertising During Health Crises: .4
Rhetorical Analysis of the Federal AIDS Campaigns, J. ADVERTISING, Jan. 1991, at 28. Survey
research suggests that the public has a high degree of knowledge of the official "facts" of HIV,
but also a fair amount of misinformation. The latter is reflected in the large percentage of people
who would be afraid to go to a dentist who also treats patients with HIV. See supra notes 83-86
and accompanying text.
256. See Gentry et al., supra note 123.
257. See Bush and Boiler, supra note 255, at 28. ("[Flear and worry are emotional
reactions to threatening situations that individuals feel are beyond their control. That is, individuals
experience fear when they believe that they lack adequate coping responses to a perceived
threat.").
258. Des Jarlais et al., supra note 254, at 1451-52.
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important supplement to the information conveyed through mass media. The
infrastructure for this training already exists in the form of a network of
regional AIDS education and training centers that provides education for health
care professionals and whose methods have become quite sophisticated. 9
Public health professionals have lately tried to assert authority over major
social problems, such as violence and drug abuse, by calling them "public
health" problems. Thinking of dental discrimination itself as a public health
problem also provides some insight into how best to reduce it. First, it allows
us to see discrimination as a socially undesirable but personally gratifying
behavior. To the extent discrimination is like smoking, or riding a bicycle
without a helmet, there is a wealth of research and practice that can be applied
in constructing a program to change how dentists behave. This analogy will
be discussed at greater length in Section III.B.
In looking to other major public health campaigns to change behavior,
we can also glean a second important insight about public health work, the
crucial role of the private sector. This paper largely concerns what government
can do through law to change behavior, but past public health work strongly
suggests the need for action by private philanthropies and professional
organizations. By exhortation and example, religious leaders and other socially
and economically prominent individuals can have an important impact on
public perceptions.260 As will be discussed more below, the norm of
nondiscrimination must be strongly and consistently reinforced from within the
dental profession itself. Health philanthropies-in this case, health care
charities such as the Kaiser Foundation, the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation,
and AmFAR-also have a role in supporting research on attitudes about law
and its enforcement in the health care setting, and in contributing to the public
information effort.
B. For and Against Regulation
The syllogism that leads from discrimination, through law, to regulation
has come under determined and not altogether unjustified challenge. Although
Richard Epstein perhaps overstates the degree to which he is breaking
Forbidden Grounds, his book does raise an unusually thorough academic
challenge to the antidiscrimination principle.26' Part of this challenge is
259. See, e.g., Joan Dworkin, AIDS Education for Health Care Professionals in an
Organizational or Systems Context, 107 PuB. HEALTH REP. 668 (1992).
260. See Des Jarlais et al., supra note 254, at 1451.
261. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAWS 5-7 (1992). Attacking antidiscrimination law is certainly nothing new,
though Epstein's claim that he is driven by Adam Smith rather than Jim Crow sets him apart from
those who resisted the Civil Rights Act when first it passed. Epstein operates as a thinker of the
right attacking a normative pillar of the liberal left, but his approach has much in common with
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empirical, an argument about the supposedly demonstrable disutility of specific
legislation. Notwithstanding its attention to data, however, Epstein's is a
fundamentally normative critique: without undue simplification, his view is that
antidiscrimination laws are an improper departure from a proper regime of free
contract.2 62 Epstein thus poses two basic questions about the regulation of
discrimination: ought we to regulate, and if so, can we regulate effectively?
Considering these questions in the context of dental discrimination not only
illuminates the choices for policy-makers desirous of reducing the phenomenon,
but also the limits of Epstein's attack.
that of the critical and law-and-society scholars who have analyzed the way law is used to
legitimate (or reify, or construct-choose your jargon) patterns of power and authority. His
strategy of showing that the notion of discrimination is used to justify an attack on liberty, and
then using empirical evidence to "show" that the actual effects of the principle in practice are quite
distinct from the normative claims of its proponents, reflects, albeit through a glass darkly, the
practices of critical scholars. See Crenshaw, supra note 3.
262. See EPSTEIN, supra note 261, at 22-27. "There is ... a strong reason to think that
the set of rights so developed at common law should exhaust the universe of rules on original
entitlements, their protection, and their exchange. The antidiscrimination laws should be
understood as an assault on the completeness of these common law rules and the intellectual
foundations on which they rest." Id. at 26-27. Although he here speaks of the employment
contract, the principle is equally applicable to the contract to provide a service in a place of public
accommodation.
Although he purports to be "test[ing] the foundations of the antidiscrimination principle
using the available tools of economic ... theory," id. at 7, the normative nature of his critique
is apparent in his presumption against regulation, based on the principle that government should
ordinarily not intervene to restrict the choices of individuals. He writes:
It is not enough to show that there is some residual level of discrimination in a
market to make the case for regulation. It has to be shown as well that the proposed
cure can identify and isolate the evils in some cost-effective fashion. In light of the
avenues of self-help that are available to all customers, it seems unlikely that
regulation could ever accomplish a net social good.
Id. at 54. Ian Ayres incisively identifies the implications of this position:
This quotation -- which tends to epitomize much of Epstein's scholarship -- fails to explain
why the burden of persuasion should rest with those who want to eliminate discrimination.
Although Epstein maintains the theoretical possibility that an empirical "showing" might
justify regulation in some instances, I have the impression that no empiricism about the
workings of a free market could falsify his theories to the extent that he would actually
reach the second question of whether regulation could be cost-justified.
Ian Ayres, Alternative Grounds: Epstein's Discrimination Analysis in Other Market Settings, 31
SAN DIEGO L. REv. 67, 84 (1994).
Epstein himself states that he has undergone a gradual transformation "from a natural rights
libertarian to a limited government utilitarian," Richard A. Epstein, Standing Firm, on Forbidden
Grounds, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1, 2 (1994), but while he surely is a utilitarian, too, he wears
on his sleeve a "powerful absorption-verging on romance-with the idea of contract at will,"
Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Second Chronicle: The Economics and Politics of Race, 91 MICH.
L. REv. 1183, 1184 n.3 (1993).
Perhaps the most accurate judgment on this is Jerry Mashaw's: "As when reading J.S. Mill,
one often has to ask whether Richard Epstein is really a libertarian or a Benthamite utilitarian.
In fact, like Mill, he is both, because he defines each principle in terms of the other. This leads
to an abstract unity, but also a simple tautology, at the base of the Epstein argument." Jerry L.
Mashaw, Against First Principles, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 211, 213 (1994).
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1. Faux Epstein: The Case Against Intervention
Rather than rehearse Epstein's argument in abstract form, I will state
what I would take to be an Epsteinian case for a libertarian approach to dental
discrimination.263 The starting point is faith in a system of unencumbered
contracts. If dentists are classic small business operators, offering a service
for a fee to the public, we should expect that they and their customers will,
if left alone, come to a mutually advantageous mode of operation. "Freedom
of association works because it means that both sides stand to gain from the
transaction. "21
It is unclear whether dental discrimination is a real problem. While there
has certainly been discrimination and prejudice against the disabled, Congress
and the courts exaggerate it in writing and applying laws like the ADA.
Disability is not like prior protected conditions, because while only some
people will ever be Black or female, and they know who they are, anyone can
become disabled. "There is thus a powerful insurance feature that leads
everyone to think that some assistance for the disabled may not be solely an
act of disinterested benevolence but one of prudent self-interest as well. "265
"[P]lays, stories, and movies" about the disabled that "tug knowingly at the
heartstrings" support the view that animus against them is limited. Indeed,
"[t]he entire apparatus of charitable giving and charitable service would be
unintelligible if public attitudes were as harsh and archaic as Congress and the
commentators so easily assume.'266
Moreover, some different treatment may be rational. While the money
of the disabled is as good as anyone else's, "business is harder to conduct as
the pace of transaction slows. "267 If a dentist must be more careful, if only
for psychological reasons, in treating a patient with HIV, yet cannot charge
for the excess time, is he not being cheated? What if he finds it "inconvenient,
unpleasant, or awkward" to deal with patients who are seriously ill?26 To
write this off as mere bigotry is to assume that any decision about how most
effectively to conduct one's business is merely a rationalization for animus.
It is also a drastic oversimplification. A dentists' decision to treat is
complicated, based on economic, emotional, medical, even religious
considerations. Some dentists treat patients with HIV, some do not. Some treat
263. For a general attack on the ADA, see Mashaw, supra note 262, at 217-21.
264. EPSTEIN, supra note 261, at 487.
265. Id. at 481. It has also been argued that disability discrimination law is a special case
because it is not antidiscrimination law at all, but "rules requiring compensatory treatment of
certain classes of employees." Andrew Kull, The Discrimination Shibboleth, 31 SAN DIEGO L.
REv. 195, 195 (1994).
266. EPSTEIN, supra note 261, at 486.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 486-87.
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only patients with HIV; others integrate such patients into a general practice.
Why is this really any different than some dentists choosing to do root canals
and others choosing to install braces? Why, if we discard the antidiscrimination
principle and concern ourselves with efficient access, is a choice motivated by
animus more problematic than a choice based on one's taste in procedures?
2 69
If we leave the market alone, we can expect that some dentists will
choose to treat patients with HIV for reasons that maximize their own
satisfaction. If the demand exceeds the supply, an unregulated price will
emerge at which the demand can be satisfied. Indeed, this price may actually
"tax" discrimination by either the dentist or a non-infected customer.
270
This is. not a problem like racial segregation in Southern
accommodations, where there were "barriers to entry . . . from the strong
government control over land use, labor relations, zoning, and police
regulation, and the full apparatus of segregation. "27 In that situation, the
"antidiscrimination principle could work wonders as a second-best
solution. "272 Here, however, the main objections to serving patients with
HIV come from dentists themselves and from other patients. Dentists who wish
269. Writing of the "taste for discrimination," Epstein observes that "it is not strictly
necessary to decide whether" discrimination exists, or what toll it takes, because the operative
question is the effect of discriminatory behavior on efficient outcomes. Id. at 43. (The notion of
discrimination as a taste is Gary Becker's. See GARY BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF
DISCRIMINATION 14 (2d ed. 1971)). In Epstein's normative world, prejudice is simply not a wrong;
or, if a wrong, it is a wrong without a remedy. A man who begins with the social vision of
Hobbes, Epstein is interested in conduct, not motivation. EPSTEIN, supra note 260, at 15-19. This
is not to concede that Epstein has his Hobbes right. See Richard H. McAdams, Epstein on His
Own Grounds, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 241 (1994) (arguing that Hobbes took broad view of
behaviors properly subject to police regulation). Certainly, in evoking a golden age of limited
common law regulation he misapprehends the vitality of regulation in the first century of the
United States. See William J. Novak, Public Economy and the Well-Ordered Market.- Law and
Economic Regulation in 19th-Century America, 18 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 1, 7 (1993).
270. Robert Cooter summarizes the process:
If sellers refuse to deal with some buyers, the discriminatory sellers may experience
additional costs. In perfect competition, all goods sell at cost, so discriminatory
sellers will charge more than nondiscriminatory sellers for the same good.
Nondiscriminatory buyers will purchase from the sellers with the lowest prices.
Thus, perfect competition eliminates discriminatory sellers, just as it eliminates
discriminatory employers. For example, a restaurateur who insisted on segregated
dining facilities might have higher costs, which nondiscriminatory patrons would
refuse to bear.
Now consider the case of discriminatory buyers. Once again, product markets
strictly parallel labor markets. Specifically, consumers who prefer discriminatory
sellers will pay a surcharge for the products they buy relative to nondiscriminatory
consumers. The surcharge will equal the additional cost of segregating buyers. For
example, diners who discriminate will pay the extra cost of segregating their
facilities.
Robert Cooter, Market Affirmative Action, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 133, 140-41 (1994) (footnotes
omitted).




to treat are not legally prevented from doing so, and evidently can structure
their practices and maintain the privacy of the clients to avoid losses. For those
with HIV who cannot pay the market price, charity is perfectly appropriate,
and, indeed, exists in the form of the HIV-specific and hospital-based clinics
that provide so much care for people with HIV. Under a deregulated regime,
there would be more money for such providers, because we would not be
spending money coercing all dentists,2 3 a project which in any case is not
likely to be successful if the problem is really as widespread and deeply rooted
as proponents of regulation assert.274 One can go so far as to say that the
problem is not the level of access but its distribution. Apparently, a system
of specialization or niche marketing is arising, one that is common in medicine
generally,275 and not clearly bad. If we understand HIV care as a niche
market, isn't the goal in most places, where there are enough dentists and
enough people, not that everyone treats anyone, but that someone treats
everyone? 2 6 If we want for some positive reason to promote an integration
of practices beyond what the market would otherwise produce, the burden is
on proponents to argue why this is good and how the policy can be efficiently
promoted.277
In sum, discrimination is not so pervasive as to pose an insurmountable
barrier to care for individuals with HIV, and the market is, in fact, developing
to provide these services to those who can afford them. Given all this, the best
approach to solving the problem is through non-intervention, or through
education only, letting the market develop practice patterns in which those who
wish to treat patients with HIV can tap that market, and not wasting money
on making the unwilling grudgingly perform the unnecessary.
2. Ought We ?27s
If one does not accept that a free market is the regime that optimizes
social well-being, much of Epstein's moral vision evaporates. 279 At a fairly
273. Id.
274. Cf Richard A. Epstein, The Status-Production Sideshow: Why the Antidiscrimination
Laws Are Still a Mistake, 108 HARV. L. REv. 1085, 1086 (1995) (noting backlog of discrimination
cases resulting from expansion of roster of protected characteristics).
275. See Gittler & Rennert, supra note 210, at 1370-71.
276. While Epstein attacks the Jim Crow system of involuntary separation of the races,
he defends voluntary segregation as the sort of free choice liberty affords and a rational market
allows. EPSTEIN, supra note 261, at 67-69, 262-66.
277. See Cooter, supra note 270, at 144-45.
278. My interest is in using rather than doing theory, so this will necessarily be a cursory
and perhaps for that reason unsatisfactory canvass of the issues. At least, however, it will make
clear my normative starting point in both collecting and using the empirical data.
279. See John J. Donahue III, Advocacy Versus Analysis in Assessing Employment
Discrimination Law, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1583, 1586 (1992) ("[A]n argument that proceeds
theoretically from libertarian premises is equally compelling - or unconvincing - whether the
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high level of abstraction, we can question his account of libertarian theory,2"'
or reject the libertarian position altogether. The notion that people ought to
have a fair opportunity to achieve their goals without arbitrary hindrance based
on accidentally disfavored characteristics, has been well-defended in liberal
accounts of justice2"'; the same basic values animate discussions of
discrimination from Republican and communitarian perspectives.2"2 Or one
might adopt the approach of socio-legal and critical theory, in which principles
and preferences are entirely stripped of their privileged analytic position,
becoming dependent variables in a process of social construction and control
of reality.283
At a lower analytic level, one can challenge the validity of a theory
whose proponent seems to ignore history.2 Epstein's suggestion that the
social treatment of people with disabilities has been moderated by a sense of
common vulnerability strikes me as intuitively dubious for the disabled
generally, and at any rate flies in the face of a well-documented history of
discrimination against people with communicable diseases. 25 This history
claim involves creating free markets for sex, drugs, and consensual killings or unshackling the
discriminatory preferences or practices of private employers.").
280. J. Hoult Verkerke, Free to Search: Forbidden Grounds: The Case Against
Employment Discrimination Laws, 105 HARV. L. REV. 2080, 2085-88 (1992) (noting the
libertarian case for antidiscrimination law).
281. See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 96, 302-03, 504-12 (1971); RONALD
DwoRgiN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 223-39 (1977). For an application of Rawlsian theory to
an ADA issue, see W. Robert Gray, The Essential-Functions Limitation on the Civil Rights of
People with Disabilities and John Rawls 's Concept of Social Justice, 22 N.M. L. REV. 295 (1992).
282. See, e.g., Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988); Cass R.
Sunstein, The Anticaste Principle, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2410 (1994); Wendy Brown-Scott, The
Communitarian State: Lawlessness or Law Reform for African-Americans?, 107 HARV. L. REV.
1209 (1994).
283. See, e.g., Joseph W. Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory,
94 YALE L.J. 1 (1984); Catherine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality under Law, 100
YALE L.J. 1281 (1991); Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Eighth Chronicle: Black Crime, White
Fears-On the Social Construction of Threat, 80 VA. L. REV. 503 (1994).
284. Epstein generally elides the force and so the relevance of history in understanding
discrimination. Drew Days puts it this way:
As quickly as the twinkling of an eye, Professor Epstein acknowledges dutifully
America's history of discrimination against African-Americans and passes on. This
strategy is central to the overall scheme of his impressive assault upon Title VII.
For it is designed to persuade the reader that the history of discrimination has no
significant impact upon the current socio-economic status of Blacks and their chances
for improving that condition, and that racial discrimination is largely a relic of the
past. With this obstacle out of the way, the force of his overall argument, if not
much of his rhetoric, about the blight of government regulation of discrimination
in the workplace seems almost irresistible.
Drew S. Days 1I, Reality, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 169, 169 (1994) (citing EPSTEIN, supra note
261, at 1 n.l).
285. See, e.g., BRANDT, supra note 251; David F. Musto, Quarantine and the Problem
of AIDS, in AIDS: THE BURDENS OF HISTORY 67 (D. Fox & E. Fee eds., 1988); CHARLES
ROSENBERG, THE CHOLERA YEARS: THE UNITED STATES IN 1832, 1849, AND 1866 (1987). The
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has been marked by what the Supreme Court in Arline called "accumulated
myths and fears about disability and disease."2"6 Today, discrimination
against people with HIV continues to occur in situations in which the subjects
do not pose a real threat of transmission or other harm. 287 HIV is not leprosy
or plague, but the impulse to shun and denigrate the sick is as much a product
of its history and its social legacy as the belief in Black inferiority. It is hardly
a disputed proposition, even in libertarian theory, that present justice cannot
be soundly based on past injustice,2"' hence Epstein's diligence in questioning
the history of disability discrimination.
Even if one does not share the belief that the social norms concerning
disease both reflect and reinforce social attitudes, it is difficult to rebut the
evidence that discrimination against people with HIV looms as the product not
of utilitarian logic but social accident. If the preference for avoiding the sick
is not privileged, and the harm caused is substantial, it would seem morally
justified under a number of theories to act. For example, a utilitarian could
argue that prohibiting discrimination is justifiable to the extent controlling
discrimination improves access to care and helps educate the population about
social reaction to sickness and the sick has tended to be complex, dependent on numerous variables
such as the expression of the disease, the social status of the subgroups most affected, and theories
of disease causation and control. In addition to the above, see, e.g., SUSAN SONTAG, AIDS AND
ITS METAPHORS (1988); Elizabeth Fee & Nancy Krieger, Thinking and Rethinking AIDS
Implications for Health Policy, 23 INT'LJ. HEALTH SERVICES 323 (1993); Daniel M. Fox, Chronic
Disease and Disadvantage: The New Politics of HIV lnfection, 15 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L.
341 (1990).
286. School Bd. of Nassau County, Fla. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 284 (1987). "Imperfect
information" is a common justification for intervention, even for economists. See Sunstein, infra
note 293, at 1166-69. As Sunstein observes, however, people generally do not gauge risk by
.objective" probability. It follows that justifying intervention to alter preferences on the ground
that the public's risk assessment is wrong begs the question of the nature of risk. A "reasonable
person" - defined as a person of normal intelligence, education and experience - is frightened
of all sorts of things (arbitrarily selected) that pose a smaller risk than any number of other things
the person encounters. I observe this to be clear in my rejection of the notion that dentists' or
patients' fears of HIV positive people can be turned into simple questions of correct information
and incorrect information. See generally STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE (1993)
(analyzing political problems raised by different forms of risk assessment and management).
287. See, e.g., Martinez v. School Bd. of Hillsborough Co., 711 F. Supp. 1066, 1070-72
(M.D. Fla. 1989), on remand from 861 F.2d 1502 (1lth Cir. 1988); Doe v. Dolton Elementary
Sch. Dist., 694 F. Supp. 440, 445 (N.D. Ill. 1988). To these school cases I would also add the
current crop of cases involving doctors. See, e.g., Scoles v. Mercy Health Corp., 1994 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 17383 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 8, 1994)
288. See Larry Alexander, What Makes Wrongful Discrimination Wrong? Biases,
Preferences, Stereotypes, and Proxies, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 149 (1992) (arguing that history is
a major factor in how we distinguish morally between acceptable and unacceptable discrimination);
cf. Sunstein, supra note 282, at 2433 ("[A] history of discrimination is not a necessary condition
for status as a lower caste, though in practice such a history is highly probable. No group is likely
to become second class in the sense used here unless it has been subject to past discrimination.
The discrimination may take the form of legal and social practices that are not discriminatory on
their face but that translate certain characteristics into a systemic basis for disadvantage.").
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true risks.289 Or one could assert that the antidiscrimination principle in this
context reflects a norm of inclusion of the chronically ill which is consistent
with the view that membership and participation in a self-defining community,
rather than liberty of contract, is the fundamental good.2 90
This suffices to establishes the existence of a rebuttal to an argument that
prohibiting HIV discrimination is itself a wrong, which is as much as I can
attempt in this article.29' I agree with Larry Alexander that moral philosophy
and discrimination enjoy a low level of correspondence:
[T]he line between wrongful and acceptable discrimination is, in
most cases, difficult to locate with precision because it is
historically and culturally variable. This line is historically and
culturally variable because it is, in most cases, a function of
consequentialist considerations rather than deontological norms.
That is, in most cases, discrimination, when it is wrongful, is
contingently but not intrinsically so.292
Arguably, legal economics is the wrong tool to measure even this sort of
contingent morality. Scholars from a variety of perspectives have objected to
the use of the market to value all goods, however intangible.293 This
literature, which rejects the notion that preferences are independent of social,
political and economic arrangements,294 notes among other problems the
legitimating effect of economic analysis. Dental discrimination seems to depend
significantly upon dentists' belief that they have the right refuse to treat people
with HIV. Changing that behavior, in turn, depends upon convincing dentists
that that right is a wrong. To neutralize law as a normative force in that cause,
in favor of a calculus of unfettered rational choice, is to eliminate the primary
289. See INST. OF MEDICINE, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, CONFRONTING AIDS,
UPDATE 1988 at 6, 62-63.
290. See Michelman, supra note 282, at 1528-37.
291. As Mashaw puts it, "That there is an alternative foundation for a statute like the
Americans With Disabilities Act suggests only the implausibility of concluding from other,
dissimilar, first principles that the statute cannot be justified. This form of argument, however,
simply leads us back to a debate about first principles-a debate that I have argued is unlikely to
lead to consensus." Mashaw, supra note 262, at 220-21.
292. Alexander, supra note 288, at 153.
293. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH.
L. REv. 779 (1994); Richard H. Pildes & Elizabeth S. Anderson, Slinging Arrows at Democracy:
Social Choice Theory, Value Pluralism, and Democratic Politics, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2121
(1990); Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1987). For an
insightful review of this diverse literature, see generally Jane B. Baron & Jeffrey L. Dunoff,
Against Market Rationality: Moral Critiques of Economic Analysis in Legal Theory CARDOZO L.
REV. (forthcoming 1996).
294. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1129 (1986).
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vehicle for organized, secular expression of collective values.295 In a
profound sense, market valuation begs the question.
At the same time, economics' premise that preferences are not subject
to change by market or other forces undermines any effort to systematically
change dentists' behavior through education and regulation. If we reject the
assumption that preferences cannot be changed, and accept the evidence that
treating patients with HIV tends to eliminate the preference not to, behavioral
change seems to impose only a short-term cost on dentists, and even potentially
to provide a benefit.
If the contingent morality of regulation depends on market failure, as
Epstein suggests in his utilitarian mode, the evidence still justifies action. The
data leave no doubt that many dentists continue to refuse treatment on the basis
of HIV, and the economics of discrimination by dentists against the HIV-
infected are hardly straightforward in suggesting that the market will solve this
problem. The standard associational account, relied on by my ersatz Epstein
and by the original, holds that discrimination adds to the cost of doing
business, putting the discriminator at a competitive disadvantage that must
ultimately discipline him to end the practice. Here, though, we have a variety
of deviations from the model or its assumptions.296
If satisfying a preference for avoiding people with HIV is a cost like
anything else, discrimination may be "efficient." The cost of discriminating
in this instance may be substantially lower than the cost of treating. HIV-
infected patients constitute only a small segment of the market, so that forgoing
their custom may impose only a slight marginal cost. Moreover, the data
indicate that dentists do not discriminate against people suspected of having
HIV, or even patients who have HIV but conceal that fact, so the actual
refused population is not even all HIV-positive people, but only those whose
status is known. Because knowledge of the patient's HIV status is usually
obtained voluntarily, or by diagnosis of symptoms, the cost of identifying these
people is essentially nil. Meanwhile, third-party preferences, such as not
patronizing a dentist who treats the HIV infected, can create strong market
295. The need for collective expression of values and the rational irrationalities of
collective choice are both indicated by the large majority of patients who claim they would prefer
not to be treated by a dentist who treats patients with HIV. While this is consistent with a view
of the ADA as special interest legislation, it is also consistent with a complex view of "rationality"
in a democratic polity. See Pildes & Anderson, supra note 293, at 2143-83.
296. We also now have a challenging new economic theory of discrimination. Richard
McAdams argues that individuals seek, and groups can provide, status as a good in itself, and
that groups produce status in part by subordinating other groups. See Richard McAdams,
Cooperation and Conflict: The Economics of Group Status Production and Race Discrimination,
108 HARV. L. REv. 1003 (1995). While I, perhaps predictably, disagree with Richard Epstein
on the merits of McAdams' work, see Epstein, supra note 274, the theory in its present stage of
development is not readily applicable to discrimination based on disease.
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pressure for discrimination,297 quite apart from the costs to the dentist of
stifling her own preferences and those of her staff.
The classic model may not work as advertised in a situation in which the
cost of treating is a fear of catastrophic harm rooted in a misassessment of the
risks posed by the person seeking care. Epstein's abstract analysis of a
preference not to treat fails to account for the visceral urge to shun "plague
carriers." Dentists who are afraid of being infected may not accept any
economic price for treating. Nor may there be any price that an HIV positive
patient can pay that will induce a dentist to run the risk of all his other patients
taking flight to a new dentist. Indeed, one may ask how, when the refusal to
contract is based on a reflexive desire to flee or shun, bargaining is even going
to occur.
Even if treating is more efficient than not, this discrimination may fall
into that class of inefficient behaviors that are too small to trigger market
correction.29 Because there are so few HIV positive people relative to the
overall dentist-visiting population, dentists are relatively much less hurt by
refusing to deal than HIV-positive patients, who may have a hard time
297. See Sunstein, supra note 282, at 2415-16 ("[I]n some important sectors, and for
important lengths of time, the existence of third-party discrimination can ensure that inequality
persists even in free markets. The extent of the effect is of course an empirical question.").
298. While in theory a dentist who declines to treat is at a competitive disadvantage with
a dentist who will, the fact that those refused treatment comprise so small a segment of the market
means that the disadvantage will be too small to significantly affect dentists' profitability. Cy.
David A. Skeel, Rethinking the Line Between Corporate Law and Corporate Bankruptcy, 72 TEX.
L. REv. 471, 520 (1994); Lucien A. Bebchuck, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable
Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REv. 1437, 1461-67 (1992).
It might be argued that in the absence of discrimination laws, dentists would be able to
charge their true costs of operating to HIV infected patients. That is, the price of care for an HIV-
positive person would rise to the level necessary to bring a dentist to treat, and at that price
dentists would suffer a cognizable cost if they were to discriminate. This argument seems to ignore
the lessons of the current price structure of dentistry. Patients with HIV may require more
complicated procedures more often than other patients, but dentists are not precluded from
charging more for such procedures than for routine care. On the other hand, even if treating a
patient with HIV sometimes, or even often, would require more time than treating a patient
without HIV for the same condition, such variance between patients is built into the pricing
structure: dentists generally price by the procedure, not the patient, with the overall price reflecting
an average cost. Presumably, this custom reflects the fact that standard pricing is more efficient
than setting individual prices for common procedures.
A larger problem with this approach is that it obscures the degree to which the "cost" of
treatment is constituted by the taste for discrimination. Under the universal precautions approach
required by OSHA and urged by public health and dental authorities, no special precautions are
required in treating HIV-positive patients, and equal precautions are required even if the dentist
has no knowledge of an HIV-infected person in her practice. If dentists proceed with significantly
greater care (i.e., more slowly) or use more precautions, that is best seen as a matter of taste.
Similarly, the "cost" of treating most often mentioned, negative customer reaction, is entirely a
matter of taste rather than material inputs. There is nothing wrong in economic theory with
assigning a value to the satisfaction of a taste, but by the same token nothing in Epstein's theory
explains why the market would discipline anyone to stop doing so. On the contrary, it looks a
happy bargain for the dentist or customer whose taste for avoiding people with MlV is so satisfied.
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replacing the refusing dentist.299 This form of discrimination may also pose
a collective action problem: large numbers of dentists being willing to treat,
but worried about significant patient flight if they are among the first to break
the treatment barrier. 3°
Nor is the argument carried by moving the focus from discrimination to
access. While the overall dental access problem seems largely linked to poverty
rather than HIV status per se, the data do not support the view that people with
HIV have no problems of access related to discrimination, much less that the
market has created a workable system of specialization. If we leave aside the
preference not to treat, there are few if any sound arguments for the efficiency
of the status quo. Patients with HIV are generally seeking the same sort of care
as other patients, and, since the advent of universal precautions, there is no
difference in the manner of treatment based on HIV status alone. Dentists who
refuse to treat known HIV patients may still be treating patients who are
unaware of or have not revealed their condition. Conversely, the refusal of
general dentists to treat entails the development of a system of specialists,
whose additional training and scarcity presumably result in higher costs to
patients (even assuming that individuals with HIV constitute a large enough
customer base in the local market to support a specialist). Even if the costs of
treating HIV-positive patients are identical in specialist and general practices,
the costs to patients required to endure the longer waits and longer journeys
to specialists probably make segregation inefficient. From a social point of
view, the additional transaction costs arising from separating the known HIV-
infected from other patients might make segregation inefficient even if the cost
of treating patients with HIV is slightly higher than referring for the general
dentist.3"'
The claim that the market has already met the demand of people with
HIV for dental care is belied by the evidence that subsidized clinics provide
a major proportion of it. Specialized clinics would have a role even were there
no discrimination, providing specialized and some indigent care, but
specialized clinics exist in almost every major American city because private
dentists have not met the demand for routine dental services, even among
299. In this, there is an analogy to the standard explanation of why discrimination is harder
economically on Blacks than Whites, and therefore unfair. See POSNER, supra note 240, §§ 26.1-2.
300. Epstein himself suggests that antidiscrimination law is an appropriate corrective for
this kind of problem. EPSTEIN, supra note 261, at 127. Arguably, we have not a collective action
problem but a problem of collective action, in that the majority of dentists are truly unwilling to
treat and feel insulated in that behavior by the support of their peers.
301. One could argue that a rule forbidding discrimination aims to create a pooling
equilibrium to replace a less efficient separating equilibrium. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Robert
Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE
L.J. 87, 111-14 (1989). This is perhaps an uncommon phenomenon in the world of corporate
regulation, where pooling equilibria tend to produce inefficient behavior, but it makes some sense
here, where it is the separation rather than the pooling that is based on poor information.
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insured or otherwise paying customers. The Burris-Glick study found that
almost a quarter of the patients of the clinic in Philadelphia were there because
they had been refused care elsewhere, not by their own choice. Moreover, the
insured and self-paying patients are either enjoying a subsidy (because their
fees do not pay the entire cost of operating the clinic) or are being taxed for
their disability (because their fees go in part to support free care for indigent
patients). Few if any clinics can operate without a subsidy, which means that
federal or state budget cuts threaten to close them for both paying and non-
paying patients.
Any defense of a market solution based on niche care ignores a variety
of tangible and intangible costs to people with HIV. Clinics provide care, and
patients are satisfied with the quality of care they receive, but clinics are also
often oversubscribed, leading to long waiting lists for care. Many patients
outside urban centers must travel long distances to get to a clinic. Most
significantly, patients may suffer considerably in developing their taste for
segregated care. Most patients in the Glick-Burris study did not believe that
dentists have a right to refuse treatment to patients with HIV, while the
majority view that patients with HIV are best cared for in specialized clinics
may well be understood as a criticism of the behavior of other dentists. These
views reflect the stigma of separate but equal facilities. Those who do not yet
know the rules of the current system will suffer the pain (for some, trauma)
of one or more refusals to treat. In their case, the dentists' liberty of contract
is a zero sum game, undermining the assumption that the market will
efficiently unite those who want to treat with those who want to be treated.30 2
All this suggests that clinics operate as evidence of market failure, not
efficiency. If discrimination is only a wrong in Epstein's book if it corrupts
the market, dental discrimination would still seem to qualify. 3°3
302. Epstein is unconvinced by arguments about the psychological harm done by
discrimination, arguing that it is not distinguishable as harm from other forms of unjustified
humiliation, and ought to be compensable, if at all, as a matter of general tort law. Epstein, supra
note 262, at 18-22. This view arises in part from his presumption that antidiscrimination law is
a poor idea, but also from a refusal to acknowledge the educative, norm-setting aspects of legal
rules. We have antidiscrimination laws because of a belief that certain forms of harm are more
pervasive and in some respects worse than others. Discrimination works as a form of social control
in part by the instruments of humiliation and shame. The power to deny access need not be used
if the fear of denial keeps the undesirable customer away. Law can influence those behaviors not
only by directly sanctioning them, but by making them illegitimate and shameful for the
perpetrators, and by changing them from sources of shame to sparks of resistance in the objects.
303. Even if more general dentists are treating patients with HIV, and that is one
reasonable inference from the various data, we cannot necessarily conclude that the market will
eventually heal itself to the point at which specialized clinics are not needed to provide routine
care. The various regulatory provisions described above may be among the causes of the change,
justifying continued government action. In fact, given the limits of state law prior to the ADA,
one may argue that the market had its chance between 1983 and 1991, and failed to correct
discrimination. Thus, Epstein cannot claim, as he does with respect to racial discrimination, that
the market solution was never tried.
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Finally, we are only choosing between the market and regulation if we
assume substantial compliance with the regulation. As the remainder of this
Article makes clear, I make no such assumption. I assume that rather than
displacing the market-replacing dentists' contract regime with one in which
they have no choice but to treat-the ADA merely changes the market. By
raising the cost of not treating by the dentists' estimate of the costs of
avoidance, and therefore lowering the price at which they would be willing
to treat patients with HIV, the ADA can be seen in practice as a tax, not an
absolute limit on the freedom to contract, and so as a short-term stimulus to
hasten the market's eventual correction of the discriminatory behavior.3"
Epstein's libertarian first principles ultimately cloud his vision of
discrimination in our society, and he simply does not comprehend the
unquantifiable pain of discrimination, particularly as it is felt by the disabled.
He ignores the history of disability discrimination altogether. But all that goes
only to the choice to treat HIV discrimination as a wrong, rather than a
"taste." A belief that discrimination is wrong is insufficient justification in this
day for legal action against it. No one is well-served unless state power is used
in a manner that can effectively address the problem and include both the
regulated and the protected in a new, sustainable relationship." 5
3. Can We?
The question of whether law can effectively be used to eliminate
discrimination variegates the analytic picture. This is really several different
questions, some germane to this article and some not. One inquiry goes to the
effectiveness of antidiscrimination law or of litigation as a medium of social
change in general. In addition to Epstein's, the work of Gerald Rosenberg3"6
and of the many scholars who have tried to model and investigate the effects
of antidiscrimination addresses this issue. 3 7 This scholarship is concerned
304. This was the theory advanced by Donahue concerning Title VII. See John J. Donahue
III, Is Title VII Efficient?, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 1411 (1986). Contra Richard Posner, The
Efficiency and the Efficacy of Title VII, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 513 (1987). More generally, my
approach tracks that of Ayres and Braithwaite, who argue that an intellectual or political debate
framed in narrow terms of pro or no regulation ignores the potential and need for what they label
responsive regulation. See AYREs & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 3.
305. This position is thoroughly aired in yet another contribution to the San Diego Law
Review's review of Epstein's principle thesis. Cooter, supra note 270; see also AYRES &
BRAITHWAITE, supra note 3, at 4-7.
306. See, e.g., GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT
SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991).
307. See, e.g., Paul Burstein & Mark E. Edwards, The Impact of Employment
Discrimination Litigation on Racial Disparity in Earnings: Evidence and Unresolved Issues, 28
LAW & Soc'y REv. 79 (1994). See generally John J. Donahue III & James Heckman, Continuous
Versus Episodic Change: The Impact of Civil Rights Policy on the Economic Status of Blacks, 29
J. EcON. LIT. 1603 (1991) (reviewing literature and finding inferential support for positive impact
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not with whether a particular behavior, like refusing to serve Blacks at lunch
counters, has been eliminated or changed but with whether and to what extent
litigation-driven reform has resulted in overall gains for members of the
protected classes, gains which are frequently measured in economic terms. In
the present discussion, the literature on the general effectiveness of
antidiscrimination law might speak to the issue of whether the treatment of
HIV as a protected disability has "worked" in enhancing the general social and
economic position of people with HIV, but the relevance is limited.3"' In any
event, my analysis neither depends upon nor proves the proposition that
antidiscrimination law "works" in this larger sense."
of antidiscrimination law).
308. People with HIV are hardly a discrete social class, who have suffered a regime of
explicit and pervasive legal subordination as people with HIV, and whose relatively homogenous
socio-economic status could be charted over time. As Mashaw puts it, "while it may well be the
case that the disabled lack human capital that others have, there is no historical story of the type
easily told in the cases of race or sex discrimination-that is, of a pre-existing legal regime that
systematically disadvantaged the disabled class." Mashaw, supra note 262, at 218. But see Robert
L. Burgdorf, Jr., The Americans with Disabilities Act: Analysis and Implications of a Second-
Generation Civil Rights Statute, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 413, 415-26 (1991) (reviewing
empirical data that influenced Congress in passing ADA). HIV, like other faces of death, is
actually a great leveller, joining in stigma and impoverishment highly privileged White men and
poor urban women of color.
309. Nonetheless, I believe that antidiscrimination law has had a positive effect on the lives
of people with HIV. Survey research indicates that public attitudes about HIV have shown a
general trend to better knowledge and more tolerance. See, e.g., Robert J. Blendon et al., Public
Opinion and AIDS. Lessons for the Second Decade, 267 JAMA 981 (1992); Barbara Gerbert &
Thomas Bleecker, AIDS in the Public Eye: Is the Epidemic Viewed as a Crisis?, 18 J. COMMUNITY
HEALTH 335 (1993); cf Gregory M. Herek & John P. Capitanio, Public Reactions to AIDS in
the United States: A Second Decade of Stigma, 83 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 574 (1993). A prospective
study of the impact of the ADA on people with developmental disabilities has shown improvements
in economic status, employment opportunities and personal growth. See Blanck, ADA, supra note
132.
The direct effects of legal rules on social conditions may be slight, but indirect, synergistic
effects are no less important. Schuck, supra note 132, at 1775-76. When we consider the
unprecedented level of organized advocacy by and on behalf of people with HIV, see, e.g.,
ROBERT M. WACHTER, THE FRAGILE COALITION: SCIENTISTS, ACTIVIsTS, AND AIDS (1991),
and the very existence of a vigorous public debate about discrimination against people with HIV
(as opposed to an acceptance of it), it seems reasonable to infer that the construction of HIV as
a disability worked to empower people with HIV and define the disease as protected. The volume
of litigation by people with HIV is indicative both of oppression and resistance. See Lawrence
Gostin, The AIDS Litigation Project: A National Review of Court and Human Rights Commission
Decisions, Part II. Discrimination, 263 JAMA 2086 (1990). The fact that traditional "have-nots"
are often successful in HIV litigation, Aiken & Musheno, supra note 199, is further indication
of the force of the antidiscrimination principle in changing status.
Delgado makes the point that racism gets worse rather than better, because systematic, or
at least pervasive, negative images of the other operate over time to widen the divide between the
races. He criticizes law and economics scholars for tending to focus on individual transactions
and leave out the way the context informs the very vision of individuals about what costs are
relevant and how to value them. Delgado, supra note 262, at 1195-99. I like Rodrigo's comment:
"I don't know how ... to show someone who believes all diseases are individual that there is
such a thing as social pathology." Id. at 1198.
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Answering this larger question is only one way to measure the
effectiveness of antidiscrimination law. Discrimination varies in the nature and
intensity of its expression, over time, in different places, and in different sorts
of employment or accommodation. Reducing it to a national abstraction, to be
judged by broad socioeconomic markers, necessarily obscures perhaps
significant differences in the costs and benefits of enforcement.310 If
discrimination affects "markets" differently, because women are discriminated
against in different ways than men, or because the forms of discrimination vary
in blue-collar and white-collar jobs, or because the culture of particular areas
tends to promote more discrimination than others, focusing on the national
bottom line can mislead whether it shows a positive or negative number. Great
positive effects in one area could mask smaller, but distinctly negative results
in another, and vice versa. The "shadow effect" of the law, in the form of
voluntary changes in the dental practice and culture might also evade or
compound the analysis.311 Moreover, some forms of discrimination-and
denial of dental care is one-are almost entirely constituted by the overt
discriminatory act itself. If the discriminatory behavior is changed, the problem
is largely solved, even if associated socio-economic conditions do not change.
In considering how to use the law to prevent discrimination by dentists,
I will therefore begin with a narrower inquiry: can law change particular
behaviors at a reasonable cost, and if so, how? Although neoclassical
economics assumes that law cannot,312 this position is only supportable in
the form of the tautology of exogenous preferences.313 There are countless
310. This variance is in fact noted, and plays an important role, in the efforts to identify
and assess the overall benefits of antidiscrimination law. See, e.g., Donahue & Heckman, supra
note 307, at 1612-14. Braithwaite makes a similar point about criminal theory. JOHN
BRAITHWAITE, CRIME, SHAME AND REINTEGRATION 1-2 (1989).
311. See Edelman, supra note 131, at 1569.
312. Epstein, for one, assumes that "law does not change what people do or do not
desire." EPSTEIN, supra note 261, at 74. But see Evan T. Lee, Epstein's Premises, 31 SAN DIEGO
L. REv. 203, 206-07 (1994) (arguing that racial attitudes were changed by federal
antidiscrimination laws).
313. That is, one can argue that law only changes the individual's calculation about the
value of fulfilling preferences, not the preferences themselves. The unfulfilled preference remains
as a Platonic ideal. This is a sort of perversion of Coase's caution that economic analysis says
nothing about how rights should be assigned.
Cooter also notes that economics lacks a theory of the educative role of law:
If the disagreement over policy remained within the bounds of economic science,
disputants would respect the general framework of the economic theory of regulation
developed in this article. There is, however, a decisive reason why this will not
happen. Law condemns practices by prohibiting them. Many people regard the
public condemnation of discrimination as vitally important to social justice and
public education. Efficient remedies for discrimination do not prohibit and condemn
enough of it to satisfy its victims. To address these concerns, economics needs a
theory of the expressive and educative power of law.The educative role of law is to change values by inducing people to internalize
norms. From an economic perspective, a norm becomes internalized when disobeying it
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examples of state power helping change preferences, even deeply held ones,
even compulsive ones, on a mass level. I will cite a few examples from the
field of public health: alcohol consumption,3"4 cigarette smoking," 5 riding
a motorcycle without a helmet,31 6 and driving without seat belts.317
Determining whether a reasonable investment in law"' s can help change the
specific behavior of dentists refusing to treat patients with HIV requires us to
consider the research on how law operates to bring about behavioral change.
Here, as in most other areas, law will "work" only if most people will
obey without being individually forced to.319 Over the years, considerable
research has been done in an effort to understand why people obey the law.
As Austin Sarat has written:
[T]he question of why people obey the law focuses attention on the
complex character of the law itself . . . . For positivists, the
question of why people obey can be subsumed under more general
concerns about the relationship of attitudes and behavior . ..or
about the deterrent effect of particular penal sanctions. For
adherents of Critical Legal Studies ... this question resonates with
their interest in legitimation, mystification, reification, and the role
of law in reproducing hierarchy. For interpretivists, it can be
has a psychological cost to the individual. To illustrate, many people now refrain from
smoking in public places, even though the laws are seldom enforced formally. Apparently,
smoking ordinances have been internalized by many smokers. Economics needs a predictive
theory of internalization in order to analyze the educative role of law in crucial areas such
as discrimination.
Cooter, supra note 270, at 167 (footnotes omitted).
314. See DAN E. BEAUCHAMP, THE HEALTH OF THE REPUBLIC: EPIDEMICS, MEDICINE
AND MORALISM AS CHALLENGES TO DEMOCRACY 179, 189-92 (1988) (noting the success of
prohibition and moralistic persuasion in limiting American alcohol consumption).
315. See Alan Blum, Strategies to Reduce Cigarette Sales: Excise Taxes and Beyond, 255
J. AM. MEDICAL ASs'N 1049 (1986).
316. See Center for Disease Control and Prevention, U.S. Dep't of Health and Human
Servs., Head Injuries Associated with Motorcycle Use: Wisconsin, 1991, in 43 MORBIDITY &
MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 423, 430 (1994) (reporting reduced fatalities and citing literature on
helmet laws); BEAUCHAMP, supra note 314, at 97.
317. See Siegel et al., Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance, 1986-1990, 40 MORBIDITY
& MORTALrrY WKLY. REP. SS-4, at 1 (1991).
318. The question of the cost of intervention is difficult to answer. Inasmuch as I assume
that preferences can be changed, and that dental discrimination does not have a measurable market
effect, I assume away the most obvious costs. We are left with the administrative costs of
enforcement, and the psychic costs of dentists forced to change their preferences or confronted
with litigation or professional discipline. The latter, like the psychic benefits of avoiding
discrimination to people with HIV, are not reliably quantifiable.
319. TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 24-25 (1990). As Arendt observed,
the use of force to exact compliance is the negation of authority. HANNAH ARENDT, BETWEEN
PAST AND FUTURE EIGHT EXERCISE IN POLITICAL THOUGHT 93 (2d ed. 1968). This might be said
to be the problem that law as a discourse of power solves. See, e.g., MICHEL FOUCAULT,
DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH (Alan Sheridan trans., 1979).
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rephrased as an inquiry into the social meaning of law or into the
dynamics of domination and resistance.32
Two recent additions to the literature help analyze the options for state
action against dental discrimination.32 Tom Tyler's work, based on studies
of compliance with routine law like traffic rules, emphasizes the importance
of normative elements to compliance, and strongly ties legitimacy to the
perception of procedural justice.322 John Braithwaite, emphasizing the role
of community participation in creating and enforcing norms, has stressed the
role of shame (and, with Ian Ayres, has convincingly applied his work in
envisioning an effective regulatory system that combines public and private
regulators, and mixes persuasion and punishment tit for tat in the face of
cooperation and resistance). 3" While the relative weight of these factors is
a matter of considerable importance in the construction of a theoretical model
of compliance, for our purposes a catholic approach is in order.
A broad approach to the question of compliance also must recognize that
law constructs and is itself constructed by social reality. The positivist question
of why people obey the law can be restated as one of how the "regulated"
consume, resist, or redefine it.324 This is particularly true in an approach that
looks to public health interventions as a model. Cigarette smoking has declined
because it has been made undesirable, not illegal, but law has been used to add
to the inconvenience and stigma of the behavior. Thus, in the case of law as
an antidote to the taste for discrimination, we need to keep in mind how legal
interventions will operate within a larger process of the construction of the
human and behavioral objects of the regulation. How will the legal use of
concepts like discrimination, disability, and freedom of contract affect the
identities of dentists and patients, their understanding of their behavior and
options, their standing in their communities? In the following analysis, I draw
320. Austin Sarat, Authority, Anxiety, and Procedural Justice: Moving from Scientific
Detachment to Critical Engagement, 27 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 647, 649 (1993) (citations omitted)
(reviewing TOM TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990)).
321. Both of the works I rely on here remain in an essentially positivist, liberal framework
that assumes the legal system is more or less just and that its legitimizing function is thus an
acceptable cost if not a benefit. For a very thoughtful discussion in this vein, see Austin Sarat's
review of Tyler's book. Sarat, supra note 320.
322. See TYLER, supra note 319.
323. BRAITHWAITE, supra note 310; Toni Makkai & John Braithwaite, Reintegrative
Shaming and Compliance with Regulatory Standards, 32 CRIMINOLOGY 361 (1994); AYRES &
BRAITHWArrE, supra note 3, at 16-53.
324. For a review of recent scholarship, and a suggestion that a "moderate" social
constructionist approach combining critical theory and empirical observation can accept "the
constructed character of social categories and understandings" without leading to "epistemological
or moral nihilism," see Elizabeth Mertz, A New Social Constructionism for Sociolegal Studies,
28 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 1243, 1260 (1994).
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on all these approaches, synthesizing without, I hope, trivializing. 25
a. The Stick
What negative consequences would the application of the various rules
I have suggested have on dentists' sense of the personal cost of discrimination?
The literature examines a variety of costs, which can be reduced to three: the
chance of being actually caught and punished by the regulator; the pain of
being caught doing something one's social or professional peer group would
condemn, termed "shame" ;326 and the moral or emotional stress of doing
something that runs counter to one's own internalized values, termed
"guilt. "327
Although this is an important question for future research, there is reason
to believe that dentists perceive themselves to be at very low risk of
prosecution and punishment. The high rate of discrimination reported in the
studies discussed here implies that those who are discriminating are not
deterred. This is borne out by the Burris-Glick study, in which most dentists
who declined to treat were quite open in attributing this to the patient's HIV
status. Nearly half the refusing dentists reportedly stated that they did not treat
any patients with HIV, a confession of illegal discrimination that a prudent
dentist concerned about the law would presumably avoid. (This openness may
also suggest that dentists did not feel that their behavior was wrong or illegal.)
Although we know that the mass and trade media have publicized the few
dental cases filed so far, we do not know the degree to which a dentist in rural
Minnesota regards a Department of Justice suit in Texas as evidence of a
serious enforcement threat.
Dentists who believe that they are unlikely to be seriously sanctioned for
a refusal to treat are probably right. As discussed above, none of the
regulatory mechanisms currently in place detect more than a handful of cases
of discrimination, at best. If we assume that one million Americans have HIV,
that half of them have sought dental care since infection, and that only 5 % of
them have been refused care because of their status, a rough calculation
325. Thus I follow Braithwaite's observation that "the main use of good general theories
in an applied field such as criminology is in supplying policy practitioners with a set of explanatory
frameworks worth scanning for application to a particular context." John Braithwaite, Pride in
Criminological Disensus, 18 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 501, 501 (1993).
326. This is not to suggest that peer disapproval has only psychological consequences.
Peers have the power to cut off referrals of patients and to prevent advancement or membership
in professional organizations. See TYLER, supra note 319, at 23-24.
327. The distinction between "shame" and "guilt" is discussed in BRArrHWAITE, supra
note 310, at 57. This distinction illustrates the tenuous quality of the line between rational-choice-
oriented and legitimacy-oriented theories. Deterrence theory has generally recognized the
importance of individual and social values in influencing behavior. One theory's motivation is
another's cost. See TYLER, supra note 319, at 23-27.
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suggests over 25,000 instances of discrimination. Yet, the number of
discrimination complaints of all types is in the low hundreds.328 As dentists
become more concerned about enforcement, we may also see the use of simple
but effective strategies to avoid being caught. Rudeness, long waits, and
manifestations of incompetence-or polite solicitude and a referral-triggering
diagnosis-may all be marshalled to move a patient on. More risky for the
dentist and the patient would be the avoidance of diagnosing any condition that
would require care beyond a cleaning or other simple procedure.329
It is less clear that the punishment, when it comes, would be perceived
as insignificant. Settlements and jury awards in refusal to treat cases have
reached the six figures, and the cost of defending a discrimination action can
be substantial. Even if an insurance company indemnifies a dentist for the cost
of defense, the psychological toll of defending a discrimination action may be
as great as the fear of a damages award.330 Moreover, litigation exacts a
financial toll on health care providers even if there is insurance to cover any
ultimate recovery.33'
The deterrent effect of antidiscrimination law could, in theory, be
enhanced by making the penalties greater, or by increasing the number of cases
brought. For reasons discussed below, the research does not support the theory
that harshly punishing a few dentists would be the most effective way to
change the population's behavior. If classic deterrence is to work at all, then
it seems clear that there have to be rule and policy changes that increase the
incidence of complaint. Several changes in the regulatory environment would
tend, at least in theory, towards achieving this goal. Clarifying dental licensure
policies to create a new rule of law would increase potential liability to
328. The most thorough count was published in 1990, before the passage of the ADA.
It reported a total of 46 health care discrimination claims, filed by patients with HIV against their
physicians, and by health care workers with HIV against their employers. Lawrence 0. Gostin,
The AIDS Litigation Project: A National Review of Court and Human Rights Commission
Decisions, Part I" The Social Impact of AIDS, 263 JAMA 1961, 1961 tbl. 2 (1990). Most cases
against dentists under the ADA have been widely publicized, and are included in this estimate.
Dental board complaints are less commonly reported. Friedland and Valachovic's finding of 32
complaints, in a nationwide survey with an 85 % response rate, is probably a fair count as of 1993.
See Friedland and Valachovic, supra note 153, at 38-39 & tbl. 1.
329. In one "test" in the author's experience, a patient who needed a filling was diagnosed
by one friendly dentist as requiring extensive oral surgery, outside his usual realm of practice.
A second dentist was willing to provide the filling, but drilled the cavity without anaesthetic to
avoid using a needle. 48 Hours: Fatal Secret (CBS television broadcast, 1991).
330. One may infer this by analogy to the slim research on the psychological effects of
medical malpractice. See Sara C. Charles et al., Sued and Nonsued Physicians' Self-Reported
Reactions to Malpractice Litigation, 142 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 437 (1985); Sara C. Charles et al.,
Physicians' Self-Reports of Reactions to Malpractice Litigation, 141 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 563
(1984).
331. The Harvard Malpractice Study found that New York physicians spent an average
of $7,000 per malpractice claim in lost work. WEILER ET AL., supra note 174, at 126. Dentists
in private practice could be exposed to equal or greater costs of taking days off of practice.
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complaint. Aggressive enforcement of the ADA by the Department of Justice,
and by state and local human rights agencies, would result in many more cases
being prosecuted and publicized, and could increase dentists' sense of
vulnerability to suit.
Significantly increasing the number of actions, however, probably
depends on getting more people who have suffered discrimination to come
forward and make complaints. The addition of compensatory damages to the
relief available under the ADA and state antidiscrimination law would provide
a greater incentive to individuals to file suits. Increasing the ease of access to
and speed of the complaint process under both licensure and antidiscrimination
law could help. Provisions to ensure anonymity of the complainant throughout
the litigation would reduce the disincentive to sue among potential plaintiffs.
Potential plaintiffs, however, may be as alienated from the legal system, and
as averse to the stress of litigation, as potential defendants. Given this, the
essential fungibility of dentists, and the marginal importance of being cared
for by a particular dentist, waiting for plaintiffs to come forward on their own
may not generate a sufficient level of litigation to influence dentists' behavior.
The Department of Justice and state agencies can address this problem by using
their investigative authority to deploy testing or other techniques to identify
dentists who illegally discriminate. The same authorities, or private
foundations, may fund private testing and education programs similar to those
funded under the Fair Housing Act.
It remains questionable that the many barriers to legal action against
dentists who discriminate could be overcome to a sufficient degree that such
action, by itself, would substantially change dentists' perception of the risk of
punishment. This is not, however, as serious a problem as it might seem. The
immediate goal, after all, is not to raise the number of enforcement actions,
but to increase dentists' sense of vulnerability to prosecution. This goal can
be significantly advanced by a public information campaign, linked to changes
in rules and to actual enforcement, that is designed to change dentists' legal
risk assessment. Individuals tend to judge risks by factors other than the
objective chances of their occurrence.332 Publicity targeted at dentists that
portrays the painful consequences of being caught may increase both the
aversion to being caught and the estimate of the "risk" of it happening. This
insight has emerged as important in other behavior change campaigns, such
as the reduction of drunk driving.333 Indeed, Ross's review of research
suggests that publicity is more important in effecting change than is the
332. See WILLIAM LOWRANCE, OF ACCEPTABLE RISK: SCIENCE AND THE DETERMINATION
OF SAFETY 86-94 (1976); Lawrence J. Scneiderman & Robert M. Kaplan, Fear of Dying and HIV
Infection vs. Hepatitis B Infection, 82 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 584 (1992).
333. TYLER, supra note 319, at23 (citing H. LAURENCEROSS, DETERRING THE DRINKING
DRIVER: LEGAL POLICY AND SOCIAL CONTROL (1982)).
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severity of punishment.334 From this view both changes in legal rules and
enforcement action derive a substantial amount of their potential impact from
the occasion they create for "normative publicity, " "' and continuing
enforcement efforts provide the opportunity for ongoing reinforcement of the
public message.
Braithwaite's work finds that feelings of shame and guilt can "raise the
cost" of discrimination independently of the level of legal threat. In early work
in this vein, Braithwaite and Makkai found that a method of "reintegrative
shaming," analogous to professional peer pressure, had a significant effect on
nursing home compliance with regulations governing health care, privacy, and
safety. The authors concluded that the surprising strength of the relation
resulted from the diffusion of the norm through involvement of the entire staff
in addressing regulatory deficiencies.336 Braithwaite's theories emphasize the
"reintegrative" use of shaming, in which clear and strong disapproval is purged
by repentant correction in a general climate that avoids alienation or
stigmatization of the wrongdoer. "Shaming" is most effective in situations of
interdependence, as between regulators and their professional subjects.337 "It
would seem," he writes, "that sanctions imposed by relatives, friends, or a
personally relevant collective have more effect on ... behavior than sanctions
imposed by a remote legal authority.""' Under this theory, however,
consensus in the "relevant collectivity" on the wrongfulness of the conduct is
essential ."
This work yields particularly important insights for changing dentists'
behavior. In some respects, dentists are unusually independent. They tend to
334. Ross, supra note 332, at 99-115.
335. To accept that the state can change preferences, and can do so most effectively by
a judicious combination of fear and persuasion, should start another kind of philosophical debate.
Although it is beyond the bounds of this paper, health propaganda and health law raise basic
questions about the degree to which we want the state to manipulate our preferences, even if the
goal is our general health. See Scott Burris, Thoughts on the Law and the Public's Health, 22 J.
L. MED. & ETHIcs 141 (1994).
336. Makkai & Braithwaite, supra note 323, at 380.
337. Id. at 379-81. Makkai and Braithwaite observe:
The effective [regulators] are those who believe in strong expressions of disapproval
combined with strong commitments to burying the hatchet once such robust
encounters are over, to terminating disapproval with approval once things are fixed,
to tempering disapproval for poor performance on one standard with approval for
good performance on other standards, to avoiding humiliation by communicating
disapproval of poor performance within a framework of respect for the performer.
Id. at 379.
338. BRAITHWAITE, supra note 310, at 69.
339. Id. at 38; see Makkai & Braithwaite, supra note 323, at 366. For example,
Braithwaite explains, in a society where disapproval of marijuana use falls to 50 percent,
"increased capacities to shame reintegratively will not predict marijuana use because subcultural
shaming to encourage marijuana use will be just as powerful as mainstream shaming to discourage
use." Braithwaite, supra note 325, at 504.
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operate as sole practitioners or in small partnerships, cut off from day-to-day
contact with peers. They are loosely regulated. Aside from the lightning strike
of an OSHA inspection, their experience with regulatory authorities is probably
limited to renewing their license by mail. On the other hand, they are linked
to patients in a relationship of relative intimacy, at least physically, and one
that is, as the strength of concerns about losing patients shows, characterized
by some degree of dependence. Moreover, the formal goal of legal action on
the nondiscrimination model is the creation of a new relationship between the
dentists and the refused patient. Finally, the physical isolation of dentists does
not necessarily lessen their concern for professional peer validation, hence the
finding of Weyant et al. that high professionalism scores, embracing the degree
to which the respondent was involved in a network of peers, were inversely
associated with discriminatory attitudes.3"
If Braithwaite is correct, we should see the dental professional subculture
itself as the key to defining dental discrimination as a wrong. This is the group
whose views will be deemed by dentists as most relevant on the issues of
professionalism, risk, competence and economic practicality. While
encouraging disapproval of dental discrimination in other subcultures to which
dentists belong would be helpful, the issue is hardly one that will interest most
people as even worth having an opinion about.34" ' Thus, though the diffusion
of dentists makes the connection relatively weak, we must rely on the dental
profession itself as the primary developer and enforcer of a consensus for
treatment. It follows that we should encourage the expression of strong norms
of competency and nondiscrimination in all settings where dentists interact with
their peers, beginning with initial training, and continuing through strong and
frequent disapproval of discrimination by licensing boards and professional
organizations.
To suggest that it is important to have explicit norms of nondiscrimination
set by the profession is not to suggest that there is no role for law in setting
norms or enforcing them. On the contrary, even a strong partisan of the
independence of professionals has recognized that the AMA's ethical guidelines
340. Weyant et al., supra note 57. The Harvard Malpractice Study found that physicians
were more influenced by professional training and contacts than legal rules in changing practices.
WEILER Er AL., supra note 174, at 128 tbl. 6.3.
341. There is broad support for the general norm of non-discrimination, allowing
considerable latitude in the definition of what constitutes discrimination. A dentist may be subject
to shaming by public exposure as a discriminator, even without a legal finding that the dentist was
a wrong-doer. Although its activities have subsided of late, Act-Up activists have frequently
"zapped" public and private figures for alleged mistreatment of people with HIV. Public exposure,
particularly if the object feels shame and humiliation, is a serious sanction. For an account of Act-
Up's activities in influencing medical research, see WACHTER, supra note 309. For a discussion
of the evidence for public shaming as a force for regulatory compliance, see AYRES &
BRAITHWAITE, supra note 3, at 20-27.
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on treating patients with HIV have not been successful.342 The general
research has found that even guidelines on practice created within the
profession, and transmitted by respected opinion leaders directly to physicians,
are not enough to change professionals' behavior on their own.343
Discipline to enforce the consensus should, however, be informed by a
reintegrative philosophy. An apology, additional training, and a commitment
to treat in future are more important than fines and suspension, both in
changing the individual dentist's behavior and in reinforcing the norm in
others. Harsh punishments and stigma, even from within the profession, may
tend to increase resistance.3" As the legal rule against discrimination under
the ADA becomes clearly established, Braithwaite's work suggests that
mediation and conciliation, relying on injunctive relief, will be more effective
than trials and fines. Indeed, and perhaps contrary to the conventional wisdom
of civil rights litigators, settlements of high profile cases, provided they include
a frank confession of error and a reconciliation between patient and dentist,
may be as or more effective than a final judgment of liability and the
imposition of punitive fines.
This returns us to the question of how dentists themselves perceive the
situation, the law and their obligations. Regardless of the level of actual and
perceived enforcement, the degree to which both "shame" and "guilt" figure
as costs depends upon whether or not the individual who discriminates
perceives himself as a beast or a hero in his own and others' eyes. We thus
move to the questions of dentists' perception of the morality and legitimacy
of a rule against dental discrimination.
b. The Superego
Regulation that assumes its objects are either "bad," susceptible only to
punishment, and regulation that assumes all its objects are "good," requiring
only persuasion, are equally naive.345 We can safely assume that many if not
342. David Orentlicher, The Influence of a Professional Organization on Physician
Behavior, 57 ALB. L. REv. 583, 596-98 (1994).
343. See, e.g., Jonathan Lomas et al., Do Practice Guidelines Matter? The Effect of a
Consensus Statement on the Practice of Physicians, 321 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1306 (1989); Jonathan
Lomas et al., Opinion Leaders vs Audit and Feedback to Implement Practice Guidelines: Delivery
After the Cesarean Section, 265 JAMA 2202 (1991). On the other hand, there is also little
evidence that guidelines enforced by sanctions are effective in producing long-term behavior
change. See Mark V. Pauly, Practice Guidelines: Can They Save Money? Should They?, 23 J.
L. MED. & ETHICs 65, 69-70 (1995). See generally Peter J. Greco & John M. Eisenberg,
Changing Physicians' Practices, 329 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1271 (1993) (reviewing the literature).
344. See BRAITHWAITE, supra note 310, at 127-33 (discussing role of stigma in creating
sub-culture of white collar criminals).
345. "When regulators wade in with a punitive model of human beings as essentially bad,
they dissipate the will of well-intentioned actors to comply when they treat them as if they are
ill intentioned. The problem with the persuasion model, however, based as it is on a typification
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most dentists would like to do what is "right," and that persuasion therefore
can help us achieve our behavioral goals. The complexity of the construction
of "right" in dentists' minds, however, requires a sophisticated evaluation of
both dentists' current attitudes and the tools of persuasion at our disposal.
Despite the volume of research, there are limits on what we know. A
dentist's sense that it is morally wrong to refuse patients with HIV has many
potential sources, including religious faith, professional values, and the
importance of the rule of law. The research on attitudes to date has been
secular in character, and has focused on refusal to treat as a professional
decision. It has weaknesses when used to describe the moral views of dentists
about discrimination. Shame is one of the "biases" attitudinal studies are
designed to overcome, in the sense that they are structured to minimize the
degree to which the respondent gives the answer she thinks the surveyor thinks
is "right." Dentists' attitudes about the legitimacy of the legal rule against
discrimination have likewise not been directly examined, but the data suggest
that dentists are dubious about government interference with their professional
decisions.
The evidence indicates that dentists, as a group, are ambivalent about
caring for people with HIV, and that this is true of many who do discriminate
as well as of many who do not. While one study found that most dentists did
not agree with their professional organization that they had an ethical obligation
to treat,346 more studies have found a majority agreeing with some variation
of the proposition that they "ought" to treat. Of course, this belief was rejected
by a substantial minority of dentists, and even of those who embrace it, many
also "preferred" not to treat patients with HIV. Perhaps the clearest indicator
of ambivalence in the research data is the evidence that dentists, while
frequently refusing to treat patients known to have HIV, make no effort to
screen out unknown HIV-positive patients in their practices. We do not know
the degree to which dentists who do discriminate or "prefer not to" treat feel
the sting of immorality. We also see ambivalence in the enforcement of the
ethical and legal rules against discrimination by dentists. The wording of the
ethical codes, and the failure to take strong public positions, may indicate
enduring uncertainty about the substance of the rules, or, as likely, an
unwillingness to criticize professional colleagues.
If there is a Holmesian "bad man" in this issue, it is the highly risk
averse dentist who doesn't give a damn about ethics and has no interest in
learning anything new about his profession. Very little in the way of education,
as Weyant et al. observe, can be done to affect such individuals. Even
of people as basically good-reasonable, of good faith, motivated to abide.by the law-is that it
fails to recognize that there are some who are not good, and who will take advantage of being
presumed to be so." AYREs & BRAITHWArrE, supra note 3, at 25.
346. Grace & Cohen, supra note 29, at 33.
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ferocious litigation might not bring a change. Most dentists who do not treat
probably do not sink to this level, however, and will be persuadable that
discrimination is wrong. (We nevertheless must keep in mind that the issue
is hardly clear cut, and that questions of personal risk, customer preference,
and the moral worth of the infected can provide the material for an elaborate
structure of justification.)
Those dentists who treat, or express a willingness to do so, seem to be
strongly influenced by education, experience, peer values, and personality
traits. Indeed, this combination of knowledge, commitment to professional
values, and willingness to take risks attendant upon professional status could
be said to constitute "good" in this context. Establishing that discrimination
is wrong thus entails a model of the good dentist that the less-than-ideal dentist
will aspire to emulate.
The best source of a norm against discrimination is the profession itself,
acting through the explicit and urgent adoption of a rule against discrimination
by national, state and local professional organizations, and state licensing
boards. Tyler's research on obedience to law helps explain why. The goal is
to have dentists accept and practice a behavior that they perceive to be contrary
to their immediate self-interest, to abandon their current views and practices
and to adopt new ones. Securing this sort of change is, in Tyler's view, one
of the main instrumental purposes of legitimacy, and success, therefore,
depends upon the degree to which dentists accept the new rule of behavior as
legitimate.347 Tyler's research, which measured the independent force of
factors like support for established authority in either its institutional or
individual manifestations (i.e., for Congress or for Congressperson Jones), and
faith in the fairness of lawmaking and adjudicatory procedures, supports the
primacy of professional regulation in this instance. Tyler found that:
fairness of procedures enhances or diminishes the legitimacy of
legal authorities and future compliance with the law. When legal
authorities attempt to implement policies, public conceptions of fair
procedure are particularly important. According to a perspective
based on procedural justice, people will accept or reject policies
according to how they assess their fairness rather than in terms of
costs and benefits. 4
Although we may assume that dentists, who are generally well off and
enjoy high status in society, support the law as it constitutes their status and
347. "If legitimacy is an important concept, it should lead citizens to behave in ways not
always consistent with their short-term self interest." TYLER, supra note 320, at 29.
348. Id. at 110.
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protects their property, dentists are less likely to obey a controversial
regulation that intrudes upon their professional autonomy. In a matter like
dental discrimination, which involves medical facts as much as, or more than,
ethical or legal rules, it is very likely that dentists will perceive as most
legitimate a professional decision-making process carried out by individuals
with the proper medical and dental qualifications."'
Some professionals strongly object to any extra-professional limits on
their discretion to choose whom to treat:
Any doctor who is . . . compelled by law to make any decision he
would not otherwise have made, is being forced to act against his
own mind, which means forced to act against his own life. He is
also being forced to violate his most fundamental professional
commitment, that of using his own best judgment at all times for
the greatest benefit of his patient.35
This view may or may not be linked to another common objection-doubts that
the authority promulgating or interpreting the regulation has the requisite
knowledge and competence to do so.35" ' Dentists, schooled in non-legal
methods of resolving professional conflicts, are not likely to be convinced by
practice guidelines and pronouncements about risk that emerge from legislative
debate or adversarial proceedings.352
The fact that the norm comes primarily from within the profession by
no means suggests that the norm can be entirely enforced by the profession
alone. When professional guidelines have been followed, success depended
upon the deployment of a variety of context-specific incentives and
enforcement measures. Orentlicher concluded that ". . . successful
implementation of standards for anaesthetic monitoring was a result of a
combination of mandates from both hospitals and licensing boards for their use
349. In pedagogical terms, the development of the norm through professional procedures,
and its explication by professional peers and opinion leaders, increases the credibility and
acceptability of the message. For a summary of the elements of successful HIV education, see
Burris, supra note 255.
350. Robert M. Sade, Medical Care as a Right: A Refitation, 285 NEw ENG. J. MED.
1288, 1290-91 (1971).
351. For a roster of professional objections to regulation, see Orentlicher, supra note 342,
at 583-90.
352. Daniel M. Fox described the methods physicians use to resolve professional conflicts:
The first method is the assertion of authority from the top of a hierarchy in which power
is, in theory, derived from knowledge. The second method is peer review-discussion
to consensus among experts of roughly equal standing and attainment. Both methods,
the hierarchical and the consensual, rest on the assumption that truth is best determined
by experts.
Daniel M. Fox, Physicians versus Lawyers: A Conflict of Cultures, in AIDS LAW TODAY, supra
note 195, 367, 370.
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and reductions in malpractice premiums that were conditioned on their
use. " "' Orentlichter also found that strict regulatory oversight has been
effective." 4 Reviewing the literature on six general methods355 of changing
physicians' behavior, Greco and Eisenberg also concluded that "interventions
that rely on more than one method appear to be the most successful. "356 This
is consistent with the approach advocated by Ayres and Braithwaite.357
Dentists are no more likely to accept legislative and judicial judgments
about whom they must treat than they are to accept those judgments in the
malpractice or other regulatory realms. However, much of their concern about
regulators' competency may be allayed by maximizing the coherence between
legal and professional rules . To the degree that the state is merely enforcing
a rule that has emerged from or been adopted by the profession generally, the
objections from competency and autonomy can be overcome. This suggests
the importance of focusing on the lack of valid professional reasons for not
treating, rather than on the arbitrary (to dentists) social decision to confer a
right of nondiscrimination upon people with HIV by calling them "disabled."
Even if dentists perceive the norm as coming from within their profession
and accept the legal regime as legitimate, one can anticipate their doubts about
the legitimacy of non-professional enforcement. Dentists will not like being
sued or disciplined, and it is important to recognize that coercion may
engender resistance as well as provide deterrence. Although I believe that, at
any level of enforcement, the costs will not outweigh the benefits, I also
believe that we should conduct disciplinary and litigation efforts with an
awareness of this concern and the larger goals of the campaign. We should not
ordinarily demonize dentists who discriminate; their reformation, rather than
their ruin, should be the express goal that guides settlement, publicity, and
other decisions.
4. Summary: The Elements of an Effective Regulatory Response
I can now set forth my proposals for action that will maximize the
chances of dentists changing their behavior. The claim that law cannot change
preferences is insupportable. It can and does do so in a variety of ways. On
the other hand, the effect of law is dependent on a large number of co-factors,
and the effect of any single intervention may be difficult to identify or
353. Orentlicher, supra note 342, at 601 (citations omitted).
354. Id. at 602 (citing state regulation of coronary bypass surgery in New York, and
federal regulation of antipsychotic drug use in nursing homes).
355. The six are "education, feedback, participation by physicians in efforts to bring about
change, administrative rules, financial incentives, and financial penalties." Greco & Eisenberg,
supra note 343, at 1271.
356. Id.
357. AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 3.
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disaggregate from others. Moreover, although law plays an important role in
a campaign to reduce dental discrimination, the project cannot depend on state
action. Experience suggests that no one measure can be expected to produce
behavior change. The best candidate for success is a strategy using an array
of measures aimed at changing attitudes, information levels, and incentives.
Thus, the goal of a systematic intervention includes both attitudinal and
behavioral components, and is best described as persuading dentists that
discrimination is wrong (i.e., inconsistent with social and professional norms),
and bringing them to act consistently with that belief. There are three principal
means to achieve this goal: 1) clear normative and behavioral messages from
legitimate sources; 2) perceptible incentives for compliance and disincentives
for noncompliance; and 3) continuous reinforcement of the desired behavior.
In the remainder of this Section, I will propose mechanisms for achieving
attitudinal and behavioral changes.
a. Establishing the Wrongfulness of Discrimination
The program as a whole depends upon establishing that discrimination
is wrong, in any of the many ways it might be: unprofessional, unnecessary,
cruel, illegal, un-Christian and so on. It depends, that is, on clearly stated,
unambiguous, vigorous norms that individual dentists can understand and with
which they can identify. Although I am putting forth a "legal" strategy, I see
the law operating at a deep level in ways I will describe. To begin with, I have
not phrased the goal in terms of persuading dentists that discrimination is
illegal; the legal rule against discrimination can readily be seen to depend upon
the prior judgment that discrimination is medically unnecessary and unethical.
We may wish to phrase the rule that way because of the substantial evidence
that antidiscrimination law is probably perceived by dentists as the least
legitimate source of the norm among our alternatives, and conversely that
professional values are very influential in reducing discriminatory attitudes.
It follows that authorities constituted by dentists can most effectively
advance the cause of establishing clear norms of nondiscrimination. On the key
issues that underlie discriminatory behavior-fear of infection, uncertainty
about competence, and concern about patient and staff attitudes-no other
authority will be as credible in an effort to change dentists' attitudes and
behavior. The norm itself should be as forthright and unambiguous as possible.
Recommendation 1:
Dental ethical codes and licensure regulations should be'amended
to make it unprofessional (or otherwise actionable) conduct for a
dentist to refuse, withhold from, deny, or discriminate against an
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individual with regard to the provision of professional services for
which the licensee is licensed and qualified to render because the
individual is HJV positive. 358 Such conduct includes providing care
to the individual at a standard that is lower than that provided other
individuals with like medical needs. Rules should clearly state that
a subjective belief that one is incapable of treating, without
evidence of a condition outside ordinary competence, cannot justify
discrimination, and that any referral based on general health or
HIV-related conditions should be made only after consultation with
the patient's physician, if any.
A professional standard will not be established by mere words. Vigorous
action consistent with an ethic of treatment is also required. The adoption of
various educational and social marketing proposals, discussed below in the
section on reinforcing the norm, are crucial to establishing the norm in the first
place. The same is true of the deployment of incentives. Rewards and
punishments signify a commitment to the norm of treatment. Their absence
is readily perceived as a wink at the rule.359
A "clear" norm will be a public norm. If dental authorities are perceived
as afraid to address publicly the issue of HIV in dentistry, individual dentists
afraid of customer reaction will be justifiably skeptical of the professional
commitment to nondiscrimination. To the extent that discrimination reflects
a collective action problem, the perception of collective change is essential to
reassure individual dentists that treatment of HIV positive patients will not
jeopardize their practice. Dentists must perceive that their patients have the
impression that all dentists treat people with HIV.
The legal norm of nondiscrimination has a secondary, but still important
role: It invokes powerful ideas like fairness and equal treatment. Although
legal rules may not be as legitimate to dentists as professionally-based ones,
dentists are hardly a lawless band of anarchists and will be affected to some
degree by legal rules. Moreover, legal rulings against discrimination may
reassure the public that the risk of transmission in a dental practice is
acceptably low.36 °
358. This language is based on MD. CODE ANN. HEALTH OCC. § 4-315(a)(27) (1991).
The recommendation speaks of regulatory changes by dental boards themselves, where possible,
rather than legislation, because of the greater legitimacy of professionally produced rules to those
passed by politicians.
359. Nevertheless, dental licensing boards can be effective in setting norms even if
enforcement is left to other bodies, provided the norm is clear enough, the lack of prosecution
is based on a policy of referring such cases to human rights agencies, and the referrals are actually
made.
360. See Burris, supra note 255, at 386-87.
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Recommendation 2:
Department of Justice, state human rights agencies, and civil rights
attorneys should continue a strategy of establishing and defining the
extent of a legal rule against discrimination through impact
litigation.
b. Establishing Incentives
In addition to validating the norm, incentives for treatment and against
discrimination, if they are perceived as significant enough by dentists, will
contribute to behavior change. The research of Weyant and Bennett supports
the inference that enhanced professional status for those who treat HIV positive
patients would encourage treatment by many dentists sensitive to professional
regard. Role models exemplifying the good are needed, not only for symbolic
purposes but also to provide adequate care for patients and education for
dentists. Two recommendations follow.
Recommendation 3:
Professional organizations, local governments, and philanthropies
should seek or create opportunities to recognize dentists who are
willing to be publicly identified as treating patients with HIV,
actively promote the virtues of treating, and praise those who treat
HIV patients.
Recommendation 4:
Rather than routine care, clinics or practices specializing in care
for people with communicable diseases should provide clinical
advice to local dentists, leadership in professional education at all
levels, and care for patients requiring specialized procedures or
facilities.
If professional regard and institutional support are the carrots,
professional discipline and legal action constitute the sticks that are sometimes
necessary to induce change in a heretofore gratifying behavior. Legal action
should, in the words of Ayres and Braithwaite, be both "ferocious and
forgiving," clearly demanding compliance with the norm but seeking and
recognizing the reformation of the wrongdoer.36" ' The level of punishment
361. AYREs & BRArrHWArrE, supra note 3, at 27.
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theoretically available seems more than sufficient to provide a disincentive for
discrimination. The problem lies more in the levels of litigation and publicity,
leading to several recommendations intended to encourage those who
experience discrimination to come forward, or otherwise to increase the actual
and perceived volume of litigation.
I will begin with dental licensing boards. Their problems have led to
some common suggestions for improvement. These include increasing fees to
allow the hiring of more staff, reducing the burden of proof to preponderance
of the evidence, and streamlining the investigation and appeals process.362
Further:
Recommendation 5:
Dental licensing boards should make their complaint procedures
sufficiently expeditious and user-friendly to be a viable alternative
to litigation. The opportunity to file complaints before dental boards
should be better publicized, perhaps by requiring dental offices to
post information about the process and to supply forms. Dental
boards should vigorously and swiftly investigate and adjudicate
complaints, without awaiting the results of parallel actions under
the Americans with Disabilities Act. The procedures for filing and
investigating complaints should be simplified and should provide for
the use of a pseudonym by the complainant, even once the action
is final and public, as well as on appeal.
In the short term, taking steps to appear more willing to take cases increases
deterrence and consciousness of the norm, even if the changes have no
significant impact on the volume of cases filed or sanctions imposed.
Recommendation 6:
Dentists should also perceive a meaningful threat of suit under the
Americans with Disabilities Act and state antidiscrimination law.
The Department of Justice and state human rights agencies should
conduct or fund testing in communities throughout the country
where no litigation has been brought, in order to enhance the
deterrent effect of antidiscrimination law.
362. See Kusserow et al., supra note 164.
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Recommendation 7:
To increase the incentive for individuals who have suffered
discrimination to bring actions, state and federal antidiscrimination
law should be amended to provide for damages in public
accommodations cases, specifying a minimum liquidated amount of
at least $5,000. Testers should explicitly be allowed to recover
damages.
Under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, the Office for Civil Rights
of the Department of Health and Human Services has the authority to
investigate discrimination in programs funded by that department, including
many, if not all, of the major university hospital and dental school clinics.
While I am not suggesting a harsh crackdown on institutions operating HIV-
only clinics, there are at least two important roles for regulators.
Recommendation 8:
First, the Department of Health and Human Services should take
steps necessary to ensure that no federally funded institutions refuse
to provide dental care for people with HIV. Second, the Department
of Health and Human Services should use its authority to bring
institutions with HIV-only clinics into compliance with legal rules
prohibiting mandatory segregation and to promote the model clinic
role described below.
Increasing somewhat the volume of cases brought should not be taken
as a suggestion that we "get tough" on discrimination. A program perceived
as "punishing" dentists may be counterproductive, leading to organized
resistance among dentists.363 Although the destruction of a career may have
its attention-getting side, beyond the short run the achievement of behavior
change may better be served by a positive example that enhances the legitimacy
of the legal rule. Thus:
Recommendation 9:
The goal of any complaint or lawsuit should be publicly changing
the behavior of the dentist, rather than placing blame or exacting
punishment. Therefore, dispute resolution procedures ought to be
expeditious and reintegrative more than stigmatizing and punitive.
363. See AYREs & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 3, at 25.
Vol. 13:1I, 1996
Dental Discrimination
Settlement should be encouraged, provided its terms are public and
include an acceptance of wrongdoing and a commitment to change.
Education on HIV treatment and infection control, whether ordered
by a dental board or as part of a settlement in a lawsuit, is perhaps
the ideal sanction.
Despite the current inefficacy of licensing boards, we should not conclude
that professional discipline has no power to deter dentists from misconduct.
Indeed, action by dental regulators has several notable advantages over other
forms of legal action. In general, sanction from within the dental profession
will be more readily accepted by individual dentists. In addition, dental boards
generally possess the authority to impose flexible, intermediate sanctions
designed to repair defects in a dentist's training or skills. Dental boards could
require continuing education in treating patients with HIV, or require some
kind of community service treating patients with HIV, either outside or within
the dentists' practice."
c. Reinforcing the Norm and Behavior Change
Changing behavior requires different types of intervention at many
different levels. A permanent, systematic program of dental education in
infectious disease dentistry and HIV is fundamental to our goal of reinforcing
the norm of nondiscrimination.
Recommendation 10:
Dental licensure laws and/or regulations should be amended to
require training in both infection control and infectious diseases
dentistry as requirements of initial licensure in dentistry and allied
fields. All licensed and certified dentists and allied health
professionals should be required to complete continuing education
on the dental care of people with HIV and other infectious diseases,
and infection control generally, as a condition of relicensure or
recertification. Training should include the communication of risk
information to patients and other staff members.
To the degree that dentists are refusing to treat out of concern for the
economic impact of their patients' fears, a broader public information
campaign will reduce the need for discrimination while conveying and
364. For example, the Pennsylvania board can require counseling and education (and may
use probation as a stick.) PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 123.1(b)(s) (1994).
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reinforcing a norm of nondiscrimination to both dentists and patients. A mass
effort, perhaps a unit in the ongoing America Responds to AIDS campaign,will
respond to the public concern about transmission of HIV and enlist the public
in the enforcement of dentists' observance of universal infection control
procedures. A targeted campaign, designed to reach patients in the dental
office and funded primarily by philanthropies and dentists themselves, is
feasible and would be quite effective. Such a targeted campaign would benefit
from the experience and organizational powers of the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC).
Recommendation 11:
The CDC, working with health philanthropies, as well as dental
boards and associations, should develop a public information
campaign on HIV transmission in dentistry, with separate
components targeted to dentists, dental staffs, and dental patients.
One of the greatest virtues of legal activity is its capacity to generate free
publicity. In addition to raising dentists' perception of the costs of
discrimination, an active litigation program, bringing "routine" cases in
communities across the country and making sure that they are publicized in
local and national dental trade papers, will reinforce the norm at an affordable
cost. This requires a departure from a traditional focus of civil rights lawyers
on "impact" cases that formally establish the rule once and for all. Even cases
that break no new legal ground are important because they will eventually
penetrate the consciousness of new communities of dentists. Routinized,
continual, and well publicized legal action diffused throughout the nation will
establish the nondiscrimination norm. Legal action can reinforce
nondiscrimination in other important ways. The process of proposing, debating,
and implementing the various initiatives described here puts dental
discrimination on the public agenda and creates opportunities for engaging and
educating dentists and their patients.36  Testing programs or other
investigatory devices may also be used to document the extent of the problem.
d. Other Measures
This article has identified important steps not directly related to changing
dentists' behavior. There is a need for research on dentists' attitudes about
antidiscrimination law, which might well be appropriately funded by the
Department of Justice as part of its effort to implement the ADA. As a general
365. See Burris, supra note 335 (discussing educative role of lawmaking).
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matter, I have suggested here that we ought not to assume that the law works,
but rather attempt to assess and explain its effectiveness. There should be more
support for, and scholarly interest in doing, work to assess the impact of
interventions on discriminatory behavior. I have also noted the degree to which
the cost of dental care limits the access to care of people without the means
to pay. States should seriously consider widening the availability of dental care
under the Medicaid program and increasing reimbursement rates.
Research also suggests a few things that are not advisable. Governments
and health planners should not address the discrimination problem by fostering
routine care in dedicated HIV clinics. If clinics are not clearly limited to
tertiary care, consultation, and training, their existence will undermine efforts
to reduce discrimination. Finally, we should avoid the tendency to talk about
dental discrimination as if it poses a conflict of rights.366 There is surprising
consensus between dentists and their patients that the dentist should be aware
of the patient's HIV status. In the end, patients want their teeth cleaned, and
dentists want to be physically and economically secure.
e. Some Thoughts on Cost
Funds are by definition scarce. I cannot lay out a budget for the program
suggested here; however, a few general observations indicate that a concerted
effort to reduce HIV discrimination would not be prohibitively expensive.
This project relies heavily on existing regulatory and professional
institutions. Given the severity of dental discrimination, the Department of
Justice and state human rights agencies should redeploy existing staff to
concentrate on dental cases. Of course, human rights agencies at all levels are
backlogged, and the addition of new staff would be better for all concerned.
A high profile campaign of investigation and litigation could be carried out,
at a cost of about $10 million per year, by adding one to two lawyers and the
same number of investigators to human rights agencies in each state and the
Public Access Section of the Department of Justice.367 Fortunately, a high-
profile campaign conducted by only five or six states and the Department of
Justice could have national impact for little over $1 million per year. Grants
in the neighborhood of $150,000 per year to private agencies for testing would
be additional. Although changes in dental licensure laws would entail no new
line item costs, improving the budgets of licensing boards obviously would.
Educational efforts would also impose costs, many of which would be
borne by the private sector. Although setting HIV-related continuing education
366. For a critique of this construction of HIV disputes, see Burris, "AIDS
Exceptionalism", supra note 208.
367. This assumes a cost of about $200,000, based on attorney salaries of $45,000,
investigator/support staff salaries at $30,000, 25% for benefits and $13,000 in expenses.
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requirements imposes a substantial cost on dentists-the hourly cost of training
plus the time lost-this would not be a new cost if HIV-related education is
substituted for currently required training in other subjects . Even if it imposes
a new cost, the growing importance of infection control in dentistry, and the
lack of other regulatory interventions, makes this a justified cost beyond its
impact on HIV care.
The production of training materials for continuing education could be
included in the cost to dentists, or it could be subsidized by governmental and
private contributions funnelled through the existing AIDS education and
training centers for health care workers.3 6' Both governmental and
philanthropic financing and expertise will be needed to produce public service
ads and brochures for dentists and their patients. These costs could be
minimized by incorporating the dental discrimination campaign into existing
public information programs, such as America Responds to AIDS. Additional
funding from the organized dental profession would also be useful for symbolic
as well as fiscal reasons.
Reducing discrimination will improve the quality of life and oral health
for people with HIV, but money should not be taken away from either HIV
prevention or care programs to fund dental discrimination control. Dental
discrimination should be controlled primarily because it is wrong, an insult to
civility and fair treatment, and clearly illegal. Discrimination control should
not be balanced against other HIV programs, but is justified by the larger
social cost of indulging wrongful behavior.
Conclusion
Law scholarship is addicted to grand theories. This approach not only
often produces elegant results, but also has the additional advantage of allowing
considerable leeway for convenient factual assumptions. These grand theories
tend to be supplanted by new grand theories well before they can be validated
or falsified in the field. This pattern is in danger of cutting off a productive
debate about the use of state power to eliminate discrimination. Having stated
the broad question of whether and how antidiscrimination rules work, legal
scholars ought now to specify and test their theories.
I have used empirical data, and theories about compliance with authority,
to identify a series of measures that the dental profession and the state should
deploy to reduce the level of discrimination against people with HIV. I have
not proven that the particular package of changes proposed will work or
determined the relative importance of the various proposals. Much needs to





be specified by professionals in dentistry and health education. Prior research
suggests that behavior change of this kind involves far too many variables and
contingencies to allow for confident prediction of the results of any serious
policy intervention. Nevertheless, there is value to the analysis. In a world of
imperfect information, it is ultimately no objection to a policy proposal that
it has not established a high likelihood of success. Indeed, there is no
immediately apparent proper definition of success. I doubt that dental
discrimination can be wiped out; I would regard an intervention as successful
if it seemed to reduce the level of discrimination over the next decade by, say,
half.
The advantage of the proposals offered here is that they are, by and
large, inexpensive and have collateral benefits. Changing ethical rules and
licensing regulations has some cost, but it is not likely to be very high.
Likewise, increased enforcement of the ADA and better publicity would not
be prohibitively expensive. Public education would require the outlay of cash,
but the burden could be divided among public and private funders and,
assuming dental discrimination is deemed an important issue for people with
HIV and the dental profession, it may be met through the use of funds already
earmarked for public education. Beyond cost, the approach I have outlined has
the virtues of patience and an underlying presumption that dentists are not bad
men and women when it comes to caring for patients with HIV. Regulation
that follows my advice will be used responsively, particularly, and doggedly.
I conclude that we should and may use state power to reduce
discrimination by dentists against people with HIV. Discrimination can
reasonably be seen as an evil, the hurtful exercise of arbitrary market power
by misguided individuals against an emotionally and physically vulnerable
group of people. It derogates from ideals of responsible risk assessment and
inclusion of the sick and disabled. It will not go away with a wave of the
invisible hand.
Leaving aside first principles, I have shown that relatively modest
changes in law and practice stand a reasonable chance of substantially reducing
discrimination. The current scholarly and political debate about the value of
antidiscrimination law has largely ignored the substantial body of theory and
data showing that government is powerful, and that citizens, in the end, are
responsive to this power. When the dust of the current debate settles, we are
still going to have a country exhibiting racial, gender, and other more or less
arbitrary divisions. Advocates of collective action to deal with these social
divisions should not be expected to defend the proposition that "government"
or law provide a complete solution. Nor, in defending the value of government
action, should we understate the practical problems and empirical lacunae that
activist policies entail. Indeed, we may find that beyond first principles,
considerable common ground can be found in the torturous, mundane
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unravelling of the problems themselves.
